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“Follow the Buddha 
but fear the Natts” 
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Disclaimer 
 
 
The use of both the toponyms “Burma” and “Myanmar” in the following work is not used to 
mean any ethnic, linguistic or political position by the author with respect to the country, its 
people and its actual  government. The two words are used as synonyms, representing the same 
geo-political entity, which used to be known, in English, as Burma and whose official name is 
since 1989 “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”.  
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
 
The thesis deals with the democratization process taking place in Burma/Myanmar with 
particular reference to the influence which India and China have been exercising on it; 
The aim of the work is to assess in which way and to what extent Beijing and Delhi have 
contributed to the progress or the delay of such a process, by impeding or backing the military 
government in power till date. 
Myanmar –connection among the Indian subcontinent, Indochina and East Asia– has always 
suffered of an “encirclement complex” due to its peculiar geographical location, which 
“sandwiches” it between the three historical Asian giants: India, Thailand and China. In modern 
times, especially India and China – today’s major emerging economies– have played a 
fundamental role in Burmese affairs; this happened also with regard to the recent political 
evolution of the country, which has been governed by a military junta since 1962. 
Thus, Myanmar became one of the main “battle-grounds” of the competition between the 
Chinese “Dragon” and the Indian “Elephant”. 
Being Burmese history and political scenario relatively unknown and extremely complex, a 
broad introduction in this regard seemed necessary and inevitable, in order to offer a more 
comprehensive framework for the analysis. Thus, Chapter I, after providing a general location of 
the country, exposes two Burmese peculiarities which are extremely relevant from a political 
point of view: the national ethnic variety and the strong Buddhist belief of Theravada tradition. 
Multiethnicity –root of a long civil war still far from being over– and Burmese Buddhism are 
two elements which have strongly influenced the political development of the country and that, 
as a consequence, have also played a role –directly or indirectly– in the Indo-Burmese and Sino-
Burmese relations. 
Chapter II focuses on the reconstruction of recent political history of Myanmar, starting from the 
period just before the independence to latest events. 
Chapter III opens the dissertation on the core topic, discussing the following question: how has 
China contributed to the recent political evolution of Myanmar? The communal authoritarian 
characterization of Myanmar and the People’s Republic of China government would suggest a 
simple answer: Chinese Communist regime gave support to Burmese military rule. Such an 
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intuition would not be wrong, but extremely superficial; in fact history and actual events show 
that the relation between the two states has been much more complex and that Beijing has faced 
numerous obstacles while attempting to expand its influence over Myanmar; because of this, 
moreover, such an influence has not been as effective as Beijing wished it to be. Therefore, new 
questions need to be inquired: to which extent Beijing supported the Tatmadaw (the Burmese 
Army) and for which reasons? What is the relation between the Tatmadaw and the Chinese 
regime and how did it influence the development of the correspondent foreign policies? Was 
Chinese influence on the democratization process decisive?  
The analysis suggests that the support China used to give to the Burmese generals is not to be 
taken for granted in the future, and that there is a certain possibility that Beijing may decide to 
revise its Burma policy in order to better pursue its goals in the country. 
Chapter IV deals with the same primary queries raised in Chapter III, but with regard to India. 
Also in this instance, the diverse ideological background characterizing the two states could 
suggest an immediate impression; India and Myanmar adopted forms of government which 
deeply differ from each other and this could easily bring to conclude that Delhi has plausibly 
attempted to impede the perpetuation of the military rule and to support a democratic 
development for Burma. 
Anyways, in this case also, such an intuition reveals to be correct but incomplete: though India, 
different from China, have explicitly condemned the Burmese junta and backed the democratic 
front in first stance, however in the 1990s it has drastically changed the orientation of its Burma 
policy; Delhi has consequently sought a collaboration with the same undemocratic government it 
had contributed to ostracize earlier.  
A deeper analysis of Indian position –with reference both to the democratic phase and to the 
actual one– demonstrates its overall inefficiency. In addition to this, India’s support to Burmese 
democratization, when framed within the wider pro-democracy activity practiced by Delhi in the 
region, shows that Indian approach to democracy promotion is extremely “realist”, i.e. not 
inspired by a sincere interest in the advancement of democracy per se, but by precise strategic 
interests that, if not fulfilled , can easily change its stance. 
The Conclusions will formulate an overall evaluation about Chinese and Indian influence on 
Burmese democratization process; based on that, a forecast will be drawn, assessing how the 
eventual success/failure of such a process could affect the regional geopolitical balance, and vice 
versa. 
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Chapter I 
“The golden land” 
 
 
I.1. Locating the country 
 
Myanmar, having been shut away for more than a quarter of a century, is a country little known 
to the rest of the world, despite its important past and its rich cultural heritage, whose most 
popular icon is a host of golden stupa which in the far 13th century led Marco Polo to dub it as 
“the golden land” . 
The county is located in the macro-area known as Southeast Asia and it extends from the 
Andaman Sea in the South to the Eastern Himalayan mountain range, and it is bounded by India 
in the Northwest, Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal in the West, the Andaman Sea in the South, 
China in the North and Northeast, and Laos and Thailand in the East. 
Apart from a 1,930 km coastline long, Myanmar is surrounded by a horseshoe-shaped ring of 
mountains that form a natural border of 5,876 km with its neighbours. This same ring roughly 
divides the majority ethnic group, the Burmans/Bama, who mainly live in the central valleys, 
from the greatest number of the other minorities who primarily inhabit the highlands, being 
known because of this as “hill people”. 
Being that Burmese civilizations is historically based on wet-rice cultivation, its hydrography is 
particularly relevant: the main rivers are the Irrawaddy/Ayeyarwady, Chindwin, Thanlwin, and 
Sittaung.  
The country covers 676,578 square km and consists of the seven states of Rakhine, Chin, 
Kachin, Kayin (or Karen), Kayah, Shan, and Mon. Myanmar can be roughly divided into four 
regions: the northern and western mountainous regions, the Eastern Shan plateau, the central 
belt, and the long southern “tail”. The region North of Mandalay is commonly called Upper 
Myanmar, while Yangon and the Irrawaddy delta are known as Lower Myanmar. 
The Irrawaddy delta in the South, where the river divides into eight main branches before 
flowing into the Andaman Sea, is known as Myanmar’s “rice bowl” since the 60-70% of rice 
production comes from this area, which is also famous for its fishing industry. 
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Image 1. “Map of Myanmar” (source: www.nationsonline.org) 
 
 
 
The delta region is densely populated, but in May 2008 it was destroyed by Cyclone Nargis, 
which killed more than 84,500 people, with 53,800 missing, and rendered about 2.4 million 
homeless, mostly in the Southwest delta region1.  
                                                 
1
 S. Myat Yin, J. Elias, Cultures of the world. Myanmar, New York, Marshall Cavendish Benchmark, 2012, p. 13. 
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Many toponyms were Anglicized by the British when they occupied the country in the 19th 
century, but the present government, as aforesaid, has restored through a controversial law the 
supposed Myanmarese names of most of the towns and cities. The most famous city of the 
country is undoubtedly Yangon, previously Rangoon, symbolized by the superb Shwedagon 
Pagoda. Founded in 1755 by King Alaungpaya it was made the capital city of Burma under the 
British rule in 1886 and remained such, even after the independence until 2007, when 
Naypyidaw (lit. “Abode of Kings”) was officially proclaimed the new capital of the country. 
Some saw in this inexplicable decision one of the acts through which the military government 
expresses its intention of gaining consensus and legitimisation by emulating the ancient Burmese 
kings2. The process started in 2005 with the mass relocation of government ministries from 
Rangoon to 240 km North, to a site yet to be developed; before the place was officially renamed 
with its new royal name, Naypyidaw. The television broadcast pictures of troops parading and 
three big statues of the ancient kings Anawrahta, Bayintnaung and Alaugphaya. Therefore, the 
building of this new city, which still is under construction, seems to be Than Shwe government’s 
attempt to honour the tradition and claim of royal legacy3. 
Other main cities are Mandalay, Myanmar’s second-largest city and main cultural centre lying on 
the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy river, Mawlamyine and Pathein/Bassein. 
Myanmar is a country which is rich in natural resources and used to be one of the most 
developed in Asia; though, because of authoritarian government controls and unsuccessful 
economic policies it nowadays still lives a situation of rural poverty and political instability. 
Myanmar is a place of fascinating complexity from any point of view: its weather and nature 
extend from the tropical to the Himalayan one, its history is the succession of different 
civilizations and its culture is a very unique mix of Buddhist ethics enriched with elements of 
Hinduism, with other faiths also existing in the country. 
Though it is not possible to indulge in a wider description of Burmese geography, society and 
culture, since this is not germane to the intent of this work, there are two main aspects which 
cannot be neglected to properly introduce our politics-centred analysis: ethnicity and religion. 
The complex ethnic composition of the Myanmar people and the importance of religion –
Theravada Buddhism for the greatest majority of the citizenship- as a connotative element of 
their life has historically influenced the politics of the country and so do still today. 
                                                 
2
 S. McCarthy, The Politics of Piety: Pageantry and the Struggle for Buddhism in Burma, in “Working Paper 
Series” (Southeast Asia Research Centre, City University of Hong Kong), 2007, No.85, p. 25. 
3
 Ibidem. 
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I.2. Ethnicity 
 
I.2.1. Definition of ethnicity in Myanmar 
 
Burmese ethnic scene is extremely heterogeneous and the country is well known for its racial 
and linguistic variety. This is an obvious feature for a crossroad territory which served for 
centuries as a buffer state between different civilizations, in particular the three giants of South, 
Southeast and East Asia: India, China and Thailand. It is not easy to get a precise estimation of 
the population of the different groups anyways: lots of data proceed from governmental sources 
which are not impartial and nowadays there is no allowance for international organizations -
especially those working in the field of protection of minorities and human rights- to enter the 
country and make new field-based reports. Moreover, apart from this political-logistic 
inconvenience, a proper estimation is made hard by the ambiguity that the concept of ethnicity 
acquires in Burma. What is an ethnicity and according to which criteria should it be identified 
and quantified? 
Just like in China, this is the situation of a multi-ethnic country with a strong majority -the 
Burmans/Bama(r)- who benefits of a greater control over the state and its politics and tried over 
time to deal with the minority problem with specific policies, whose ability of guaranteeing 
minorities turned out doubtful in the end. 
In the list of the 135 ethnicities officially recognized by the government as such, in fact, some 
groups had no place, firstly. Secondly, among all these groups some are far more consistent then 
others, but the reason of the identification is not clear. Usually the main ethnicities, apart from 
the Bama, are considered to be the Kachin, the Karenni/Kayah, the Kayin/Karen, the Chin, the 
Mon, the Rakhine and the Shan. This estimation is however based on the names of those who 
were able to negotiate with the Bama-ruled government separate states/territorial boundaries4. 
After the independence from the British, who first unified the actual Burmese territory by 
merging it to India, these groups –who until that moment, except for the colonial rule, were 
never subdued to a central power from Rangoon– were persuaded under some guarantees to join 
the new state. In these way ethnic territorial entities, like the Shan State or the Karen territories, 
were born. Identifying the major groups by considering the “ethnic states” inside Myanmar is not 
correct under some points of views, since none of them is ethnically homogeneous5. 
                                                 
4 C. Ekeh, M. Smith, Minorities in Burma, London, Minority Rights Group International, 2007, URL: 
http://www.minorityrights.org/3546/briefing-papers/minorities-in-burma.html. 
5
 Ibidem. 
9 
 
The estimation of the same majority Burman population is also controversial: they are 
considered to be around 30 millions, i.e. two third of the total but this measures are based on the 
primary usage of  
Burmese language, though not all the speakers have the same racial belonging6. Social mobility 
and intermarriages contributed to make the racial puzzle more complex7. 
Another criterion which has been used to categorize ethnic Burma is a socio-economic hierarchy 
based on the progress reached by each people in terms of productive activity, social structure and 
religion. Fistié, writing in 1985, made a difference in this sense between two main groups8: the 
first one, including the Burman majority, the Mons and the Shan, was characterized by the rice 
cultivation as their main economic activity, some advanced forms of state organization and the 
belief in Buddhism. 
The second group included all the other “hill people”–except the Chinese and the Indians who, 
as recent immigrants, were considered to have features apart– practicing a subsistence economy 
(based on hunting/ gathering/ fishing/ opium cultivation or even trafficking in people) and/or 
tribalism as societal rule and/or less “developed” worships like animism. 
Another alternative, quoted and used by the same Fistié and mainstream among ethnologues, is 
to classify the groups according to their language, qualifying them as linguistic-families: Sino-
Tibetan, Hmong/Mien, Thai/Kadai, Austronesian, Austroasiatic, and Indoeuropean. According to 
other classification the linguistic groups of Burma are: Sinic, Tibeto-Buran, Malayo-Polinesian, 
Miao-Yao, Mon-Khmer, Tai9. 
Explaining and quantifying “ethnicity” in Myanmar is therefore particularly hard. 
Not only in terms of content but also in its denomination. Also the usage of ethnicity-related 
words is controversial: words who can be politically sensitive seem to imply a specific political 
recognition to the user10; on the other hand there are particular names like “tribe” which sound 
incredibly offensive to those like Kachin and Karen who have nationality aspirations11, or others, 
like “nationalities” itself, which hurt those like the Chinese and the Indian, who feel excluded by 
                                                 
6 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), Ethnic Groups in Burma. Development, Democracy and Human 
Rights, in “ASI's Human Rights Series”, 1994, No. 8, London, Anti Slavery International, p. 35.  
7
 Ibidem. 
8
 P. Fistié, La Birmanie ou la quê de l’unité. Le problème dela cohésion nationale dans la Birmanie contemporaine 
et sa perspective historique, Paris, École Française d’Etrême-Orient, 1985, p. 1. 
9
 D. I. Steinberg, Burma. The State of Myanmar, Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2001, pp. 192-193 
(Appendix A – Linguistic Groups of Burma/Myanmar). 
10
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 36. 
11
 Ibidem. 
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their being not-autochthon newcomers and who are usually not even included in the number of 
the non-Burman ethnicities12. 
I.2.2. Main minority ethnicities 
 
Kachin 
The Kachin are between 1 and 1.5 million people, mainly settled in the Kachin State, in the 
Northeast of the country, but present also elsewhere, in particular inside the Shan State, where 
they mixed with the Shan and the Burmans13. 
The notion of Kachin is particularly controversial an can acquire two different meanings. On one 
hand according to an ethno-linguistic and cultural concept, they are people belonging to the 
Kachin and Jinghpaw/Singpo/Jingphosu group who live basically inside the actual Kachin state 
and are divided in a number of sub-groups according to their dialect: proper Jinghpaw, Gauri, 
Tsasen, Duleng, Hkaku, Htingai. On the other hand, ethnologists often prefer a more general 
cultural definition according to which Kachins are all the non-Buddhist population practicing 
slash and burn farming and living in the so called “region of the Kachin Hills”, including the 
Kachin state and part of the Northern Shan states14. Though they initially resisted to the British 
conquest, following the arrival of missionaries many converted to Christianity and together with 
Karen and Chin constituted the mainstay of the British Burma army15. Obviously their religious 
identity caused problems when in 1961 U Nu tried to impose Buddhism as Burma's official state 
religion16 and, being more than two thirds of them Christian, many denounce the violence 
perpetrated by the government against them because of their belief still today.  
The Kachin nationalist movement created a strong political identity among the various above 
mentioned sub-groups, linked among each other by a dynamic clan system. In contrast, Kachin 
subgroups living in India and China have never associated with the goal of independence 
pursued by the nationalist movement in Burma17. 
Participating actively to the anti-Japanese resistance during the Second World War, the 
nationalist cause grew during the war years and the Kachin State (89,042 km2) was created 
under the 1947 constitution. After U Nu’s decree establishing Buddhism as Burma’s official 
state religion, in 1961 the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was formed to demand the 
                                                 
12
 Ibidem. 
13
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 12. 
14
 Ibidem. 
15
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
16
 S. Gil, The Role of Monkhood in Contemporary Myanmar Society, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Publications, 2008, p. 
7. 
17
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 38. 
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secession of the Kachin State. After Ne Win’s coup the rebellion spread out more and KIO 
became a strong rebel army.  
Following the SLORC takeover the KIO became a founding member of the Democratic Alliance 
of Burma. In 1989, when the SLORC agreed cease-fires with ethnic armies from the CPB in 
Northeast Burma, including the New Democratic Army (NDA) in the East of Kachin State. 
These moves were followed by the SLORC’s growing rapprochement with China, which had 
previously been quietly sympathetic to the KIO cause. With thousands of troops  following the 
cease-fires, the SLORC was able to launch a series of massive military operations against the 
KIO in both the Shan and Kachin States, probably considering the KIO as Burma’s best 
organised insurgent group to be neutralized. Violence perpetrated by the government forces 
included forced relocation, forced evacuation of villages and expropriations, construction of new 
Buddhist monuments and apparent encouragement of immigration –a demographic 
counterattack- in traditional Kachin territories by other ethnicities, especially the Chinese. 
The Kachin, though possessing a soil rich in gold and jade, got poorer and poorer. The SLORC 
having planned a number of projects in the area, some assisted by China, they fear this will bring 
exploitation and not benefit to the people and feel squeezed by the three big powers at the border. 
In 1994, looking for a peaceful solution, talks were opened with Rangoon.  
Chin 
The Chin are a Burmese hill-people of Tibeto-Burmese language who inhabit the mountain chain 
linking western Burma with the Northeastern Indian state of Mizoram, where they are known 
with the name of Mizo. They have strong links with another Indo-Burmese minority which in 
Burma is named with the name of Kathe/ Meithei/ Ponna or Manipuri, the great majority of them 
being native of the Indian state of Manipur18. Of these Manipuri those who live nowadays inside 
the Burmese borders seem to be descendents of war prisoners made by the Burmans following 
their incursions in Manipur in 1758, 1764 and 1819, and are still nowadays well known as 
weaver and astrologists19. Contrary to these Burmese Manipuri, the Burmese Chins, also due to 
the low quality of their lands, have one of the worst economic development index among the hill 
peoples, lacking of proper transportation and communications20. They practice the itinerant corn 
cultivation in the North and rice cultivation in the South, hunt, fishing and some gathering, but 
                                                 
18
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 16. 
19
 Ibidem. 
20
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 36. 
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are dependent for food and supplies on the interaction with their neighbours from the lower 
lands21. 
Although nationalist leaders have claimed a “pan-Chin” or “Zo” identity embracing their Mizo 
cousins in India, Chin political movements have frequently reflected a more local, regional or 
even sub-group loyalty. 
 
Image 2. “Major ethnic groups of Burma”  
(source: M. Smith, Burma: insurgency and the policy of ethnicity, London, Zed Books, 1991) 
 
 
Following the arrival of the British, many Chins abandoned their traditional animism and 
converted to Christianity and some also joined the army. Under colonialism they were divided 
                                                 
21
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 16. 
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between Northeast India, the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma; at the moment of 
independence they were at first denied a state of their own; instead they were granted a 
mountainous “Special Division”. The 1974 constitution finally upgraded the Chin Special 
Division into a 36,017 km2 state, but remained underdeveloped. SLORC's Border Areas 
Development Programme (BADP) is seen by nationalists an the attempt of altering the ethnic 
balance of the population through forcible relocation of Chin villagers to new areas. As a 
traditional escape from poverty, many young Chin men have joined the Tatmadaw, the central 
government Army. Consequently, the Chin have often been cited as a successful example of co-
operative development with their Burman cousins. But although the Chin have not featured in 
the insurrections to the same degree as other ethnic groups, dissatisfaction has often surfaced22. 
As in late 80ies the nationalist Chin party got some success, in early Nineties its Pm had to seek 
exile in India, all Chin political parties were declared illegal or deregistered by the government, 
and around one thousand students and activist fled to India over years23. 
Mon 
It is uncertain the number of Mons living nowadays in Burma, shifting the estimation between 1 
and 4 millions24. They are the descendants of one of the most ancient civilizations of Southeast 
Asia, having probably descended from China to today Thailand in the IV century B.C. giving 
birth to the civilization which was origin of the neighbouring Khmer, Tibeto-Burman and Thai 
people25. They maintained a constant contact with India, existing a trace of this link in the name 
Telangas with which they were known in the XIX century26. Belonging to the Mon-Khmer group 
of the Austroasiatic languages, they have always practiced the rice cultivation as their main 
economic activity and the Theravada Buddhism as faith27. 
Today the greatest majority of Mon speakers live in the Mon State, which was established in 
1974, between the Thai boarder and then Andaman coast. Though the Mons during the Second 
World War supported Aung San and the mainstream nationalist movement in general, they did 
not get the delineation of a Mon territory. Later on many Mon communities followed the Karen 
insurrection of 1949 and under a 1958 cease-fire agreement, the creation of a Mon State was 
decided by the U Nu government, but implemented not before than 197428. Between the end of 
the Eighties and the beginning of the Nineties the SLORC’s Tatmadaw and the Thai army started 
                                                 
22
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 37. 
23
 Ivi, p. 38. 
24
 C. Ekeh, M. Smith, op. cit., p. 4. 
25
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 2. 
26
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 3. 
27
 Ibidem; C. Ekeh, M. Smith, op. cit., p. 4. 
28
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 50. 
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working in conjunction against the Mon rebels. In 1994 the NMSP (New Mon State Party) under 
continuing pressure of the Thai authorities who threatened to repatriate the Mon refugees 
compromised with the SLORC and in 1995 had a ceasefire with the military government. But in 
areas where ceasefire agreements have not held, the Burmese army has continued to conduct 
occasional raids, causing severe human rights violation and the continuous displacement and 
migration of Mon villagers to Thailand. Mon language and culture moreover, which in ancient 
times introduced in Burma both writing and Buddhism, are under threat though the engagement 
of monks and intellectuals in preserving them. 
According to what Fistié defines an ethnic linkage, to this highly civilized people two other 
groups of hill-people belonging to the same mon-khmer compound shall be connected; they are 
the Palaungs and the Was, which can be found in the Northwest and the Northeast of the Shan 
State29. 
Karen 
The Karen belong to the same ethno-linguistic Sino-Tibetan group of the Burmans. They are 
descendents of a hill people practicing taungyia (slash-and-burn farming)30 so that previously to 
the colonial era their economical and societal organization was still pretty primitive. Having part 
of them settled in the valley among the Mons and later the Burmans, the converted to the wet-
rice cultivation. They were not assimilated to the Burmans, differently from the Mons, because 
considered less developed than these; this made possible that at the end of the colonial era the 
Karens constituted the main ethnic minority of Burma31. The maintenance of national features is 
due also to the development of a strong nationalism which was boosted by the British rule itself, 
since, though there was some resistance in the hill, the great majority of the Karens considered 
the British as the liberators from the oppression of the Burman kings32. This sympathy with the 
British –great part of the Karens joined the British Burma Army and converted to Christianity– 
caused a polarization between Karens and Burmans which still exists today33. Despite this 
supposed favouritism of the British towards the Karens, the Karen Nationalist Movement 
(KNM), which was founded at the end of the 19th century by Karens educated in Europe, was 
disadvantaged by the partition of colonial Burma, which scattered the Karens party in the 
Ministerial Burma and party in the Frontier Areas. This problem still exists in contemporary 
Myanamr since the Karen State, formerly part of the Frontier Areas, includes only the 25% of 
                                                 
29
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 3. 
30
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 42. 
31
 P. Fistié, op. cit., p. 3. 
32
 M. Smith, A. Allsebrook (in collaboration with), op. cit., p. 42. 
33
 Ivi, pp. 42-43. 
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the Karen population, causing division and underrepresentation and therefore boosting the claim 
for a fairer political demarcation34. In 1947 the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed and 
Karen leaders decided to boycott the Panglong Conference and election to the National 
Constituent Assembly35 so that the issue remained undecided until after independence. As the 
British left Burma in 1948, one year later the KNU engaged in a war against Burmese central 
government for an independent or autonomous state covering much of southern Burma. In 1976 
the KNU has started claiming for a federal system rather than a fully independent Karen state. 
An estimation of the Karen population is not simple since under the label of “Karen” diverse 
groups coexist, and it depends on whether they are counted as a whole or, as the SLORC prefers, 
as different groups, so that it shift in a range from 2.5 to 7 millions36. Generally speaking the 
great majority of the Karens, also said proper Karens (around the 70%) belong to two groups, the 
Sgawa and the Pwo, respectively known to the Burmans as Bama Kayin (Burman Karen) and 
Talaing Kayin (Mon Karen). To the Karen family are also often associate the Pao or Thaungtu, a 
sub-group f Karens living in the Southwest of the Shan States, and the Karenni or Red Karens, 
also known as Kayah, which can be considered as a group aside37. 
Naga 
The Nagas belong to the Sino-tibetan family and mainly inhabit the Patkai Range in North 
Burma; the great majority of the Naga people, possibly over one million, live across the Indian 
border in the Nagaland state, one of the Northeastern federate of the Indian Republic. The 
Christian-led Nagaland movement has spread across the border and for many years the two main 
Naga resistance factions kept military bases in Burma. Naga forces have faced raids by both the 
Indian and the Burmese government troops into their territory and continuous warfare has kept 
the Naga Hills underdeveloped and devastated. Although fighting has spanned the frontier, for 
many years there was no military co-operation between Burmese and Indian government forces 
but in March 1993 there was collaborative shift in the Naga-policy by both the states, with great 
fear of the Nagas. Naga activism has faced an increasing division specially following the 
announcement in mid-1993 of separate talks between one armed Naga faction and the SLORC. 
Its leader, Khaplang, reportedly wanted to break away from the nationalist movement in India, 
led by T. Muivah, where the heaviest fighting was then taking place. As a result of these constant 
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upheavals, the Naga have not  yet achieved a clear national identity in the modern political 
world.38 
Rakhane and Rohingya 
The Rakhane and the Rohingya are two different ethnic groups of Myanmar, strictly linked to 
each other because living together in the same ethnic state. The Rakhine State, previously known 
as Arakan, is located on the western coast of Burma, neighbouring with the Bay of Bengal to the 
West and the Chittagong division of Bangladesh to the Northwest. Beside being another ethnic 
state, with the Rakhane representing the majority of the population, it is peculiarly characterized 
by geographical isolation, the presence of the biggest Muslim minority in the country, the 
Rohingya indeed, who are descendent of Muslims of Bengali origin, and a high percentage of 
Indians among the population, effect of a more recent immigration. The history of the area is 
very complex. Arakan has a long past of independence constituting until the end of the XVIII an 
independent Buddhist realm; the Rakhane inf act, whose language is a peculiar Burman dialect 
which distinguish them from the majority Bama though belonging to the same ethnic family, are 
still today mainly Theravada Buddhist. Their history has been characterized by a strong Muslim 
influence which has started with the Sultanate of Bengal first and developed with the Mogul 
realm later, due to political vicissitudes and dynastic upheavals. In the XV century the Arakanese 
king succeeded in conquering back the region, fell under the control of the Burmans, thanks to 
the help of the Sultan of Bengal, opening the doors to the affluence of Muslims proceeding from 
the region inside his reign as a consequence. The Islamic influence developed given the positive 
effect brought to the region by this linkage: the commercial relations with Bengal and Malacca 
made Arakan a very prosperous state which since 1459 could take over the Indian harbour of 
Chittagong39. Later on, at the end of the XVII century, in a period of political instability the 
political history of the realm was strongly influenced by the Muslim warriors who had 
previously arrived to Arakan with the son of the Mogul emperor seeking asylum at the court of 
the Rakhanese king. This Muslim soldier are considered to be the forefathers of the Rohingya; 
known as Kaman or Kamanchis (“archer” or “Persian”), in 1710 they were exiled in the region 
of Ramree where their descendants have assimilated to the Arakanese population keeping their 
Muslim faith40; the Rohingya language, indeed, is a Bengali dialect interspersed with words 
borrowed from Persian, Urdu and Arakanese41, and the actual name of the Muslim minority is 
considered to be the deformation of Rwahaung-ga-kya which means tigers of the ancient village 
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or braves. After political instability, Arakan was conquered by Burma in 1785, a domination 
which lasted 40 years. Cruelty by the Burmese troops caused unrest which exploded in the 1794 
Arakanese revolt, easily repressed, which brought the survivors to flee to Bengal under the 
British control. After a new revolt in 1799, in 1811 the Rakhane leader Chin Byian invaded the 
Arakan from Bengal, passing through the British territory, and proclaimed himself king, giving 
origin to a conflict between the British East India Company and Burma, which would have led in 
1824 to the first Anglo-Burmese war and finally to the annexation of Arakan by the United 
Kingdom in 182642 as part of British India. Later Arakan became part of the province of Burma 
within the British Indian Empire and finally part of British Burma when it was constituted as a 
separate colony, no longer merged to India43. 
Another feature which makes the region special is the great presence of Indians, mainly of 
Muslim faith, who, differently from the Rohingya who also have an Indian ascendant, arrived in 
the region recently, during the British rule, following migrations which took place in the 
proceeding from the region of Madras and from what at that time still was Eastern Pakistan, and 
increased after 1948, also illegally, from Bangladesh44. Differently from the Indian settled in 
other parts of Burma, the Rakhanese Indians represent a stable minority.  
The problems of the region are due to the interaction of the exposed peculiarities, which created 
a controversial situation in which the Rakhane are in conflict with the Muslims –i.e. both original 
Rohingyas and recent immigrants– and moreover both of the groups –Buddhist ethnic Rakhane 
and Islamic citizens- collide with the Burman-ruled central government. 
Though in the 1930s Arakan was immune to the violence exploded in Lower Burma, which took 
several hundreds of casualties among the Indian community as well, in 1962 the forced 
expulsion of Indians acted by Aung San’s nationalists caused many Arakanese to stand on the 
British side and, as a consequence, grudge and detachment in the Rakhine nationalist 
movement45.  
Many Rakhane consider to have suffered invasion first by the Burmans in 1784, then by the 
British in the 1820s and finally by the Bengalis. For most of them there is no difference among 
the Muslim Rakhanese population between proper Rohingya and later immigrants, as they 
consider “Rohingya” as a term coined in the Fifties to describe Bengali settlers who had been 
brought in from the British Raj and all those who followed as illegal immigrants, who in their 
eyes are invasive land-grabbers. This, they consider, added to the threat of Burmanization –
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which always existed for each autochthonous ethnic minority in Myanmar– the one of 
Islamization, due to the high birth rate of the Muslims, which the central government tried to 
control limiting Muslims to two children46. The Burmese government seems to promote the same 
view according to which the Rohingya problem is not the problem of a ethnic minority issue but 
the one of unregistered illegal immigrants. According to the 1982 Citizenship Act Rohingyas are 
not recognized as an ethnic group, though those in Burma for three generations could become 
citizens. This situation of stateless gave the government a justification to persecute them with 
massive attacks by the Tatmadaw in the Seventies which produced great violation of human 
rights including deportation to camps, causing a mass movement of the Rohingya towards 
Bangladesh, where still today they live in refugees camps. Despite the pressure put by the 
Bengali government and other international actors, including the UN and China, to repatriate the 
refugee, Myanmar refuses to accept back those who do not meet the criteria of the 1982 
Citizenship Law. Still today the violence against Muslims in Rakhine state continues and 
according to many observers the state government is practising ethnic cleansing. The Rohingya 
in vain maintain that they are original dwellers of Arakan. Moreover, Muslim armed rebels are 
nowadays organized in two Mujahid groups, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and Arakan 
Rohingya Islamic Front, whose activity is nevertheless not very effective47. 
Somehow paradoxically, Rakhane and Muslims actually share the common independent claims 
and opposition to the central government. Both Arakanese procommunist and Muslim rebel 
groups took up arms even before the British had left Burma and, not appeased by the constitution 
of the Rakhine State in 1974 under the BSPP’s constitution, different Rakhine, Muslim and 
communist movements prosecuted in their militancy48. 
The reciprocal contrast existing in the Rakhine State among Rakhane, Roinghya/Muslims and 
Rangoon, in conclusion, hides not only ethnic discrimination, implemented by the Burmese 
government in incredibly cruel ways, but also economical dynamics and problems of cultural 
clash and assimilation. This situation of continuous instability made the former prosperous 
Arakan one of the poorest state of Myanmar. 
Shan 
The Shan people are one of Myanmar’s most numerous minorities and are not related to any 
other ethnic family since constitute one of the branches of the Thai group together with the Thais 
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and Laotians. The name Shan indeed has been given to them by the Burmans while they call 
themselves as Dtai or Tai/Dai49. They have settled down in the East and in the North of actual 
Burma before the first half of the 11th century. Even though they have been influenced by the 
Burmans adopting from them the Theravada Buddhism, they have safeguarded till the modern 
era their peculiarities, not only linguistically but also in terms of socio-political system. Their 
organization was characterized by a strong fragmentation and total lack of a centralized state 
since every basin valley constituting a paddy also represented a mong apart, ruled by an 
hereditary chief called saohpas, sawbwa in Burman50. The Shan society was strongly 
hierarchical, with the highest administrative functions monopolized by the nobility of the 
soahpas court. This reality continued even during the XX century, helped by the British who at 
the beginning of the century founded schools for the sons of the Shan leaders, reservoir of the 
great part of the administrative cadres of the post independence Shan State. The Shans moreover 
practiced especially the wet rice cultivation, as their aptitude in trading was frustrated by the 
advent of the Chinese merchants who followed the arrival of the British. For all these reasons, 
the Shan society with its somewhat “feudal” characteristics resisted until the middle of the XX 
century51.  
In the Shan States, the Shan themselves lived only in the valleys where they could practice the 
wet rice cultivation, being the rest of the territory occupied by a variety of hill people; this 
include the Danu, the Intha and the Taungyo (the three belonging to the Burman family), the 
Palaung, the Was and the Lau/Lisaw (the three from the mon-khmer family), the “long-necked” 
Karens, the Kachin, the Panthay Chinese (also known, like in China as “Hui” or “Hui zu” or with 
the name of their ancestors, “Hui Hui”), and the Kokang Chinese, settled in Kokang, the 
Northeastern area  of the Shan States, centre of the opium cultivation and boarder trade52. The 
Indians living in the Shan States were a lot less than the Chinese, and actually they were mainly 
Gurkhas originally from Nepal who, after having served in the British army, remained in the 
country53. 
The Shan states have never been united until the arrival of the British, but after the fall of the 
Burman Pagan dynasty in 1287 the Shan expanded in the most of Upper Burma and established 
subdued the other ethnic groups to their power, being rival to the Burmans for the control of the 
entire area until 1604, when they stopped resisting and accepted the indirect rule by the Bamas. 
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In matter of fact, anyways, the Shan states remained independent even under the Burmans thanks 
to the aforesaid saohpas system, which resisted both to the Bama’s and to the Chinese’s 
pressure. 
Their political status however underwent drastic changes Great change in the political 
configuration of the states occurred in the 19th century as a consequence of the competition of 
French and British colonialism in Southeast Asia. In front of the ongoing French expansion 
which had already incorporated Laos on the East, the British decided to encompass in their 
sphere also the wild Shan States on the North, in order to avoid the formation of an 
uncontrollable buffer state and to control the trans-Burma trade roads driving to the Qing 
Empire, which crossed the Shan states indeed54.  
Under the British rule the about thirty Shan States acquired the status of protectorates, whose 
conditions were in matter of facts analogous to those of the Indian princely states, and the 
saohpas got their command recognized and warranted. In this way the Shan maintained their 
traditional independence, enjoining an exceptional status when compared to that of Lower 
Burma, which was under any point of view a directly administrated colony55. 
In 1922 with the creation of the Federated Shan States all the principalities came to share for the 
first time a common governing body, the Federated Shan States’ Council. 
Being the colonialist plan that of developing the Burmese lowlands into a rice-exporter granary 
for India, the British were not really able to exploit the resources of the land and, as a 
consequence, the colonial era was for the Shan States a time of peace and stability but also of 
economic and political stasis56. 
After independence from the British, the federated Shan States merged into one state, the Shan 
State, and incorporated into the new Union of Burma. Along with the 1947 constitution it 
obtained the right to secession after a ten-years trial period and the sawbwas were allowed to 
keep many of their traditional feudal rights also in the democratic Burma. During the fifties the 
relations with the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) deteriorated and as 
Guomindang troops were continuously invading the Shan State from China, the U Nu 
government sent the Tatmadaw to the state for the first time. In 1958-59 Ne Win persuaded the 
Shan swabwas to give up their traditional rights but resistance grew giving birth to a cultural 
revival movement, to block which Ne Win did his coup in 1962. As in 1968 Mao Zedong 
ordered military backing to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) as a consequence of the break 
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with Rangoon consequent to the anti-Chinese riots of one year before, the People’s Liberation 
Army seized control of the region East of the Salween river. 
Meanwhile, throughout 1970s and 1980s Shan, Palaung, Kachin, Pao, Kayan, Wa and Lahu 
ethnic forces established their own “liberated zones”. To resist against the central government all 
the ethnicities paid a high price in terms of deaths and economical loss. Nowadays the almost 
unique revenue for the people refugee in the mountain is opium. As the CPB collapsed a 
ceasefire was signed with Rangoon and the ethnic chiefs were entitled to keep their arms and 
police their territories; consequently the opium and heroine production expanded. 
The configuration of the Shan State politics is very uncertain: no definitive political deal has 
been made and the SLORC seems to practice the old divide et impera strategy making different 
promises to the different ethnicities. Despite the ceasefires armed clashes occurred again in rural 
areas, sometimes between opposition groups but also with the SLORC, who, according to some 
critics, is increasing the military control over the zone and assimilating the minorities57. 
Karenni 
The Karenni, which mean “red Karens”, are a Karen-related group, mainly living in the Kayah 
(formerly Karenni) State, born consequently to the establishment by the chiefs of the Kayah (i.e. 
the main ethnic sub-group within the Karenni) of a princely state58. Considered one of the less 
technologically and culturally advanced people in Burma, they have remained animist, practicing 
the cult of the Natts59, or converted to Christianity following the British missions, but have been 
influenced by the Shan, living partly in the South of the actual Shan State, under their same 
political organisations, since they adopted the saohpas/sawbwas system. The Karenni states were 
recognized as independent and separated by the rest of Burma with an agreement signed in 1875 
by the representatives of the British Crown and the King of Burma, but, though officially outside 
British Burma, in matter of facts the Karenni states enjoyed the same status of the Shan States, 
similar to those of the princely states in British India60. Under the 1947 they got the right to 
secession after a ten-year trial period. In 1948 the Karenni leader U Bee Htu Re was killed and 
the uprising which consequently broke out is persisting still today. In 1952 the name of the 
Karenni State was “politically” changed by the central government into “Kayah State” to 
promote division among the Karens, and the legal right to secession disappeared with the 1974 
constitution. Since then on the state has been steadily militarized, and together with troops 
growing numbers of Burman migrants have been brought there, while the Karenni has been 
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forcibly relocated61. Nowadays the Kayah State is one of the smallest and poorest within the 
Union of Myanmar. Despite the ceasefires signed during the Nineties with the armed Karenni 
rebels and the pressure for pacification from neighbouring Thailand, the incursion of the 
Burmese Army continued, causing a situation of humanitarian emergence62.  
Indians and Chinese 
Inside the complex picture of the diverse ethnicities of Myanmar the Indians and the Chinese are 
exceptional groups because, though they are important minorities, because of their being non-
autochthonous and recently settled in Burma they are denied the status of nationalities and are 
bypassed in dealing with the issue of minorities. The presence of both on the Burmese affairs 
dates long back given the close relation of the country with the two big neighbours: Burma had 
always been one of the main crossroads linking India, Indo-China and China and, as travelling 
by land was safer, it inevitably became a compulsory gateway63 for the trading routes which 
linked the three macro-regions. 
Indian influence originated during the Mon empires64, introducing Buddhism and an alphabet 
based on the pali65. The presence of Indians continued through the rise and fall of the various 
kingdoms, being stronger in the Northwest of the country, even giving birth in Arakan, 
nowadays the Rakhine State, to the exceptional story of the Rohingya Muslim of Bengali 
descent. The number of Indian on Burmese soil multiplied steadily during the British era, since 
they were brought inside the country, which until 1935 was part of British India, to work in the 
different fields of the colonial establishment: infrastructures, services, administration, army and 
also agriculture. Relying in the comparative advantage given by the fact that many of the British 
companies active in Rangoon had already developed in India, Indians were more familiar with 
commerce and modern finance than the Burmans, and easily dominated trade and commerce in 
all the main urban centres66. Indian immigrants proceeded from different parts of the 
subcontinent –Chittagong, Ooriya, Bihar, Orissa, Madras, United Provinces of Northern India- 
and often the economical specialization happened along national lines, which each of these 
subgroups monopolizing a different economic activity67. Anyways the most famous and most 
detested by the Burmans of the profession exercised by the South Asian immigrants was that of 
the money-lenders, also know as Chettyars or Chettiars. The Chettyars were a money-lending 
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caste indigenous of Chettinad in the Madras Presidency and operated through widely caste 
family networks channelling capital between India and Burma, which was their main area of 
interest. Though they were not the only money-lenders active in Burma, they were the most 
numerous. From 1890 on rural lands were progressively alienated to moneylenders, phenomenon 
which reached a peak in 1930 consequently to the international rice market crisis68. Though in 
the alienation of the field they were involved not alone but together with British banks and also 
Burmese money-lenders, Chettyars were especially despised for being foreigners, as a 
consequence of the xenophobic sentiment developed by the economic frustration of the Burmans 
in front of the success and the apparent favouritism in business enjoyed by the immigrants 
entered in Burma after the British. This feeling of alienation in their own country of the 
Burmans, especially perceivable in the capital city, brought to the rise of village associations in 
the 1920s and the Saya San rebellion in 193069. The nationalist movement which finally 
originated from these events indeed was not only against the British, but even more against the 
kala, name which identified in pejorative way the South Asians70. 
On the other side, the relations with the Chinese minority -whose influence in Burma dates back 
to 1287 AD and the fall of the ancient capital Pagan to the Mongol armies of Kublai Khan- was 
generally better since the Burmese always felt closer to these rather than to the Indians, because 
of the Chinese propensity to intermarriage and the fact that the size of the Chinese community 
was not so overwhelming like in the Indian case, so to maintaining a low level of hostility71. This 
did not prevent them to experience the violence by Burmans in occasion of the major riots which 
broke out consequently to the Great Depression in 1930 and, especially, the strong anti Chinese 
hate which broke out in 1967 in Rangoon, causing also an attack to the Chinese embassy, and 
spread in the country, bringing the PRC to break the diplomatic relation with Ne Win 
government72. 
The Burmans developed the hate towards the immigrants basically because of economic and 
political frustration. Being considered by the British less developed or efficient than the Indians 
or the Chinese as employees and businessmen or simply more expensive as labour, they soon 
joined their intolerance against the Asian immigrants with the anti-British resistance73; as a 
matter of facts, the Chinese and the Indians dominated the commerce in almost every city of 
Burma and the Indians were preferred to the Burmans for working in the administration of the 
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state and its military forces; Rangoon especially, economic centre where the great majority of 
both the minorities considered lived, well represented this situation with its ethnic ghettoes, its 
immigrant success stories and a social hierarchy which put the Burmese at the lowest place, the 
Asian in the middle and the Europeans (and the Anglo-Burmans too) at the top74. 
Though the domestic politics of Myanmar has changed, the relations with the PRC reborn in 
Eighties, Indians and Chinese are still today ghost-minorities inside the Burmese puzzle: the two 
of them have been the most strongly targeted by the citizenship law of 1982 which imposed that 
no status of Burmese citizen will be recognized to those who cannot demonstrate to have 
ancestors who are Burma-based since three generations at least75. 
 
I.3. Religion 
 
I.3.1. Religions of Burma 
 
Myanmar population include worshippers of all the main religions: Buddhists represent the 
majority of the population in Myanmar, but there are also Christians, Hindus, Muslims, animists, 
Chinese Taoists, Confucians and a reduced number of Jews76.  
Hinduism obviously entered the country due to its proximity to India, and then increased as a 
result of the Indian migration promoted by the colonial administration: elements of Hindu 
heritage constitute a component of  the typical Myanmarese culture and way of thinking, mixed 
with the teaching of Buddhism, which represents the core of Burmese weltanschauung.  
Buddhism on the other hand (as will be more extensively analysed later) entered the country 
through the Indian border as well, being India the homeland of the Sakyamuni Buddha.  
The Muslim component of the citizenship instead is mainly ascribed to two groups, very 
different from each other; a minor part of Burmese Muslims belong to one of the minority hill-
people native of nowadays China, having a remote Turko-Persian descent, which is common to 
the people who in China are called Hui zu77, to which these Muslim hill people are commonly 
associated. The greatest number of the Myanmarese Burmans instead are representatives of the 
Rohingya minority, settled in the Northeastern Rakhine State and different from the previous due 
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to their ancestry, which is Indian, Bengali in particular, and their minor inclination to 
assimilation.  
The Christian influence arrived in Burma first with the Portuguese and the earliest conversions to 
Christianity took place around the early 17th century78. A significant number of Karens, Chin, 
Kachin, and Burmans are Baptists and, secondarily, Catholics. Christian missionaries were active 
from the colonial period up to the mid-1960s, establishing schools and running hospitals and 
social welfare centres, which were of high standards and provided good-quality services, being 
these establishments nationalized by the government after 196279.  
Taoism as well as Confucianism, on the contrary, came from East, brought through a long-
lasting cultural exchange with the former Chinese Empire and later improved, as for Hinduism, 
by the arrival of Chinese immigrants which settled in the country during the colonial era.  
According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar «The main religions of the country are Buddhism (89.2%), Christianity (5.0%), Islam 
(3.8%), Hinduism (0.5%), Spiritualism (1.2%) and others (0.2%)»80, numbers which are 
substantially confirmed by other sources81. But the same governmental source also states that 
«Religious intolerance or discrimination on grounds of religion is nonexistent in the Union of 
Myanmar throughout its long history»82, which is undoubtedly untrue, especially regarding the 
most recent political history which saw various coups bringing to power different generals83. 
Contemporary Burma indeed has experienced and is still experiencing nowadays the troubles of 
religious conflicts, which are caused by the interference of the generals with religion and also by 
the involvement of the highest religious authority of the country, the sangha, in the political 
affairs of the country. 
I.3.2. Theravada Buddhism in Burma 
 
Theravada is the oldest branch of Buddhism still surviving nowadays, practiced by the 89-90% 
of the Burmese and majoritarian also in Sri Lanka (70% of the population), Cambodia (95%), 
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Laos (67%) and Thailand (95%)84. Its origin is linked to the third council held in Pataliputra 
around 250 b.C. by the Indian Emperor Asoka, which gave rise to the Sthaviravada school85, 
from which Theravada claims descent, in particular from the Vibhajjavada current within the 
Sthaviravada86. 
After the council the Theravada soon spread to Sri Lanka through South India and from there it 
reached Burma, where many kingdoms, like the Mon, the Pyus and the Bamar, had already 
adopted the Mahayana Buddhism and soon converted to the new doctrine87. 
Nowadays Theravada is a fundamental element of Burmese life, being the country the biggest 
Buddhist nation in the world in terms of percentage of monks in the population (half a million) 
and proportion of income invested in religion practices88. The Theravada is professed by the 
Burmans, the majority ethnicity, and among the Shans, the Arakanese (Rakhine), the Mons, the 
Karens and the Chinese who have well assimilated to the Burmese lifestyle. Moreover, among 
many groups, like the Bamars and the Shans, the Buddhist belief and practice cohabit with the 
worship of the spirits called Natts, which in the indigenous animist tradition are considered to 
interfere and intercede in the mundane affairs, in accordance to the Burmese saying which 
commands to «Adore the Buddha, but fear the Natts»89. 
According to Burmese ethics, the most venerable individuals within the society are the monks, 
followed by teachers and parents90. The monks, which are called sangha as a collectivity, benefit 
of the best living standards and of the highest respect from the Myanmarese not only due to their 
religious role but also to their involvement in common people’s life. Monks have historically 
been the principal depositaries of culture, not only the theological but also the secular one, and 
they have always contributed to the education of the upper class and also to the alphabetization 
of the common people. Monasteries are neither alien nor inaccessible places, nor simple temples 
to pray and  to do rituals, but acts as a shelter for those who are lost or in need, as an asylum for 
those who seek advices or a period of reflection, as a school for those who wish to receive a 
Buddhist education or for who cannot afford school fees91, and also as a substitute of the hotel 
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for native travellers92. Monks are paid respect and offers also due to the duty of the dana: the 
refusal of food by a monk is equal to the worst excommunication, envisaging bad consequences 
for the soul of the believer. The importance of the acceptance of the offer by the monks was the 
core of the symbolic “bowl upside down” protest, also known as Saffron Revolution, led by the 
sangha in 2007 against the government93. 
The Theravada deeply influences the Burmese way of life not only in the religious belief and 
practice, as exposed, but also in terms of social and political values. A number of important 
principles can be deduced by the Theravada religious teachings: the first one is the concept of 
social upliftment through cosmic assistance, derived by the centrality of the Shakyamuni as 
focus of worship. As mentioned before indeed, the Theravada tradition emphasizes the 
importance of Gautama Buddha, reducing that of the Bodhisattvas. Moreover, it considers that 
the self-liberation can be pursued by merit accumulation through actions and deeds. Since, at the 
level of social manifestation, the Buddha finds his correspondent in the Buddhist abbot, 
opportunities of material progress within the Burmese social hierarchy are to be sought through 
and in accordance with the sangha94. 
Another politically relevant principle is the right/duty to actively intervene against adversities in 
life, deduced by the importance of the dullabha, the human life; according to the Theravada 
indeed, the teachings of the Buddha clearly show that life is regarded as precious and that 
humiliation and dehumanization of the people allow the Buddhist to fight against such 
injustices95. In respect of the dullabha then, the Burmese shall act in order to alter the life 
condition they got and improve them, instead of leaving the change to the samsara, the cycle of 
reincarnations; this, in political terms, could be translated as a right/duty to “resistance against 
oppression” and to “rebellion”. 
This reasoning is closely related to the standard of the good Buddhist king, since the 
resistance/rebellion against the ruler can be legitimate as long as the duties of the last one are 
clearly established. Since Theravada explicitly enumerates the qualities and duties of the good 
monarch, consequently the infraction of these allows the disavowal of the ruling power by the 
ruled ones. According to the ideal standard of the Buddhist monarch, which is incarnated by the 
Indian Emperor Asoka, the king, to be obeyed and respected by his subjects, must comply with 
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the dasa raja dhamma (ten duties of the king), which include the dana (liberality), the pariccaga 
(sacrifice for the people), avihimsa (non-violence) and avirodha (non-opposition)96; Theravada 
Buddhism, in sum, prescribes roles for the ruler and the ruled which, like in a contract, are 
clearly defined, and therefore, if violated, enable the “injured party” to take action for the 
restoration of the lost balance.  
It is interesting to notice that there is a special denomination for those monks who are politically 
committed. “Pongyi” is the name for those of the sangha who, as a socio-political vanguard of 
the society, mediate between the power and the people and, responsible of the welfare of the 
community, are entitled to oppose those who act evilly. The justification of such a political 
commitment of these monks lies in the fact that, being sons of Buddha, they work for others’ 
good following the life example of the Enlightened, who, proceeding on his way to 
enlightenment, engaged in mundane affairs97. 
The proximity of the monks to the people, given by the aforesaid involvement of the monkhood 
and the monastery in Burmese daily life through a variety of ways, but also and especially by the 
almsround though which the sangha receives food and resources from the believers, make these 
guardians of the nation on their turn dependent on those they defend. This closeness has shown 
all its political potential when acted as a basis for mobilizing the people as the sangha protested 
against the generals’ government, somehow becoming “public conscience” of the Burmese 
citizens98. 
I.3.3. Buddhism and Burmese politics 
 
The characterization of Burma as a mainly Buddhist country is fundamental to understand its 
politics, which is strongly influenced by this feature not only in terms of common ethics, 
sensibility of the people and political rhetoric, but also in very concrete ways. As mentioned 
earlier, indeed, the two highest national authorities, the military power and the monks, interact 
with each other, in terms of both collaboration and contrast, in shaping the political evolution of 
the country. 
This double intersection happened in various ways, depending on the historical period 
considered and on the actors involved. The military rule has disposed of religion in various ways, 
promoting Buddhist ethics in order to acquire legitimacy emulating the tradition of the ancient 
Buddhist Burmese kings, attempting to control the sangha, i.e. the collectivity of the monks, by 
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institutionalizing it under a governmental Ministry, but also officially promoting Buddhism by 
donations and the affirmation of it as official religion of the state, which can be seen both as a 
way to strengthen the sangha and as an attempt of subjecting it to sphere of the State. In addition 
to this, the regime, which is overruled by Burmans, has as well used the Buddhist element 
(which is a strong feature of identification of the Burman majority but also of other important 
minorities like the Shan and the Mons)99 to promote its cultural assimilation policies against non-
Buddhist minorities, through the construction of temples in areas of non-Buddhist majority. In 
some cases, it is claimed, this has been done using forced labour of minority individuals, victims 
of forced relocation100. 
Monks also, despite the ancient prohibition of meddling with politics, have played their role. 
Historically, they have been the counterpart of the Burmese rulers, and after some time of 
detachment from the mundane affairs, came back to their old function as boosters of national 
identity in anti-British function and as promoters of democracy under the regime. Recently their 
already strong political role has further expanded as a result of the rise of an islamophobic 
movement, led by one of the most popular and charismatic monks of the country against the 
Rohingya minority, which contributed to the presentation, months ago, of the law regulating 
mixed Buddhist-Muslim marriages. 
The Shakyamuni Buddha was son of a kshatriya family within an aristocratic society, i.e. 
member of the noble caste of worriors, but after his adhesion to asceticism he avoided any 
implication in politics. This extraneousness of Buddhism with regards to political affairs was a 
plus which advantaged the religion in spreading throughout South India, but ended when the 
Maurya Emperor Asoka converted and became an example of Buddhist king. Asoka indeed 
directly intervened in matters regarding both the organization of the sangha and the orthodoxy of 
the doctrine itself, relaying on his political authority to convene the third Buddhist council aimed 
to the reform of the sasana, i.e. the Buddhist order101. In this way a close relation between 
political power and the sangha was established, liaison which did not last in India as the Maurya 
dynasty fell, but survived in the rest of the Theravada countries, where Asoka kept being brought 
as standard of the ideal relation between state and monks. 
As a consequence, according to what could be defined the “Theravada political doctrine”, the 
ruler is responsible for the welfare of the sangha and is entitled to censor those monks who 
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violates the vinaya, i.e. the juridical norms which regulate the life in the order. Though 
guaranteeing the respect of the vinaya by the monks and punishing those who have contradicted 
it with their perverse behaviour should be competence of the Buddhist spiritual jurisdiction, 
religious tribunals had no power to ensure the effectiveness of such measures whose execution, 
as a consequence, fell within the political sphere of powers102. 
Various times monks acted in such a way as to merit the exclusion from the sangha. This led to 
the necessity of a reform of the sasana, which took place through the Buddhist councils, general 
assemblies aimed to state rules and fixed points about the holy scriptures103. The last one was 
held in Rangoon between 1954 and 1961 following the convocation by no less than premier U 
Nu104. 
This shows that the recent implication of the Burmese government in the sangha affairs is a form 
of reappropriation by the State of ancient prerogatives which had been historically owned by 
Buddhist rulers. Since in ancient times regular relations between State and sangha were 
established in southern Buddhist countries in a similar way, in these states Theravada became a 
sort of state religion: while in Thailand this situation remained unchanged until contemporary 
times, in Sri Lanka and Burma the connection was interrupted by the colonial rule and the state 
as a result lost his control over religion. This is one of the reason which led to the emergence of 
the so called “political Buddhism” in the recent history of both the countries105. 
In the case of Myanmar indeed the infiltration of the government in religious affairs have been 
frequent and important, revealing an intention by the junta of reacquiring the ancient 
prerogatives of the Buddhist kings over the sangha. Between 1949 and 1961 the U Nu 
government blended Buddhism and natts with politics: most important of all, in 1956 the Sixth 
Great Buddhist World Council was held; Buddhism also became part of the school curriculum 
and Ecclesiastical Courts and Pali universities were created. The Buddha Sasana Council, aimed 
to the promotion of Buddhism, was created and in 1960 the U Nu electoral campaign, under 
pressure of the sangha, included the making of Buddhism the official state religion as a point of 
its programme106. 
In 1962, after seizing power through a coup, Ne Win proposed the “Burmese Way to 
Socialism”107, strongly influenced by Buddhist cosmology and terminology. In 1979, within the 
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Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Department for the Promotion and Propagation of the Sasana 
was created, together with a number of committees and in 1980 nine Myanmar Buddhist sects 
were united. Furthermore, the government reorganized as well the Vinaya Judicial Courts 
(religious tribunals) and started sponsoring the state Pali examination and many monastic 
schools108. Many analysts stress the fact that the junta took possess over the practice of the dana 
as a mean of legitimizing its power, through a “state-merit making” consisting in the 
construction of pagodas and other official offering ceremonies109. The junta has also drawn from 
Buddhist tradition in terms of political rhetoric, but in a very different way respect to the 
democratic movement of Aung San Su Kyi, which also relies on Buddhist cultural features as a 
political appeal; while Suu Kyi links Buddhism to a democratic form of government, the military 
rule promotes the idea that their legitimacy is based on the ancient kingly duty of maintaining 
order through the preservation of Buddhist traditions110. 
As mentioned, in Myanmar history, the ruler was the main supporter of religion on one hand and 
the sangha had a sort of constitutional check upon the ruler, preventing despotism and 
tyranny111. This created a link of interdependence between the king and the sangha, one 
supporting and balancing the other. During colonial times, in contrast, the ecclesiastical order, 
due to the secularization of Burma and the “non-interference in religious matters” policy by the 
British, came to lack of traditional political support from “the centre”; this negligence by the 
British caused the emergence of a nationalism with substantial Buddhist basis112. Due to these 
reasons in modern times the political activism of the monks was linked to anti-colonialism, 
nationalism and the process of the nation building, both in pro- and anti-governmental sense. 
Burmese monks, after a period of extraneousness due to the prohibition to mingle with politics 
into force under the Burman kingdom, restarted being politically involved during the colonial 
era, developing an anti-colonialist consciousness whose casus belli was the so called “shoe 
issue”113: monks led protests against the British who intentionally refused to take off shoes inside 
the pagodas, a gesture which was considered highly offensive of Burmese value system, 
expressing the need of restoring a political power which was coherent with the Buddhist heritage 
of the nation114. 
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In the Twenties monks and lay people created the “General Council of Burmese Associations”, a 
movement which aimed to the independence of the country. Between the two World Wars the 
activism of the monks increased and, together with the Youth Male Buddhist Association 
(YMBA), the sangha was the main militant force for the liberation of the country115. Two monks 
in particular, U Uttama e U Wizaya became martyrs of the Burmese movement of liberation and 
are regarded as fathers of modern Burmese nationalism116, while between 1930 and 1932 the 
monk Saya San led a peasant rebellion against the British imposition of tax collection and was 
finally executed117. Leading the national movement against the colonial oppression what the 
monks did was not dissimilar from their historical function of check and balances against the 
excesses of the political power; also, the monks seemed to be acting in accordance to their 
function of socio-political vanguard of the nation, expressing the political consciousness of the 
citizenship and boosting the mass mobilization, according to the aforementioned political 
principle deducible from Theravada doctrine118. 
The monks kept serving the nation even later, in collaboration with the governmental power, 
when they contributed to the creation of the new ideology proposed by general Ne Win in 1962 
as the new leading philosophy of Burmese development. The so called “Burmese way to 
socialism” indeed, though considered at the time a lay doctrine, included a number of elements 
typical of Buddhist cosmology and under many points of view appeared to be influenced by 
Burmese tradition rather than contemporary Marxism119. 
The sangha’s role of political mobilizers assumed pro-democratic function along with the 
increase of the  excesses by the junta and the worsening of the living condition of the Burmese 
following its unsuccessful economy policies. This happened during the people’s revolution of 
1988120, during which strong political interventions by big groups of monks occurred121, and 
even more clearly during the Saffron revolution in 2007, whose absolute protagonist was the 
sangha itself. The monks, without coordination nor permission of the highest levels of the 
sasana, gave birth to a spontaneous protest aimed to force the government to consider the 
economic situation of  the Myanmarese –whose worsening, moreover, caused a reduction in the 
offering of food and alms, resulting in an impoverishment of the monks as well122. They acted a 
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pattaneikkuzana, a boycott of the offers from the Buddhist offender123: given the strong religious 
importance of the dana, turning the alms bowls upside down the monks excommunicated the 
junta, undermining its political legitimacy. In addition to this, the All Burma Monks Alliance 
Group presented to the government four demands, including the reduction of the prices of 
various items, the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Su Kyi, and the opening of a 
dialogue with democratic opposition forces; in this way the essence of the protest appeared to be 
not only moral, but also highly political. 
Recently the involvement of the sangha in Burmese politics has been discussed again due to the 
development of an anti-Rohingya front led by two charismatic and powerful monks, as a 
consequence of the recrudescence of the Muslim-Buddhist conflict which happened some 
months ago. The violence erupted in the locality of Meiktila (200 km South of Mandalay) after 
the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman allegedly by three Muslims124; it was the occasion for 
long-standing ethnic tensions to come out again and it resulted in the burning of about 82 
buildings in the Muslim block of the city by Buddhist mobs, which caused the exodus of great 
number of homeless partly interned in refugee camps partly dispersed on the way towards the 
Bengali border. Consequently to the humanitarian emergency various monks have enforced 
denial of humanitarian assistance to Muslims, ordering to locals not to associate with the group 
and refusing to accept international aid destined to the Rohingya. In addition to this, many 
noticed that Buddhist involved in the crimes were given, as usual, lighter sentences than 
Muslims125. 
The Buddhist anti-Muslim violence and boycott seems to reflect the growing islamophobic 
sentiment promoted throughout the country by the so called 969 movement led by Ashin 
Wirathu, its unofficial leader, often referred to as the “Burmese Bin Laden”126. The movement is 
characterized by a call for the return to Buddhist orthodoxy and prominence without any 
compromise, starting from its name, “969” which represents the Buddhist tiratana (“three 
jewels”), consisting in nine special attributes of Lord Buddha (9), six fundamental teachings (6) 
and nine attributes of monkhood (9). Wirathu, already sentenced in 2003 to 25 years in jail for 
inciting anti-Muslim hatred but later released in 2010 following a general amnesty for political 
prisoners, declared to be proud to considered a radical Buddhist, and that “If Myanmar wants to 
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live in peace, Buddhist and Muslims have to live separately”, “Muslims are fundamentally bad. 
Mohammed allows them to kill any creature. Islam is a religion of thieves, they do not want 
peace”127. 696 movement’s activism is not limited to the release of sermons, which many 
considers responsible of the growing religious violence, but also aims to directly impact 
Burmese Muslim reality through legal means. The 696 proposed an interfaith marriage law 
which, inspired by similar legislation in Singapore, hopes to limit the number of Buddhist 
women who marry Muslim men, establishing the permission from local authority to do so as 
compulsory128. It is the latest attempt to obstacle the so called “love Jihad” which, pointing the 
finger on the allegedly higher demographic growth of the Muslim, is considered responsible of 
the growing Islamic population in Burma, at the expenses of the Buddhist one. 
Myanmar government had already supported such a demographic containment subjecting only 
Muslim families to a two-children policy. In addition to this, Burma’s president Thein Sein 
seemed to align with the position of 696 with words and with facts:  he took the part of Wirathu 
after the Time magazine dedicated him the cover page dubbing the monk as “the face of 
Burmese terror” and, though receiving the UN Secretary’s critics and incitement to deal more 
effectively with the humanitarian crisis following the events of Meiktila129, urged neighbouring 
Bangladesh to take in the Rohingya not showing any concrete intent of solving the emergence. It 
looks like the influence of the sangha in Burmese politics, far from being over, is nowadays still 
strong, perhaps more than ever. The fact that Aung San Su Kyi, who opposed the interfaith 
marriage law but avoided any declaration in regard to the Rohingya crisis, was criticized not to 
have spoken out enough not to affect the electoral support given by the Buddhist majority to her 
party contributed to make the issue even more controversial. 
                                                 
127
 Ibidem.  
128 R. Vandenbrink, Controversial Myanmar Marriage Proposal Gains Two Millions Signatures, in “Radio Free 
Asia”, 17th July 2013, URL: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/interfaith-marriage-07172013194410.html; 
Z. Mann, S. Micheals, Petition to Restrict Interfaith Marriage Garners 2.5 Million Signatures in Burma, in “The 
Irrawaddy”, 18th July 2013, URL: http://www.irrawaddy.org/conflict/petition-to-restrict-interfaith-marriage-garners-
2-5-million-signatures-in-burma.html. 
129
 The Associated Press, op. cit. 
  35    
 
Chapter II 
“From province of India to Republic of Myanmar” 
 
 
II.1. British rule, Japanese occupation, regained Independence  
(1886-1948) 
In 1885 Burma fully fell under the British control. The colonial administration, after having 
flirted for some time with the idea of constituting the newly conquered territory as a protectorate 
apart, finally declared it to be a province of the Indian Empire1. The British used to consider the 
Burmese as less developed and politically more immature than Indians, prejudice which would 
contribute along the years to the refusal of conceding the status of dominion and the retardation 
in granting the final independence. 
As Burma became a province of British India, a flood of Indian immigrants (followed by the 
Chinese) entered the country2, being generally preferred to the indigenous people as employees 
in the colonial administrative body, a fact which contributed a lot to the estrangement of the 
Burmese towards the colonial rule and to the development by them of a xenophobic sentiment 
against these communities3. The Burmese felt usurped in the rights on their land twice, by 
European invaders and by non-Burmese Asian immigrants, according to what Hagen termed the 
“doubly colonial society” of British Burma4. This caused a guerrilla warfare against the British 
which was joined or somehow supported by all elements of the society, monks included, and 
brought the colonial rule, during the four years immediately following the annexation of the 
country, to use harsh measures in the attempt of controlling the uprising5. 
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Between 1890 and 1920 Burma lived a peaceful period, especially due to the regained order and 
the new economic development. Nonetheless, the British rule, neither exposing the people nor 
their religion to open persecution as it was happening in other colonies in South and Southeast 
Asia, slowly changed the features of Burmese society. Over the decades nationalism started 
developing. As in other Asian countries, the expectations towards the liberation from the 
Western yoke and a consequent Asian resurgence were fomented by the upshot of the Russo-
Japanese war (1904-1905)6. 
Moreover, as typical of Burmese political culture, nationalist sentiment was enhanced by 
Buddhism7 thanks to the activity of various personages and through the occurring of different 
events. Around 1910 a Buddhist “renaissance” was led by scholars Thingazar Sayadaw and Ledi 
Sayadaw, further fuelled by increasing contacts between the sangha and the monks of Ceylon. 
As a consequence a Young Men’s Buddhist Association –inspired by the already existing 
YMBA in Ceylon and modelled on the YMCA of the West– was set up with the scope of 
supporting Buddhism, especially counterpoising the impact of the Christian missions, very 
successful among the hill-people, and establishing and funding Buddhist schools8. Soon after, 
anyways, the goals of the YMBA acquired political tones. 
In 1919 the Government of India Act established the diarchy in the subcontinent but excluded 
Burma from the reform, considering it was not ready for such a step and still able to benefit from 
the “India’s family of provinces”, in order to gain further political development9. 
In December 1920, following a number of labour strikes, a great university strike took place in 
Rangoon –event considered nationalists’ first challenge to British authority– agitating against a 
University Act Bill which imposed English as the teaching language. The general turmoil had its 
political outcome in 1921 with the extension of the Government of India Act to Burma10. 
In 1923 the dual government was effectively established, but this did not really fulfilled the 
aspirations of the Burmese11. In this way the altitudes inhabited by minorities were not included 
in the diarchy. In such a way the Hills remained cast away from what became Ministerial Burma, 
strengthening divisions which would have contributed to a state of continuous contention and 
rivalry12. 
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In 1930, as a consequence of the world economic depression, the price of the rice fell incredibly, 
leaving almost the totality of the Burmese labourer and cultivator penniless. The general 
dissatisfaction constituted fertile ground for the rebellion led by the physician and ex-monk Saya 
San who, preaching the superiority of national culture and the need of chasing the invader, 
brought the people of the Therrawaddy to create a galon army13 and attack the government 
outposts14. 
The peasants’ rebellion and the problem of the separation from India, which created new 
divisions among the Burmese barristers15, produced a vacuum of leadership, of whom young 
patriots from University of Rangoon took advantage. These students –Ba Sein, Ba Thoung, Lay 
Maung, Thein Pe Myint– started wearing traditional clothes and singing national songs in the 
Univeristy, making the prefix “thakin” (master) part of their names, a big challenge to British 
authority given that since 1886 the title thakin had been reserved to Englishmen only, like in the 
case of sahib in India16. In 1935 they organized a political party called Dobama Asiayone, which 
means “We, the Burmese Confederation”, and came to the fore the following year, when a new 
students’ strike shook Rangoon, giving to some of the students leading the protest –among them 
Aung San– prominence as nationalist leaders17. As a consequence of the strike a new generation 
of leaders was born, more familiar with Western institutions and political tactics to be used 
against the British18. Meanwhile another rebellion had taken place, led by a monk, U Ottama, 
including the active mobilization of exponents of the sangha19. 
In the month of September of the same year the Second World War broke out and two months 
later the thakins, the All Burma Students’ Organization and the Sinyetha Party of Ba Maw (one 
of the most influential barristers), created the Burma Freedom Bloc Organization presided by 
Aung San, aimed to obtain a deadline for Burmese Independence from London in exchange of 
Burma’s participation in the war. As Churchill refused, the Bloc promoted an anti-war campaign. 
U Saw, premier from 1940, went to London to personally negotiate with the English statist but 
again obtained nothing; he got a refusal also from Roosevelt, though he was the father of the 
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self-determination clause within the Atlantic Charter20. Thus, Saw finally offered Burma’s 
alliance to Japan but the British intercepted him. However the Japanese support finally came to 
Burma through Aung San, although he had initially sought help from the Chinese Communists21; 
as a consequence of the deal with Tokyo, 29 men selected by the thakin –known to history as the 
“thirty Comrades” – were sent to the Japanese-occupied Formosa to receive intensive military 
training22. 
Aung San sincerely believed Japan would have declared Burma to be an independent state as war 
against the Allied forces had been declared, but he was wrong. The Empire of the Rising Sun 
was interested in Burma because of the Burma-China road23, but the new ally played only a 
marginal role in the plan which had been disposed for the Asian arena: Burma was only 
supposed to be a starting gate to enter India, as to the initial expansion plans, destined later to 
become the western defence wall of Asia, as those plans started collapsing24. As a matter of fact, 
the Japanese occupation of Burma, though very short –only three years (1942-1945)– set up a 
regime of terror; the occupants killed thousands of Burmese as forced labourers in the 
construction of the “death railway” which connected Burma to Thailand25 and impoverished the 
country26. 
However, as the war between Japan and the Allies was declared, they created a Burma 
Independence Army headed by the Thirty Comrades and together entered Lower Burma from 
Thailand, gaining soon the whole country. Then they established a new Army, the Burma 
Defence Army, officially under General Aung San but in reality controlled by the Japanese 
generals attached as advisers. As a matter of facts Burma was administrated as an occupied 
enemy territory27. The thakins started claiming for further independence, which the Japanese 
were not willing to concede, but as the fortune of the war started disadvantaging them, they tried 
to persuade Burma and other enslaved nations with their conception of a co-prosperity sphere 
within an Asian commonwealth headed by Japan28. Burma was declared a sovereign state 
starting from August 1943, but given the purely formal nature of such a status, Aung San and his 
faction secretly prepared to mutiny, after having obtained support from the British. This 
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happened in March 1945 and soon the British gained control over the country, completely 
destroyed29 by years of war. 
The transition towards independence sped up due to a number of circumstances, namely the 
sudden end of the war, the outbreak of protests which persuaded the British of the seriousness of 
the situation and the appointment as prime minister of the labour Attlee, who invited a Burmese 
delegation to London30. The London Agreement or Anglo-Burmese Agreement in January stated 
Burmese independence and its freedom to decide whether to join or not the Commonwealth31. 
In 1946, from March to April, a meeting between the Burmese and the Frontier Areas leaders 
was held in Panglong, followed by another one held in the same locality in February 1947, 
known as the Panglong Conference. Surprisingly for Ba Maw and other critics of Aung San, the 
majority of the representatives decided to join the union, and according to the agreement the 
areas would have been under the control of the centre for matters of common interest like 
defence, foreign policy and funding, maintaining at the same time their internal autonomy. The 
Karens anyways, being their territories less ethnically homogeneous and identifiable and having 
their delegation split between supporters of the integration with Burma and advocates of an 
independent state, finally left the conference. Consequently, the Karen National Union (KNU) 
was born, putting together all those Karens who did not wish to remain part of the newborn 
state32. In this way, in the aftermath of the independence, the issue of eternal ethnic conflicts, far 
to be solved, soon came back to bite. 
In June the Constituent Assembly approved the London Agreement and also, under pressure of 
the Burmese left wing, resolved to leave the British Commonwealth33. 
The new republic was soon shook again by the assassination of Aung San, together with other 
fathers of the independence, taking part to a meeting of the Executive Councils. Police soon 
found proves against U Saw, who was arrested and hanged, but soon the speculation that the 
homicide was carried out by the British government using Saw as a simple instrument spread 
out. 
After Aung San’s death works towards independence proceeded fast: in October 1947 the Anglo-
Burmese Treaty stated the terms of relationships between Burma and the United Kingdom and 
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the Burma Independence Act, approved against strong conservative opposition, made the 
independence possible to be declared on 4th January 194834. 
II.2. The AFPFL rule, the Caretaker Government, NE Win’s coup 
 (1948-1962) 
Aung San’s charisma, together with the common ideology of Marxist inspiration, was the only 
element able to keep the AFPFL united, so that as the latter disappeared, the alliance soon 
broke35; In addition to this, Aung San was the only Burmese leader, along with few other fathers 
of the independence, to be trusted by the minorities including the Karens36, and the lack of his 
prestige was determinant to the detachment of these from the national unity project and the 
emergence of the Karen revolution.  
After Aung San’s death however, Thankin Nu37 was invited by Attlee to form a new government 
immediately after the assassination of Aung San; Nu –dismissed the “militant” title of thakin and 
reacquired the civilian one of U to show that the struggle was finally over38– tried to deal with 
the problem of the ongoing civil war.   
The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) had already split into two factions, the so-called “White 
Flags” under Than Tun and the “Red Flags” under thakin Soe39. Nu tried to re-include the BCP 
in the AFPFL but his attempt was unsuccessful due to the impossibility of getting to a deal with 
the leadership of the party, which consequently started the insurgency. 
Soon after, beside these ideological conflicts, major ethnic rebellions broke out as the 
government refused the demand for independence to a Karen-Mon State claimed by two Mon 
separatist groups and the KNU, whose armed wing, the Karen National Defence Organization 
(KNDO)40, became one of the most durable ethnic forces facing the authority of Rangoon41. 
Following the early advances of the rebel groups, Ne Win, as new commander of the Army since 
1949, started a dramatic empowerment of the armed forces so that the country was under martial 
law during the period from 1948 to 1950, which was one the most terrible time for the 
government in the attempt of resolving the civil war. Moreover in 1949 and 1950 the Shan States 
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were partly invaded by the KNDO in its fight with the government and also by militias 
belonging to the Guomindang (GMD).  
The GMD had first entered the state from Yunnan in 1950, being defeated by the Chinese 
Communists forces, and remained there, supported by Taiwan and the CIA, getting soon 
involved in the opium trafficking42; in this way, it represented for long time an important 
variable for the determination of the delicate position of Burma in the international arena, with 
respect to China and to the Cold War in general. 
From the point of view of its foreign policy, the Nu government promoted a position of strict 
neutrality in international affairs: it resisted to the US attempts of mobilizing the Burmese 
against the Communists and at the same time reduced the risk of a PRC intervention against the 
GMD stationed on Myanmarese soil43. Nu declined the invitation to join the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) offered by Eisenhower, especially not to provoke a Chinese 
intervention. At the same time he affirmed his neutralism also with respect to the Non-Alligned 
Movement, preventing Burma from taking the side of any bloc, even the neutralist one44. 
The government followed a hard time also in economic matters, trying to promote for the first 
time socialism in the country. Since during the British era a small number of foreign capitalists 
dominated Burmese economy, U Nu started nationalizing their concerns. Moreover, he promoted 
measures to control the flight of capitals from the country, particularly to India, and supported 
the emergence of an autochthonous business class. In 1950 the Pyudawtha (“pleasant country”) 
plan was open, moderately socialist in inspiration and consisting in a series of government-
directed development plans aimed to the creation of the welfare state45. The first one, of the 
length of eight years and inaugurated in 1952, was initially successful but, as a consequence of 
the end of the Korean war, the price of the rice, which was Burmese main export, fell 
dramatically. U Nu had to look for alternative sources of sustainment, signing in 1954 a peace 
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treaty with Japan which included reparations, and exchanging in 1955 rice supply for Soviet aid 
to development46. 
A new reinforcement of police and military activity occurred in April 1956. The AFPFL won the 
election proposing the continuation of the state policies and overrunning the opponent National 
United Front (NUF), which instead run on the pledge of an immediate peace negotiation with the 
rebels. Nu temporarily left the role of premier to focus on his work as president of the AFPFL 
and reorganize the league, while Ba Swe, who temporarily took his place, increased the activity 
of paramilitary brigades, promoted campaigns to improve the nation’s moral and reduce 
corruption. Nu finally resumed his office in June 1957. 
Another characterizing element of Nu’s years was the strong relationship between Buddhism and 
the state. As a matter of facts, monks had created a strong lobby and in 1947 some monastic 
orders pushed for the designation of Buddhism as the state religion justifying their claim with the 
fact that over 80% of the Myanmarese population was effectively Buddhist. Nu on his turn 
believed that promoting Buddhism was a way to prevent a Communist drift and that since a 
strong element of the society was asking for that, rejecting the demand would have boosted 
religious extremism. A sequence of reforms followed, among others the Vinasaya Act which 
registered all monks and created ecclesiastical tribunals, the Pali University and Dhammacariya 
Act, the Buddha Sasana Council Act, the Pali Education Board Act. A renewed pressure from 
the sangha to elevate Buddhism to the level of state religion immediately followed, but the 
awaited proclamation was delayed. 
In 1958 the unity of the league leading the government broke, revealing dissidence and rivalry in 
its internal; it split into two factions, the “Clean” faction led by U Nu and thakin Tin, and the 
“Stable” faction headed by Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe47. The clash between the two groups 
progressively escalated, various murders between their exponents being reported; in the middle 
of the crisis U Nu left on a tour of Upper Burma, while the army, acting upon his return, 
occupied the strategic points in Rangoon and Insein. As U Nu returned, he received high chiefs 
of the Army warning him about the possible attack from the Clean faction, so finally the ex-
thakin agreed to resign his mandate and consign the premiership to a “Caretaker” government 
under the leadership of Ne Win to administrate the country in status of emergency for six 
months. 
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Nu announced the Caretaker Government of Ne Win on the 24th September 1958, explaining that 
he himself had invited the general to make it possible to hold free elections within six months 
and appealing all the population to support him. Nonetheless, U Nu stressed that the army should 
not get involved in politics beyond the measure required by its administrative duty and that the 
country should maintain its neutral trend in the conduction of foreign affairs. It was not easy for 
the citizen to accept that what had occurred was not a coup and before it happened students and 
various political groups protested against the transition.  
The targets of the Caretaker Government were bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption, moral 
decadence; with the so-called sweat campaigns and operation clean-up they tried to promote 
civic awareness and politeness and eliminate from the streets of the capital dirt, stray animals, 
pornographic material and also anti-aesthetic traditional habits like betel chewing48. They also 
eliminated the autonomy of the Shan sawbwas and made the opium production illegal49.  
In February 1959, at the end of the six months, the Ne Win Caretaker Government resigned 
stating it was impossible to hold free and fair elections the following month, as its mandate 
initially required, and that to make it possible it needed more time to deal with the insurgency. 
The constitution was amended to allow him to remain in power until 1960. At the time of the 
elections, in February 1960, thanks to his prestige among the Buddhist electorate given by the 
promise of making Buddhism the state religion and by the adoption of saffron as the colour of 
the campaign, Nu’s Clean AFPFL won50. Immediately he reorganized the party, renamed 
Pyidaungsu Party (i.e. the Union Party) around popular principles and adopted a two-cabinets 
government, being one cabinet destined to the Union and the other to the states. The return to 
civilian rule however was not destined to be long-lasting due to difficulties arisen with respect 
to: the ethnic minorities and their adhesion to the Union, the consequence of this on the Army’s 
endorsement of Nu’s position, the Buddhist question and, finally, unsuccessful economic 
policies. In June 1961 at the Conference of States held at Taunggyi, capital of the Shan States, 
federalism was the option which had the upper hand, producing dissatisfaction among the Karen, 
Chin and Kachin claiming independent states. In addition to this, critics were addressed to the 
government, first of all by the Army, because Nu’s availability to negotiations with respect to the 
separatist minorities was seen as a threat to the national unity51.  
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The Buddhist question undermined the basis of the civilian power as well, causing great protests. 
Elected on the pledge of making Buddhism the state religion and strained by the renewed 
pressure of the Buddhist electorate, Nu finally proceeded to the awaited reform submitting the 
Constitution Amendment Bill to Parliament. The State Religion Act was finally promulgated in 
August 1961 and, as a consequence, the Burmese state became responsible for maintaining, 
protecting and promoting the religion through consultations, constructions and restorations, and 
state-funded universities, examinations and provisions52. A wave of religious violence followed, 
involving the Hindu community and the Muslim one; against them militants monks arose, ending 
up in setting fire to a number of mosques. 
The Army, who had tasted power during the Caretaker Government, assisted thus to Nu’s 
incompetent administration53. Having opposed Nu’s Buddhist campaign and seeing the 
preservation of the union in danger, a coup was considered to be the solution for safeguarding 
the country54. 
II.3. Ne Win and the Burmese Way to Socialism  
(1962-1988) 
 
The coup acted by the armed forces occurred on the 2nd March 1962 and, on the same day, the 
creation of a military government by a Revolutionary Council headed by general Ne Win 
followed. Soon the new government dissolved the Parliament as well as the state councils as 
well.  
The author of the putsch, Ne Win, at the moment of the coup Commander in Chief of the 
Burmese Army, was a general of Sino-Burman descent whose influence on Burmese politics 
would have extended for more than twenty-five years, until the end of its power in 1988 and 
beyond. 
Educated in the University of Rangoon during the Thirties, he was later one of the Thirty 
Comrades chosen by Aung San to receive training from the Japanese and lead the mutiny against 
the British; during the AFPFL government he was Ministry of Defence and, as a consequence of 
the coup of 1962, commander of the Army, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council at power and 
of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) (until 1981)55.  
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Historians still discuss the reasons which brought him and the military to forcibly seize power; 
according to what the Revolutionary Council itself declared immediately after the coup in the 
person of Aung Gyi, the main motivation was concern about the preservation of the national 
unity; given the dangerous understanding of the Nu government towards the federalist demand 
by the Shan leaders, the military were afraid that, if it happened, Burma would have slipped in a 
void of problems similar to those faced by Laos and Vietnam56. Beside the preoccupation of 
maintaining a unitary state, the Council expressed dissatisfaction towards Nu’s management of 
the political agenda and proposed a new programme based on three points: development of 
agriculture, freedom of religion and separation of this from politics –in open contrast to the last 
pro-Buddhist period of Nu’s rule- and freedom of press57. Unfortunately, over a period it would 
have revealed not to be able to realize any of these programmed developments. 
The political and economical failure of Ne Win’ period was due to the chronic weaknesses of 
Burmese politics which had already come out during U Nu’s time and stayed unresolved also 
under the military rule: ethnic insurgency, economical stagnation and the factionalism which 
soon affected Ne Win’s front as well as; but it was also affected by a certain visionary and 
irresponsible style in conducing public affairs, in great part given by an over-sensitivity to 
occultism and astrology to which the general was devoted, typical feature of authoritarian 
personalities58. The military always adduced the concern towards chaos as a justification to 
intervene, ending up, perhaps, to cause that chaos itself in order to have a reason to act, like in 
1988; however, some observed that the real threat for the armed forces headed by the general 
was, in reality, «the attrition or destruction of the military’s role in society»59. 
The transformation of the country in a single-party state would have ensured, according to the 
Revolutionary Council, the avoidance of the internal disintegration of the political forces which 
affected Nu’s period, finally determining its end. As a consequence, the Council created in July 
the Burmese Way to Socialism Party (BWSP, later known as BSPP), promising that since the 
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real nature of the Council was a revolutionary one and it had to assume the junta’s role only 
because of historical necessity, soon it would have grown into a mass party shaped around the 
democratic centralism principle. At the same time, the process of dissolution of all the other 
political parties started (the main “opponents” of the BSPP were the AFPFL, the Pyidaungsu 
Party of Nu and the Burma Workers Unity Party, formerly NUF)60. A similar purge applied to 
the press, all the private newspapers and foreign news source being blocked and journalists being 
trained according to the new socialist spirit61.  
The new course was made explicit by the publication in January 1963 of The System of 
Correlation of Man and His Environment, the manifesto of the new party ideology62, whose 
doctrine was a mix of Socialism –even though often deviationist with respect to the Marxist 
orthodoxy– Buddhism, Humanism and other various thoughts, and became soon a compulsory 
textbook in the training of civil servants63. The promotion of the new ideology had also the scope 
of emancipating Burma from foreign influence, especially the Chinese64. 
The government tried to extend its control over the two most militant elements of Burmese 
society, students and monks. The most important event in these terms, usually remembered by 
historians as a great misstep by the general, was the blowing of the Rangoon University Student 
Union building, symbol of Burma’s independence movement, as a consequence of the students’ 
riot broken out after the first forced closure of the institution in 196265. As of the monks, given 
that the junta came to power on the pledge of the contestation of Nu’s discriminatory Buddhist 
policy, the abolition of the Buddha Sasana Council was ordered in 1962. Two years later anyway 
the general proposed the creation of the Buddha Sasana Sangha Organization (BSSO) aimed to 
act as unitary organizational body of the sangha and which tried to impose, but in vain, the 
compulsory registration for each monk. The regime would have been able to finally obtain this in 
1979, with the establishment of the Sangha Maha Nayaka. During Ne Win’s period also there 
was a certain connivance between the political power and the religious one: the junta seemed to 
prefer the Shwegyin Sangha, more conservative as a monastic order when compared to the 
Thudhamma one, which had got the better under Nu, finally obtaining the proclamation of the 
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creed as official religion of the state66. The mingling of religious and political power was evident 
also in Ne Win’s drawing, in quality of ruler, to the ancient narrative of the Burmese king67: the 
purification of the sangha through the All-Sangha All-Sect Convention in 198068, always 
followed by a typical amnesty, and the building of pagodas can be interpreted in this 
perspective69. 
Under the economical point of view the military junta embarked in the job of developing the 
country repairing the damages of the former government, and its policies showed different 
phases of evolution. Initially the main influence in economic matters was acted by Aung Guyi, 
already economic hero of the Caretaker Government, who belonged to the so called Paungde 
group, characterized by favouring industrialization and a moderate approach to nationalization. 
As head of the Ministry of Industries, he emphasized the Import Substitution Industrialization 
model which had already been initiated in the Caretaker period. By the end of 1962 Tin Pe, 
known as “the Red Brigadier” for its pure Marxism, came to the fore. In the initial years the 
government embarked in a number of project aimed to increase agricultural productivity. After 
the publication of the ideological manifesto of the BSPP in 1963 anyways, also the economy 
suffered a more radical shift: Aung Guyi was pushed out of the way and the Burmese economy 
was subject to a quick Marxist transformation, with Tin Pe finally becoming Chairman of the 
Finance Committee of the Council in 196470. At the end of 1965, however, Ne Win in person 
had to admit the terrible situation of the national economy, in a country that, used to be the first 
world exporter of rice, was now at risk of starvation, as consequence of the decline of the 
exportable rice surplus due to mismanaging by the government over the price of the good71. 
Another eternal problem that the junta had to face was the one of the insurgencies on many 
fronts.  In April 1963 it announced that he would have offered an amnesty to the rebels willing to 
depose their weapons and, in order to ensure that the opposition did not undermine the peace 
talks, proceeded to the arrest of the central leadership of the AFPFL. Though, the conditions 
proposed by Ne Win did not satisfy the rebels, so that many abandoned the negotiation72. 
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Within the rebels problem, a big issue was still represented by the Communists: influenced, as 
common to many communist and socialist parties of the time, by the evolution of the relations 
between the USSR and the PRC, the Communists had split in Burmese Communist Party (BCP) 
and Communist Party of Burma (CPB), being especially the first one the most serious challenger 
for the central government. As aforementioned, Nu was good enough to maintain a strictly 
neutral line in the conduction of foreign affairs73 so that the PRC did not become involved with 
the two Communist insurgencies during the years of Burmese civilian rule. Moreover, after 
Bandung, willing to present itself as a champion of neutralism, the PRC renounced to build a 
relation with the Communists of Myanmar. In 1962 however the PRC changed its policy after 
Ne Win seized power, encouraging both the CPB and the BCP to join the peace talks with the 
new government74. Nevertheless the negotiations failed with both the groups and the gap 
separating Rangoon and Beijing deepened as the Council built closer relations with the USSR: 
this brought the PRC to label Burma as a reactionary country and to start a consistent even 
though not open support of the Communist insurgency in Myanmar75. Aware of this and further 
alarmed by the possibility that the country got infected by the recent Cultural Revolution, the 
relations between the two government worsen76; the decline finally culminated in the anti-
Chinese riots of 196677, which had their consequent equivalent in the anti-Burmese riots 
following in China78. 
In the mid-Sixties Ne Win started realizing that the shift to a military rule had not been well 
accepted by the people in general, so he decided it was necessary to give to the junta a civilian 
face. This was done first of all by the transformation of the BSPP in a people’s party, as it was 
actually promised at the moment of its creation. At the second congress of the party, the BSPP 
approved a draft constitution transforming Myanmar in a single-party socialist state called 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. 
In  January 1974 elections for the Assembly were held, though the BSPP was the only party 
allowed to run. In this occasion the military rule had official –though formal and not substantial– 
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ending as Ne Win resigned power in advantage of the Assembly. Not surprisingly however, this 
one soon after elected him as the President of the State Council i.e. head of the country79. 
The “demilitarization” of the government continued also in the economic field with the 
decadence of Tin Pe to the advantage of the formerly disqualified Aung Gyi. In 1973 the 
government decontrolled the trade market and suspended the export of rice, which caused the 
doubling of the national price of the good. The situation further worsened due to terrible floods, 
the outbreak of cholera epidemic and new students’ and monks’ riot following the return in 
Rangoon of the corpse of the former UN Secretary General U Thant, recently died in New 
York80; as a consequence in June the government closed the Universities again, established the 
martial law over the capital city for more than one year81, and finally extended its control over 
the sangha at the aforementioned All-Sangha All-Sect Convention of 198082.  
In 1976 Ne Win discovered a coup plot planned to assassinate him and other cadres of the party 
so that at the third BSPP Congress in advance in February 1977 he proceeded to purge the party 
eliminating the so called Gang of 113. At the next Congress held in August 1981 he announced 
his decision to abandon the chair of President of the Republic but this did not prevent him to 
keep a firm control on the country as he kept his authority over the state party until 1988. 
In 1981 a new forthcoming law citizenship, highly discriminatory of those who did not have 
“pure Burmese blood”, was announced: an expression of the dormant xenophobic sentiment 
developed by the Burmese during the colonial rule on one hand, and an extreme attempt of 
boosting national economical renaissance on the other. According to the law three categories of 
citizens come into existence: the genuine citizens were pure blood nationals, enjoying a status 
which could not be revoked and which enabled them to be elected for public posts; the “resident 
citizens” or “associate citizens” in turn were those immigrants, mainly Chinese and Indians, who 
had settled in Burma and applied for citizenship under the 1948 laws; this status did not admit 
dual citizenship and could be revoked in case of unmoral or disloyal conduct with respect to 
national affairs or interests; finally, the “naturalized citizens”, in great part belonging to the 
aforesaid two communities as well, were pre-1948 immigrants who did not apply for citizenship. 
Many considered this law as a way to disadvantage non-Asian immigrants’ enrichment and 
upliftment in the country, given that in such a way they were denied any option of assuming 
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official power, which was possible only for those enjoying the full citizenship83. The other two 
groups indeed «could not be given bureaucratic or military position, could not vote and were 
denied higher education»84. The most affected group was the Rohingya to whom any level of 
citizenship was denied, creating the basis of a persecution which continues still today. 
Ne Win’s period finished with the final crackdown of Burmese economy: after forming a special 
consortium for consultation on the Burmese question within the World Bank, countries like 
Japan, West Germany, but also PRC, started donating aid since the end of the Seventies; 
nevertheless, this did not prevent the economy to further worsen, and a new liberalization of the 
rice trade was launched by the general in 1987, but in vain. During the same year the situation 
became more critical after an unpopular demonetization of the kyat85, followed by the usual 
students’ protests. At the end of 1987 the situation bottomed out and Burma was given status of 
Least Developed Country by the UN86, thanks to which the country should have been enabled to 
receive highly subsidized loans. Significantly such a status, for whose obtainment Burma had to 
lobby since its literacy level was too high to meet the objective criteria, was not announced by 
the regime to the Burmese people.  
II.4. The military rule of the SLORC/SPDC and the fight for democracy 
(1988-present) 
The end of Ne Win’s era started with the so called 1988 popular revolution, which developed 
from relatively accidental events. Riots progressively spread and turmoil reached its peak in the 
sadly famous incident of the White Bridge in Rangoon, were students demonstrating against the 
one-party state were beaten to death and gang raped by the armed forces, the government 
refusing at that time and also in future any responsibility for the event. In response, the general 
closed the universities once again and declared the martial law over the capital city. Aung Gyi 
expressed all its disagreement towards the management of the emergence by the government in a 
letter in which he indicated in Ne Win’s economical policies the reason of national decline. 
Predictably, he was consequently arrested. Violence broke out again in various cities. In an 
extraordinary congress of the party in July 1988 U Aye Ko, in quality of General Secretary of the 
BSPP, admitted the failure of government’s economical policy and expressed the intention of 
going back to an open economy so to create the conditions to increase investments in the 
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country, which were what Burma needed more for rising again. In addition to this, since in Ne 
Win’s mind the bloody clashes of March and June proved that people did not trust the 
government, the general asked the congress to approve the proposal of holding a national 
referendum to decide whether Burma should remain a single-party state or shift to multipartism. 
In the second case, he asked to be allowed to resign from his role of Chairman of the party (full 
member indeed had no option of resigning and it would have required a change of party 
regulations). The Congress ended with the acceptance of an eventual resignation by Ne Win but 
with no possibility of leaving the party. 
At the tenth meeting of the BSPP Central Committee Sein Lwin was appointed Chairman of the 
party and became as a consequence President of the country. A staunch believer in the Burmese 
Way to Socialism known as “the butcher of Rangoon” for his previous management of revolts, 
students started protesting as he came to power. Since monks joined the protests, in August the 
government tried to ensure the support of the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee and the 
Sangha Nayaka committees through a number of agreements aimed to make sure they would not 
have allowed the monks to participate in the rioting. However, since violence escalated, the State 
Snagha Naha Nayaka Committee itself urged the government to respect the dasa raja dhamma 
and make concession to the people. In response, the Army entered Rangoon and built barricades 
to prevent the movement of demonstrators within the city; soon after Sein Lwin resigned from all 
his charges and was replaced by Dr. Maung Maung. 
Though people did not like the choice of Maung Maung because of the close relationship he had 
with Ne Win, immediately he demonstrated to have a different approach to the situation, making 
various concessions to the demonstrators, including a referendum about the future of Burmese 
one-party system. The measures, however, did not placate the riots. While the numbers of people 
joining the protest against the military rule was quickly growing, the personality of Aung San Su 
Kyi as new point of reference and eventually leader of the growing movement for democracy 
started coming out. Although, according to her declaration, at that time she felt she was still 
acting simply as a “kind of unifying force”, protestors began recognizing her as the new guide in 
the fight against the generals, especially after the famous speech she gave at the Shwedagon 
Pagoda in August.  
In September another emergency congress of the BSPP was held: aim of the meeting was voting 
with regard to a national referendum, as it had already been promised more than once since time. 
The great majority of the delegates however voted against the referendum and in favour of a 
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multi-party general election87. In the while, Nu, returned to Burma in 1980 under amnesty, was 
preparing his political return; the old man put himself at the head of a group of former politicians 
and leaders of his era and announced the creation of a parallel government88. On the other side, 
the leaders of the new pro-democracy movement who would have later resulted in the National 
League of Democracy (NLD)89, rejected the proposed multi-party election due to a number of 
reasons. 
Meanwhile the chaos increased due to the persistent strike of the government employees, 
fomented in their boycott by Su Kyi, and the progressive internal disintegration of the armed 
forces, less and less effective in facing the protestors. 
On the 18th September 1988 Maung Maung was overturned by a coup acted by Saw Maung, 
whose closeness to Ne Win brought many to consider it as a fake putsch. Immediately the new 
military government imposed the end of the strike and the curfew, stated that every association 
or demonstration would have been treated as a crime and ordered the shooting of those who 
resisted90. 
The group headed by Saw Maung who staged the coup was initially named Organization for 
Building Law and Order in the State, soon changed in State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC)91. The agenda of the SLORC was further detailed in four points: law and order; 
transport; food, clothing and shelter; democratic multi-party elections. Order, first of all, was to 
be established through the easy application of martial law. At the same time, in the perspective 
of achieving the fourth and final goal, the SLORC set the condition for a multi-party system with 
the Political Parties Registration Law92, which required all those formation wishing to run for 
the elections to be recorded by the Election Committee. 
Meanwhile in October 1988 the SLORC passed the Law on the Substitution of Terms, which 
renamed the country and the highest offices of the state; “Socialist Republic of the Union of 
Buma” was replaced “Union of Burma”93. Less than one year later, this reform would be 
completed by a two more regulations of the toponyms. In May the Council abolished the name 
“Burma” because derived from “Bama”, meaning “Burman” in Burmese language, and therefore 
considered to be discriminatory of ethnic minorities; as a consequence, it was substituted with 
“Myanma”, so that the new official name of the country became “Union of Myanma” (later 
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amended in Myanmar to recreate in English the particular intonation of the final syllable)94. In 
June the Adaptation of Expressions Law, aimed to modify the English names referring to 
Burmese people and places in order to make them more similar to the effective Burmese 
pronunciation. Behind this measure, a sort of symbolic re-appropriation of the country, there was 
the attempt of the junta of gaining consensus among the population in accordance to its typical 
hostility to foreign influence95. 
In February 1989 the Election Law Drafting Committee declared that election were to be held in 
May 1990, the precise date (27th May) being declared only in November. According to the draft 
Election Law all government employees, members of army and police, monks, ethnic rebels, 
foreigners were excluded from the active electorate; however, at the same time, the SLORC tried 
to guarantee that civilian servants supported the government or at least did not support the 
opposition by raising their salary and imposing to teachers not to get involved in political 
affairs96. 
As the organization of the forthcoming election was progressing, the main political parties 
running for them were finalizing their reshape. The most important transformation regarded the 
BSPP, which was officially dissolved but actually subjected to a cosmetic change. In September 
it was granted permission to both military and civilian members to resign from the party and all 
the properties of the former BSPP started being moved to the new National Unity Party (NUP). 
At the same time, Nu had organized his allies in a party called League for Democracy and Peace 
(LDP); although it was the first party produced by the anti-government movement given the 
composition of the line-up it failed to gain support among the youth97.  
In the same period the abovementioned leaders of the pro-democracy movement formed the 
National United Front for Democracy, soon renamed as National League for Democracy 
(NLD)98, being Aung San Suu Kyi the General Secretary, Tin U the Vice Chairman and Aung 
Gyi the Chairman. During the electoral campaign Tin U and Suu Kyi faced numerous 
intervention of the SLORC aimed to discourage their activity and disqualify them in the eyes of 
the masses. In front of Suu Kyi’s perseverance, the government started claiming she was a 
danger for public order and an instigator of turmoil and distrust towards the State and the Army. 
On July 20th both she and Tin U were placed under house arrest, followed by the arrest of 2,000-
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6,000 members of the League. In its attempt of undermine the League’s appeal, the SLORC 
started a propaganda campaign based on the association of Suu Kyi and the NLD with the BCP 
and foreign elements99. 
In addition to this, to extend its control over the pre-election phase, the junta allowed military 
trials to exercise summary trials; started a campaign for issuing citizenship cards for the check-in 
of the voters and, taking advantage of this to control the citizenship of political candidates, it 
started claiming the ineligibility both of Aung Gyi, who had a partly Chinese descent, and of Suu 
Kyi, because married to a western. Not even obstructing NLD rallies and imprisoning its 
representatives the SLORC could secure its victory. The awaited election were held on the 16th 
June 1990 and the NLD won 392 seats out of 447. The SLORC, expecting a victory for the NUP, 
initially complained about the validity of the balloting, not really an intelligent move given that 
the SLORC itself was responsible for ensuring the legitimacy of the voting. 
In front of the overwhelming victory reported by the League, the SLORC, not to transfer power 
to the NLD, suddenly changed what had been its position towards the election until the release of 
the results. In April indeed, little time before the election, when the Council was still sure it 
would have reported a landline victory over Aung San Su Kyi, the SLORC declared three of the 
four programmatic points achieved, only the election still to be fulfilled. After the publication of 
the results on the contrary, Saw Maung declared that the elections had been the only task the 
SLORC had realized, still remaining all the other ones100. Evidently not willing to resign in 
favour of the League, the Council started to de-democratizing Myanmar from June, violently 
repressing every expression of popular discontent, like in the clash between the Army and monks 
in Mandalay in August101. At the same time, it emphasized its anti-Suu Kyi propaganda stressing 
her Western background and her being a female, both features absolutely contrary to Burmese 
traditional political culture. In 1991 Suu Skyi received two important honours, the Sakhov Prize 
for Human Rights and the Nobel Peace Prize, which helped to draw attention on the struggle for 
freedom and democracy that Myanmar was fighting. However, the SLORC used the events to 
reinforce its prejudice towards Suu Kyi’s dangerous links with foreign powers. 
At the beginning of 1992 Saw Maung began showing evident symptoms of mental illness102. As 
a consequence his two most powerful deputies, Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe, competed for 
replacing him. Than Shwe won the competition, becoming initially Chief of the Army and then, 
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in April, also Chairman of the SLORC and, consequently, premier. His first scope was restoring 
internal security, so that he inaugurated a season of negotiation with the ethnic rebels, aimed to 
reach ceasefire agreements. After its collapse in 1989, great part of the BCP had transformed into 
ethnic armies. Between 1989 and 1990 the government created ceasefire agreements permitting 
the rebels to keep their weapons and control their areas, exploiting them economically, leaving 
the political arrangement to the post-constitutional era. Of course they should not engage in 
actions against Rangoon and their activity could not include the opium production103. Most of the 
groups agreed to ceasefires between 1993 and 1995; after the great number of the agreements 
had been signed, the government reorganized the ethnicities of the country identifying 135 
“officially recognized” groups104. These policies enabled the BCP, with a certain amount of 
plausibility, to claim to be the administration who better managed the ethnic issue in the recent 
history of the country. 
At the same time, he started a process of re-education of the teachers, considered responsible of 
the turbulence of the students, who demonstrated to be the strongest militant power in opposing 
the government. The government set up a re-education camp, the Central Institute of public 
Services, inspired by those built by the Red Guards during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 
In the attempt of improving Myanmar’s international prestige, the SLORC embarked in a 
number of “reforms” regarding the Council itself, the opposition, its domestic and its foreign 
policy. With regard to the domestic rule, the government put an end to the martial law, released a 
good number of political prisoners and allowed Suu Kyi, still under house arrest, to receive visit 
of her family. In terms of foreign policy it tried to uplift its image by rejoining the Non-Aligned 
Movement, signing four articles of the Geneva Convention and hosting a Convention of the 
Colombo Plan in the capital city. The biggest change however arrived in 1997 when the SLORC 
was abolished and replaced by the State Peace Development Council (SPDC). Still today it is 
discussed which has been the real reason for the junta to make such a change, given that it 
revealed to be more formal than substantial, bringing many scholars to refer to the 
“SLORC/SPDC” as one single period. Finally, the explication which appears most probable is to 
link the reform to the necessity of new respectability aimed to the admission in ASEAN: since 
Myanmar was preparing to get its membership in 1997, the “cosmetic change”105 was decided. 
Also the purge acted in March 2002 has been seen as a move to please ASEAN by removing the 
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corrupted Ne Win’s old guard (which had continuously exercised its influence during the 
SLORC era). 
Though the two institutions show strong similarities based on the communal military and 
authoritarian characterization of their power, there are some differences. One of the peculiarity 
of the SPDC has been the concentration of power in a small minority at the top, constituted by 
four generals: Than Shwe, Maung Aye, Khin Nyunt and Tin Oo (dead in 2001)106. Khin Nyunt 
and Maung Aye especially competed with each other to affirm their authority on the 
organization; finally Khin Nyunt prevailed becoming prime minister in August 2003. He was 
brought down by a purge in 2004 that “although clearly the result of Khin Nyunt’s long political 
rivalry with Maung Aye […] was characterized as a move by the SPDC to eradicate 
corruption107, because of his numerous smuggling crimes”108. Under the economic point of view 
the SPDC, initially enjoyed the benefits of the investments following the liberalization of trade 
and the investment-friendly policies adopted by the SLORC starting from November 1989109. 
Foreign companies, especially Japanese, South Korean, Western, Taiwanese and American 
quickly entered the re-opened Burmese market, as Myanmar appeared as a source of cheap 
labour and a virgin market for the placement of their products. In the mid-Nineties Western 
companies practiced a first boycott following Aung San Suu Kyi’s admonishment of June 1989, 
in which the leader of the NLD censured them for doing business in Myanmar given the 
violation of human rights perpetrated by the Burmese government. The boycott, however, did 
not really impact the country since the space left by the Western investors was quickly occupied 
by companies within the ASEAN. As a consequence, foreign investments kept giving the 
SLORC “an economic lifeline”110 thanks to the policy of appeasement towards Burma played by 
the ASEAN. 
The neutral attitude of the organization towards the country changes as the humanitarian issue 
also started representing a potential destabilizing factor in the area of its concern. The 
persecution led by the government against the Arakanese Muslims called Rohingyas111, cause of 
a flood of refugees in the neighbouring Bangladesh, and the incursion of Myanmar army in Thai 
territory as a consequence of attacks led against the KNU. As a consequence of increasing 
ASEAN concern, the SLORC decided the move on the transformation in SPDC. In January 
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1997, despite the opposition of the US and the EU to Burma’s inclusion, the country obtained its 
membership in the organization112. In response, Europe suspended preferential trade benefits to 
Burma and the US adopted a ban on US investment, being America Burma’s fourth most 
important investor113. In recent times, as a consequence of the renewed arrest of Suu Kyi in 2003 
the Bush administration approved the Freedom and Democracy Act, imposing new sanctions on 
Burma. The effectiveness of the measure was highly criticized since, affecting the textile 
workers, it compelled many jobless women to enter the sex industry, leaving on the other hand 
the SPDC completely untouched114. Nevertheless, due to the persistent imprisonment of the NLD 
leader, in August 2006 the Freedom and Democracy Act was extended. Beside the controversial 
question of the sanction, the SPDC years are characterized, under the economical point of view, 
for building of strong relations with the PRC, important source of military hardware, low-interest 
loans and technical advisors, followed by Russia115 and India116. 
In 2005 the government of Than Shwe suddenly announced to move the capital city from 
Rangoon to another location whose construction was in progress, later named Naypyidaw 
Myodaw117. The unexpected decision and the celebrative style used by the general had strong 
reminiscence in the tradition of the ancient Buddhist kings and revealed the intention of the 
premier to emulate them. Since an official reason justifying the measure has never been given, 
many speculations arose about it118. The relocation definitely indicates that the junta is 
centralizing its control over the country, however the most popular explication referred to the 
yadaya119 acted by Than Shwe following the forecast of an astrologist that Rangoon would have 
soon exploded. 
The forecast was finally confirmed in 2007 by the outbreak of the so called Saffron Revolution, a 
protest led by the monks in support of the more general demonstrations against the economic 
policies of the government. As protestors were physically beaten by the police, from Mandalay, 
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ancient Burmese capital and main monastic centre of the country, the sangha spread the order to 
refuse donations from the families of the government élite, the most severe excommunication for 
a Buddhist believer120. Though the manifestation was pacific in nature, monks were violently 
beaten –an act which is illegal according to Buddhist laws– and in some cases killed. The fact, 
beside representing an incredibly significant event in the history of the relations between the 
sangha and Burmese political power, drew the attention of the international observers on 
Myanmar. The United Nations, after the Gambari report was released, urged the junta to open 
negotiations with the NLD, but without effective results. 
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Chapter III 
“China and Burma” 
 
 
III.1. China-Burma relations 
III.1.1. From the PRC to the Cultural Revolution 
 
Burma-China relations have always been strongly determined by two elements: the proximity of 
the two countries, which has caused in Burma a constant fear of its giant neighbour, and the 
porous nature of the border dividing them. During the Wold War II, between 1942 and 1945 
Chinese militia of the GMD used to cross and settle inside and outside the Sino-Burmese border, 
as well as Burmese freedom fighters, who frequently used Chinese territory as a shelter. The 
government of Nanjing recognized Burma very early in September 1947, but the Chinese 
Nationalists were soon shook by the threat represented by the Communist led by Mao Zedong, 
who in turn showed support to the Burmese independence cause in 1945. As the Communists 
overthrew the Nationalists, however, the relations with Rangoon worsened as Burma showed 
resistance to join the Leftist block after its independence in 1948. The fact that Burma did not 
want to make the left turn and explicitly take their side was not well accepted by Beijing that 
soon dubbed the gained independence of the country as product of appeasement toward 
imperialism. Beijing began to spread its influence across the border: inhabitants of the villages 
controlled by the Communist guerrilla were subjected to Maoist indoctrination and the Chinese 
and the Burmese Communist parties were said to have associated with each other. As a 
consequence, the authorities of Yunnan joined the Burmese government in counter attacking the 
Maoist offensive; the Chinese nationalist authorities then, based on the fact that the local 
Yunnanese government had no qualification to act as such, let their troops invade Burmese 
territory after having crossed the border with the Southern province. In this way the stationing of 
GMD troops on Burmese soil began, a fact which, besides giving an idea of the abnormality of 
Sino-Burmese relations, represented for long time a thorn in the side for Rangoon in its 
friendship with Beijing1.  
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As the PRC was officially established, the relations between the countries kept being 
complicated: On the eve of the Korean War Beijing Rangoon received the intimation from 
Beijing not to let any Western power building base on Burmese soil. But soon after Burma voted 
along the UN majority in condemning Chinese-backed North Korea as aggressor, move which 
represented a great affront in the eyes of the Chinese. This, together with rumours of 
collaboration of the country with the British and the Americans, was enough to make the PRC 
identify Burma as a state servant to capitalism. As a consequence, by the end of 1950 the 
Chinese and the Burmese Communists were said to have again joined hands.  
The opportunity to make peace with Beijing was given by the UN resolution branding the PRC 
as an aggressor in the Korean War, with an embargo as a punishment. Burma voted against the 
resolution on February 1951 and soon after the new Burmese ambassador in Peking made 
declarations about the realized importance of China’s role in Asia. 
In 1952 Premier U Nu expressed his willingness to seek and accept aid both from China and 
from the USSR, with the condition that no “strings” were attached, in accordance to its policy of 
strict neutralism2. The alignment of Rangoon was evident during the Asian Socialist Conference, 
held in January-February 1953 and sponsored by Burma: in this occasion Burma’s intervention 
attacked the imperialism of the Soviet block but carefully avoided to talk about the PRC. Soon 
after, in connection with its own measures adopted against the GMD militias stationing in its 
territory, Burma asked the UN to brand Nationalist China as an aggressor3. 
The attitude Burma developed starting from 1953 has been dubbed by the newspaper the Nation 
as a “One sided love affair”: Burma began in evident way to make efforts to please Beijing 
through its friendly moves in foreign policy4. Also China, anyways, replied to Burma’s advance 
with a certain number of moves, basically diplomatic meetings and opening of official cultural 
ties. In February of the same year the PRC offered help to Burma for solving the problem of the 
GMD trespassing by sending its troops there, but the proposal made the Burmese more scared 
than glad. 
1953 was the year of new developments in Sino-Burmese relations. In 1954 thanks to the support 
of an international group constituted by US, Thailand and Nationalist China, the GMD militias 
were partly evacuated, removing in this way a “thorn” in the side of Communist China and 
Burma. 
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In April a major trade agreement between the two countries was signed. 
In June Zhou Enlai visited Burma, confirming in his public speech the 5 principles of peaceful 
coexistence. In November new trade agreements were concluded, establishing that the PRC 
would have bought great amounts of Burmese rice. 
During this period Burma’s neutralist policy gradually took shape, as Rangoon progressively 
addressed its critics to the US-PRC dispute as hegemonic attempt detrimental to Asia peaceful 
coexistence, and built closer ties with anti-Communist neighbours such as Thailand. 
Thanks to further trade contracts in 1955, Chinese installations and equipment started arriving to 
Burma and, while travelling towards the Asian and African Conference, Zhou Enlai remarkably 
visited U Nu, confirming soon after at Bandung the willingness of the PRC to respect the Sino-
Burmese border. In view of Zhou’s declaration, when U Nu flew to America, he even attempted 
to mediate between Beijing and Washington, which of course resulted in no outcome. 
In the fall of 1955 new cultural relations were created, further diplomatic exchanges took place, 
and several Sino-Burmese protocols and agreements were signed. Burma’s concern not to offend 
China was evident in occasion of the informal visit that Mrs. Sun Yatsen paid to Burma: after 
some Rangoon-based newspaper made reference to her, the police immediately arrested the 
editors5. 
Soon after U Nu resigned from Prime Minister in favour of U Ba Swe because of the new 
strength demonstrated by the opposition and the necessity of giving a new organization to its 
own party. During this time, U Nu reportedly suspected the financial support given by the 
Chinese embassy to its political opponents, but in its declaration such an allegation always 
appeared to be down-toned and he avoided addressing the PRC in explicit way. 
In 1956, anyways the border issue came to the fore once again and numerous Chinese 
Communist troops entered Burma, the PRC justifying the act maintaining that those troops were 
necessary to preserve peace in the border Wa district in the Northeast of the Shan State. The 
situation did not degenerate only thanks to the calm of the Burmese leaders and their intention 
not to further provoke a reaction from Beijing. In October U Nu made a special trip to Beijing by 
invitation of Zhou Enlai to negotiate about the border settlement, which was finally reached in 
1960. 
Since Burmese independence from the British, three major agreements had been concluded, in 
1894, 1897, and 19416. According to these agreements, however, two of the four sections of the 
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Sino-Burmese borderline remained without a defined status. The Nu-Zhou negotiations reached 
the following terms of the deal: Peking would have recognized the frontier line lying in the Wa 
district which was located in 1941, but never ratified by China, and Chinese forces stationed 
west of this line would have been repatriated7; three villages in the Kachin State –Hpimaw, 
Gawlum, Kangfang– which the McMahon Line of 1914 included without Chinese approval, 
would have been returned to Beijing, and Burmese forces would analogously be evacuated; a 
negotiated settlement dealt with the issue of the Namwan Assigned Tract, under “perpetual 
lease” to Burma since British times and extending between the Shan and Kachin States. 
The Sino-Burmese Agreement on the Boundary Question however was finally signed in Beijing 
in January 1960 by Ne Win and Zhou Enlai along with the Non-Aggression Treaty. The final 
version of the Boundary settlement basically reproduced the abovementioned terms; the Non- 
aggression treaty, on the other hand, contained two important statements.  
Art. 3 established that «each contracting party undertakes not to carry out acts of aggression 
against the other and not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other party». In 
this way the Burma government agreed to formally limit its freedom of action in terms of self 
defence. As a matter of fact, the Non-Aggression Treaty conferred to the Beijing a veto over 
Burma’s future foreign relations in respect to military defence. Such a bond however did not 
prevent in 1963 rumours about secret Burmese acquisition of American and West-German 
weapons to spread8. 
China did not welcome the move and clearly expressed its concern and irritation over Burmese 
“deviationism” when in July 1964 Premier Zhou Enlai visited Myanmar. Zhou explicitly asked 
Ne Win to reaffirm his understanding of Art.3 of the Treaty. Though the General agreed to the 
Chinese request, no specific statement about the “right” interpretations of the commitment was 
included in the final report. 
On the other hand, Art. 4 stated that «The contracting parties declare they will develop and 
strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the two states in a spirit of friendship and 
cooperation in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and mutual non 
interference in each other’s internal affairs»9.  
Though equality is prescribed as conditional, when the cooperation is to be done between a big 
power vis-à-vis a small and weak partner, it is likely that the partnership will finally result in the 
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extension of the first’s influence over the second. As a matter of fact, trade exchanges between 
the two countries increased in absolute terms, but the equality clause did not receive application. 
In the meantime, while the negotiation for the border agreement continued, the two countries 
engaged in the so called “People’s Diplomacy”, consisting in the solid exchange of a wide 
variety of public subjects and entities such as trade unionists, leaders of Parliament, officials, 
youth delegates, medical personnel, journalists, sportsmen, important political personages etc. 
From this point of view, the Burmese decision of accepting again US aid in 1959 represented 
somehow an exceptional move, but could also be interpreted as «Rangoon’s new found sense of 
relative safety with the final working-out of the boundary question»10.  
The cultural diplomacy in which the two countries engaged in this period however, seemed to 
have two different meanings in Beijing and in Rangoon11; the Burmese government apparently 
considered these ties as a genuine proof of availability and goodwill towards China, while the 
Chinese probably looked at the people’s diplomacy as to an instrument to promote Chinese 
interests, eliminate Western potential influence from the country –the American in particular– 
and boost the creation of closer ties with the PRC.  
This would represent additional evidence of the fact that the Chinese have generally speaking 
demonstrated to possess a much clearer idea of their targets when compared to the frequently 
inscrutable Burmese policy; this feature of Chinese conduction of international affairs came 
along with a strong sense of urgency about their achievement, which is evident in PRC’s 
interaction with Myanmar12.  
A clear evidence of the “realist” conception of such a policy is given by the fact that all the 
associations involved in it from the Chinese side –the Burma-China Friendship Association, the 
All Burma Peace Committee, the People’s Democratic Youth League, the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee, etc– used to work as centre of distribution of pro-PRC propaganda aimed to 
influence the Burmese to take a favourable position toward China and an hostile one towards 
China’s adversaries. It was not a case that in 1967 these same organizations were involved in 
Cultural Revolution activities which culminated in the anti-Chinese riot, casus belli of the Sino-
Burmese rift. Not a case also that after the 1967 crisis these pro-Chinese political organizations, 
given the worsening of the relation between the two governments, stopped being active13.  
In February 1964 the Chinese Premier Chen Yi and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai visited Burma. 
According to foreign press the scope of the visit was to obtain the General’s support and 
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endorsement of forthcoming Chinese call for a second Afro-Asian Conference to be held in PRC 
and primarily aimed to discuss, among other things, the Sino-Indian border dispute. This was 
based on the fact that, one week prior to Zhou’s arrival in Rangoon, Ne Win flew to the Indian 
capital receiving from Nehru the request to support India’s call for a conference of non-aligned 
nations to be held in Cairo with the exclusion of the PRC. Sandwiched between the two opposite 
petitions, the General resorted to its evergreen neutralism and urged the two powerful neighbours 
to accept the Colombo powers recommendations as a starting point to find an accommodation to 
their territorial dispute. 
In 1966 Chairman Liu Shaoqi visited Myanmar once again along with Zhou Enlai. Liu’s tones 
were vehemently anti-imperialist and anti-American; in addition to this, with regard to the 
Vietnam affair, he explicitly accused the US for having acted as an aggressor and for having 
refused the NLF’s peace proposals. By doing this, Liu intimated to Burma to adopt a more active 
role in the anti-imperialist struggle along with China. The Chairman’s intention was to exhort the 
country to demonstrate greater commitment to the Chinese cause by opposing the American 
Vietnam’s policy. Given Burma’s tenacious neutralism, China’s frustration over its failure to 
make Burma support Chinese foreign policy has been, with great probability, one of the reasons 
of the deterioration of the bilateral relations which brought to the rift of 1967. Generally, most 
commentators agree that the major cause of the schism was the Chinese Cultural Revolution and 
China’s consequent attempt to “export it”, even to nations who enjoyed friendly relation with the 
PRC14. In sum, it is possible to conclude that PRC’s failure over making Burma a Chinese client 
state and the advent of the Cultural Revolution were the main causes of the Sino-Burmese 
breakup which occurred at the end of the 1960s.  
With reference to the second motivation, still unclear why China wanted to export the Cultural 
Revolution in Burma, and a number of explications appear as possible. A first cause for the PRC 
to embark in its “Red Guard Diplomacy” could have been its own status of chaos due to the 
revolutionary situation itself; from this point of view, the exportation of the revolutionary 
enthusiasm could have been an outward “spill-over effect” of Chinese domestic reality15. 
Another possibility is that China, always divided between the urgency of improving government-
to-government relations with Rangoon and the necessity of maintaining links with the local 
Communists, decided to use “hard” ways to force Ne Win to accept the BCP participation in the 
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government. This possibility could be supported by the fact that China saw Burma as very weak 
due to its economic crisis, considering  relatively easy task to make the government capitulate16. 
Whatever was the motivation of China, its revolutionary approach to Burma did not produce the 
planned results, but contributed to strengthen Ne Win’s determination to resist to Chinese 
influence and to create greater unity in support of the regime17. 
Another important aspect in the development of Burma’s relations with China concerned trade 
and economic assistance. In 1961 a trade agreement was signed and consequently trade increased 
between the two nations but, as mentioned, the “principle of equilibrium between the value of 
imports and exports” was not respected. 
In the same year also an agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation was concluded. 
Chinese experts started arriving in Burma in 1962, but by 1967 only three of the thirteen 
negotiated projects had been completed, so that Chinese aid program finally revealed to be a 
failure, and it gave occasion to the PRC to accuse Burma of having sabotaged the joint projects. 
At that time however, China was not the only foreign aid supplier for Burma; the number of 
donors included Japan, the World Bank, the Colombo Plan and United Nations Development 
Program, among the others18.  
Chinese influence in Burma increased between 1960 and 1962 but, as mentioned before, after Ne 
Win’s advent the issuing by the Revolutionary Council of the Burmese Way to Socialism 
(BWTS) negatively affected such an achievement, as the BWTS was precisely designed to 
reduce foreign influence in Burma, especially the Chinese one. The new governmental manifesto 
represented an affront and an obstacle to Burma, as the government stopped its propaganda 
activities and establishing control over Chinese run schools19.  
The search for a stably neutral position brought Rangoon to adopt positions which were non-
aligned with or directly contrary to Chinese ones in a number of occasions. 
Rangoon signed the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 while China opposed it; it recognized as Indian 
territory a portion of land claimed by China in the Sino-Indian border dispute; it favoured the 
formation of Malaysia vis-à-vis Chinese disapproval; it struggled to maintain a neutral position 
in the Vietnam War despite Chinese anti US and pro NLF engagement and its attempt of 
involving Rangoon; Burma maintained positive relations with USSR while Beijing had 
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embarked in a ideological-hegemonic competition with Moscow; finally, Burma remained 
neutral even in the in the Laotian issue in face of China’s supports to the Pathet Lao. 
Burma’s political leaders have however consistently tried to maintain cordial relations with 
China. Burma’s adoption of a policy of neutralism, on the other hand, was undoubtedly 
influenced by its geographical position, imposing the necessity of avoid antagonizing Beijing: 
China was, again, the main reason for Burma’s neutralism. 
As a consequence of the 1967 rift, however, for a period the relations were tense and highly 
ideological, especially from the Chinese side. Between 1967 and 1970 the PRC launched a wave 
of anti Burmese propaganda while Chinese media praised the BCP armed struggle against the 
Rangoon government.  
The National Chinese News Agency (NCNA) called for the Burmese people to the CPB’s efforts 
to rebel against the Revolutionary Council and establish a democratic government following 
Chinese example.  
This attitude however showed that Burma was determined not to capitulate under Chinese 
pressure. This led Beijing to realize that the main result obtained from its effort of exporting the 
revolution was «to burn many of the bridges to the world outside that Peking so carefully 
constructed during the post Bandung era of peaceful coexistence». The disadvantages got from 
its Red Guard Diplomacy probably played a role in the reshaping of Chinese strategy in 
Southeast Asia, especially with respect to Burma. 
This hostile post-1967 phase, being a by-product of the Cultural Revolution, finished as the 
Revolution itself began to agonize.  
In 1968, after premier Zhou Enlai had regained control of the Foreign Ministry overthrowing the 
Revolution Group20, China began to make peaceful overtures to Burma. This new pacification 
took place despite the obvious continuing close ties between China and the Burma Communist 
Party (BCP). Thus Rangoon’s intentions to improve relations with the PRC in the belief that 
China would have helped in containing the Communist rebels proved to be wrong at least for a 
little bit longer, since the first phase of Chinese Burma policy after the rift saw the development 
of the so called “dual track diplomacy”.  
III.1.2. The end of the dual track diplomacy towards Burma 
After Zhou Enlai led his conservative counterattack against the Cultural Revolution group, he 
impressed a new rebalanced spirit to China’s Burma policy. The decision of the leader reflected 
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the awareness that revolutionary expectations in Burma had been overestimated and that China 
began to doubt the failure. Beijing began to move toward a rapprochement with the Burmese 
regime. 
Burmese efforts of reconciliation started in earnest in 1969 as Burmese troops stopped their 
border patrols after clashes with the PLA. In January 1969 Ne Win flew to Pakistan, reportedly 
to discuss with Chinese officials in Rawalpindi about perspective for an improvement in bilateral 
relations. 
Despite Ne win’s sense of urgency regarding this important matter, the process of normalization 
was slow in showing its first tangible steps. The fact that Burma apparently wanted to downplay 
Chinese importance through the “boycott” of functions of the PRC sending as representatives 
only low-level officials, contributed to the delay21. 
However, both nations appeared to have agreed in 1970 to restore official diplomatic 
representatives in the reciprocal embassies. 
After this moment, starting from 1971, China inaugurated its new “Dual track policy”, aimed to 
maintain its role of leader of the non-soviet communist block and supporter of the revolution 
while making efforts to improve bilateral relations with those Asian government who had 
suffered of its extremist shift in 196722. Burma was, among the most evident case. 
This was somehow a continuation of the dual policy Beijing had always held with Burma since 
the Bandung era, maintaining good relations with U Nu and secretly supporting the BCP at the 
same time23. After the rift however, this last aspect of Chinese two faced approach to Burma 
progressively diminished.  
In this phase the CCP was challenged by the dilemma of assessing how much help it should have 
given to communist parties in Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines providing 
material support and setting up clandestine radios, without affect the relation with the same 
Southeast Asian countries where the insurgency was taking place24. The fact that Beijing 
successfully normalized diplomatic relations with Rangoon in 1971 and kept them positive in a 
certain way was the proof that it was able to balance the two alternatives of the dilemma and that 
the dual track policy was working. 
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Beijing’s shift was due to a new importance given to Southeast Asian countries within the 
changed international situation characterized by the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute and 
the emergence of the Sino-US rapprochement25.  
Chinese leadership’s readiness in reshaping its position on revolutionary movements as to serve 
in the best way its foreign policy interest proved once again its strongly realist posture in the 
conduction of international relations26. 
The success of China in restoring its relations with the Burma government to the pre-1967 level 
was  evident in the reception given to General Ne Win during his informal trip to China at the 
invitation of premier Zhou Enlai. 
Both the countries appeared to be satisfied by the interested in the reconciliation. Beijing realized 
that the Burmese communist forces were breaking up27; moreover it had cogent problems to deal 
with, namely the internal post-revolution reconstruction and the external relations with the 
USSR, the US and Vietnam. Rangoon in turn, since it desired reconciliation with Beijing, 
demonstrated to be receptive to the Chinese flattery. Confirmation of the newfound harmony was 
Burma’s vote, along with the majority of the UN General Assembly, for the expulsion of Taiwan 
out of the UN to the advantage of Beijing, in October 197128.  
Since 1975 however a number of significant changes created a challenge to dual track diplomacy 
and as a result China further reduced its ties with insurgencies in favour of strengthening 
governmental ties. With respect to Sino-Burmese relations this resulted in the detachment of the 
CCP from the BCP. 
The shift was due to the most recent upheavals in Vietnam and to the awareness of the new 
Dengist leadership of the inefficiency of the old pro-guerrilla strategy. The return of Deng 
Xiaoping in 1978 put an end to the attention to insurgent movements and made of the creation of 
closer ties with the West the new priority29. The motivation of this change lied in the fact that 
China’s relations with its former ally Vietnam deteriorated dramatically. After Vietnam 
concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with the USSR in the fall of 1978 Vietnamese forces 
invaded Democratic Kampuchea, China’s client state. China perceived Vietnam as ground for 
the expansion of Soviet hegemony in Southeast Asia and consequently pointed out the 
improvement of relations with Vietnam’s opponents as a necessary means to contain Soviet-
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Vietnamese influence30. China’s concern about Soviet expansionism increased as a consequence 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In sum, classifying the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea as phases of a grand strategy of 
global domination31, with its new “three worlds” doctrine the PRC urged Japan, China, Australia, 
and Southeast Asia to cooperate32. Several Southeast Asian nations however remained suspicious 
of Beijing’s long-term intentions in the region, remaining the CCP’s ties with the other 
Communist parties a thorn in the side in their relation with the PRC. Given the urgency or 
counterattacking the USSR by creating joining hands with these governments, China finally 
decided to progressively abandon the brother parties, whose support anyways had turned in “a 
waste of time and money”33. 
With regard to Burma, Beijing approach to the BCP was initially to push the  BCP and the 
central government to negotiate with each other34, while downplaying Chinese support for the 
insurgents. Beijing was apparently influential in arranging negotiations between the Communists 
and Rangoon in 1980, but Ne Win unwillingness to make concessions to the BCP put both the 
BCP and China in an uncomfortable position35. In addition to reduced material support and 
pressure towards negotiation from China, the party had also suffered defections because of a 
government amnesty program launched in the same year. Beijing’s ties with the BCP, moreover 
where negatively affecting its new Southeast Asian policy, perpetuating the perception that 
communist parties in the region were CCP’s proxies. As a consequence, the BCP line 
progressively diverged from that of Beijing and as the Party experienced increasing internal 
difficulties from 1975, China took distance from it. 
The four major causes of the failure of the Burmese Communists are the following; first, the 
weakness following purges within its ranks36; second, its incompetence in collect the ethnic rebel 
forces under its leadership, in an organized war against Rangoon37; third, the consensus enjoyed 
by the BCP was affected by the shadow of the CCP since, like in other Southeast Asian 
countries, it appeared as the surrogate of China’s Communism: its progressive identification with 
China, in great part product of the governmental counter-propaganda, made him appear as lackey 
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of Beijing and traitor of the country38; the Communist finally made the mistake of establishing a 
regime of terror in the villages the occupied in central and Southern Burma, showing no respect 
for monks, shrines and consequently pushing the population to collaborate with the government 
in planning surprise attacks against its bases. These led the CPB to perform a “Long March” to 
Northern Burma which made it lose greater control over the territory. 
The deterioration of the BCP’s relations with the CCP, however, did not seem to have a huge 
impact on Burma’s foreign policy. Rangoon showed no inclination to alter its policy neutralism, 
isolationism and non-alignment39. 
In this phase the PRC started making efforts to improve relations with the Burmese government 
without seemingly undermine its commitment to support the communist insurgency in Burma. 
Chinese support for “wars of national liberation” was not a direct out growth of the Cultural 
Revolution. China’s identification with the Burmese insurgent movement dates back many years, 
since its founding the PRC has given at least tacit support to the CBP. After the 1960 border 
agreement and friendship treaty the PRC was reluctant to publicly support the CPB; after 1967 
China begun putting increasing emphasis on a long standing policy. On Burma’s side: Chinese 
assistance to the rebels had been widely suspected before that time, but then started explicitly 
linking insurgent activity with external support. 
But despite China’s apparent increased aids to support the CPB victory for the guerrilla appeared 
remote. 
III.1.3. Contemporary times 
Myanmar-China relations, in sum, seemed to fit, albeit somewhat irregularly, into the pattern of 
post-Cold War Chinese relations with Southeast Asia. (Of course the secrecy surrounding the 
policies of both the regimes makes it difficult to discern trends and implications with great 
precisions). From the late 1980s to the early 1990s the two governments joined hands in their 
mutual search for international contacts and support during a period when both were isolated by 
the Western governments and their followers40.  
Myanmar’s solitude was particularly strong: unlike China and its Southeast Asian neighbours the 
military junta persisted in its cruel repression and obstinate isolationism; the generals’ 
incompetence in dealing with the problems of the country, first of all its economic stagnation, 
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further impoverished the country and created a paradoxical situation: Myanmar desperately 
needed to open itself to the world, but kept antagonizing the great part of it. A certain level of 
reluctance existed also towards the PRC, thus the common ground which China succeed in 
building with other neighbours on the basis of mutual interest –the “economic win-win 
cooperation (jingji shang hezuo gongying)41– was less in the case of China-Myanmar relations. 
Nevertheless, the Myanmar government supported export of natural resources such as natural gas 
and hydroelectric power to China in return for goods and payments beneficial to the members of 
the regime. China benefitted from the resources provided by Myanmar and Chinese in the 
country increased notably. As a consequence, though with some exceptions, Myanmar-China 
relations appeared to follow the same path of the general post-Cold War relations which China 
established with the rest of Southeast Asia42. 
Need and isolation “forced” Myanmar to build a relation with China43. In front of such a 
situation, perhaps fearing an excessive shift in favour of the PRC, the admission process of 
Burma in the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) has been facilitated. 
Within ASEAN Myanmar’s role appeared to be in line with Chinese interests44, basically that 
organization avoids to embark in policies which could damages China’s rising influence in 
Southeast Asia45. 
At the same time China seemed aware that Myanmar was reluctant to fall under its control, as 
Myanmar tried to improve its relations with India, others in Southeast Asia and other powers, 
possibly including the US; in this perspective, the visit of the American Secretary of States 
Hillary Clinton to Myanmar in December 2011 seemed to open a new trend in Myanmar’s search 
for advantages, though Burmese leaders maintain a certain level of unpredictability in their 
policy-making. 
While Burmese position was not dangerous to Chinese revisionism in the South China Sea and 
presumably, and was probably willing to moderate differences between China and other ASEAN 
nations, at the same time tension came back along the Sino-Burmese border in 2009. 
Despite these divergences, the PRC –motivated by the need of secure border stability and by the 
strategic relevance of Myanmar in Beijing’s geopolitical play in the area– continued to provide 
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active support for Myanmar even in its worst moments. China built numerous partnerships with 
Myanmar, among the others, while the generals wholly enjoyed the benefits deriving from 
Chinese economic and military aid, as well as its political support within the UN. China opposed 
Western-led proposals to boycott the Myanmar regime. Even vis-à-vis the possibility of suffering 
a boycott of the 2008 Olympic games due to its support to the Burmese authoritarianism China 
kept sustaining the military junta within the UN and with or when dealing with other powers.  
After Cyclone Nargis devastated the Irrawaddy delta in 2008 the generals obtusely refused any 
assistance which could not be controlled by their government, worsening the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis. The PRC offered Myanmar Chinese aid, though modest, in face of general 
criticism by the international actors and public opinion. Soon however China itself was shook by 
a natural calamity in Sichuan, consequently focusing its efforts in the domestic emergency. 
In 2009 Chinese relations with countries in the area and the US worsen due to its territorial 
claims; in parallel, China confirmed its support to the Tatmadaw regime, which was preparing to 
the transition towards the civilian rule (elections were planned for November 2010). 
Myanmar however seemed to be intentioned to take advantage of Chinese situation to enhance 
control over some of the armed militias along the Sino-Burmese border, source of insurgency 
against the Burmese government from the 1960s until a chase fire reached in 1980s. Apparently 
the Tatmadaw intervention against local militias violated the terms of the aforesaid agreement. In 
addition to this, the raid caused a flux or refugees, whose number was estimated more than 
35,000, heading towards China. Calm was eventually restored thanks to the Chinese goodwill to 
solve the problem in pacific way. 
Despite these divergences over the territorial problem, China maintained high level collaboration 
with Beijing: Chinese vice president Xi Jinping arrived in Myanmar in December 2009 to 
discuss economic partnerships and in November the forthcoming construction of a pipeline to 
connect Myanmar coast with mainland China was announced46.  
While busy in the ongoing territorial dispute with the US and Southeast Asian countries over the 
South China Sea region, China never missed to pay attention to Burma. Wen Jiabao visited 
Naypidaw in June 2010, concluding a number of agreements, regarding oil and gas pipelines 
across Myanmar to directly link China with the IO and to avoid shipping through the Strait of 
Malacca, communication facilities, a hydroelectric power station, aid packages. In addition to 
this the Burmese generals updated the Chinese leader with regard to their intention to slightly 
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and progressively open democratization. The meeting was concluded with the reconfirmation of 
the reciprocal promise to maintain stability. 
General Than Shwe in turn visited China in September 2010, seeking Chinese support for the 
election that were going to be held in two months; China guaranteed its endorsement and strong 
support against criticism proceeding from the international community about the elections.  
As promised China endorsed the results of the November 2010 polls, and Chinese officials were 
reported to have acted as mediators between the Tatmadaw and some minorities along the Sino-
Burmese frontier supported by and associated to China. China’s availability is understandable 
given the relevance of the maintenance of stability along the border and during the civilian 
transition for the successful fulfilment of Chinese-participated project (in particular the 
pipelines) and for Chinese growing economic and strategic interest in the country. Continued 
China-Myanmar high level meetings confirmed the PRC as Burmese leading partner. 
New problems along the border arose in 2011: Myanmar launched an intervention to disarm an  
ethnic-based independent security force without knowing it was tied to China along another 
section of the border; the fact occurred affected negatively China representing an obstacle for an 
important Chinese dam project in Myanmar. In the end the works were interrupted by Thein 
Shwe government in September. China obviously reacted with surprise, urged for a rapid and 
peaceful solution of the matter.  
The overall trend of the Sino-Burmese relations demonstrates that Chinese leaders have been 
flexible and available in building closer ties with Myanmar. Myanmar in turn has revealed to be 
an obstinate and unpredictable ally, at the same time aware of the value of Chinese support in 
economic, military and political terms. Burmese priority has always been and still is the 
avoidance of an excessive dependence from any hegemonic power, China in particular, as it was 
the main source of threat for the Southeast Asian country since modern times.47 China is 
perfectly conscious that such a posture adopted by the Burmese leaders generates limits to 
foreign influence (especially the Chinese one) on the decision making in Myanmar; at the same 
time, however, Beijing does not renounce to its efforts, building influence through trade, 
development, investment appealing for both the governments. 
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III.2. Chinese interests in Burma 
 
III.2.1. Strategic Interests: arms deals and expansion in the IOR 
Arms deals 
Strategic relations between China and Burma have been instrumental for the interests both of the 
Tatmadaw –to obtain arm deals which could allow it expand the military and strengthen its 
power over the country– and of the CCP –to extend Chinese influence on the “reject” country  
and get strategic benefits in its new Indian Ocean strategy. As a consequence, the strategic 
relations existing between the two regimes had important implications; these have been 
implications of domestic nature in the first case, at the expense of Burma’s democratization and 
economic balance, and of external nature in the second case, enhancing the importance of the 
country as a potential battleground between China and India in the region48. 
Since the very moment of its independence Burma adopted a neutralist foreign policy in order to 
avoid to be drawn into the Cold War or into tensions existing between the great Indian and 
Chinese neighbour. This neutralism has been defined sometimes “oblique neutrality” since, as 
Ne Win seized power, strategic relations between the two authoritarian states increased49. This 
was not due to ideological affiliation, but to necessity: the Burmese regime could not survive 
alone, shook by a continuous civil war caused by the communist and the ethnic insurgencies and 
the increasing social turmoil. The SLORC obtained the support needed from China signing in 
November 1989 a $2 billion arms deal which brought to Burma arms, ammunition and military 
trainers50. Also Chinese activity aimed to build bases in Burmese territory was reported, fact still 
today denied by both the nations51. 
From the domestic point of view, the main implication of the closer association with China 
implied by SLORC’s massive arms acquisition was the reorganization and expansion of the 
Burmese Army and the increase of its control over the country52. The necessity of such a military 
expansion was inspired in the junta by the popular uprisings of 1988, which demonstrated that 
the Tatmadaw had no complete capacity of controlling the urban centres and, at the same time, 
quell ethnic guerrilla. Thanks to the Chinese-financed expansion of the Tatmadaw, it enhanced 
its capacity of controlling the cities and at the same time, in its fight against ethnic armed forces, 
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switched from a seasonal combat strategy to the one of year round occupation. Of course China 
was neither SLORC’s exclusive arms supplier53, nor the first one as the junta started receiving 
military support as early as 1988 from Singapore and Pakistan. However, Chinese massive 
cooperation was fundamental in enabling the generals to pursue their obsession of the “non-
disintegration of the Union” and build “a highly centralised, ethnically Burman-dominated 
state”54. The Army won over its chronic weakness: previously its main military strategy against 
the ethnic insurgents was to conduct seasonal campaigns and then return to barrack remaining 
inactive during the monsoon season. After the Chinese supplied material and equipment the 
soldier were enabled to stay all year long in the occupied territory. This strategy of occupation 
had the non-Burman civilian population as its main victim. As the stagnant economy was not 
suitable to support the cost of the expanded Army, a self reliance policy of the army was 
launched as a new system of financing. This meant in practice to force villagers to sustain the 
armed forces, recruiting them as forced labourers, confiscating lands and imposing them to 
provide food and shelter to the army55. 
In sum, in terms of domestic implications, Sino-Burmese strategic relations consisting in 
Chinese arms supply to the generals resulted in the perpetuation of the authoritarian and 
incompetent junta at the power, obtained trough a modernization of the armed forces. This has 
enhanced the effectiveness of the military control over the territory, worsening the economic 
situation and the Human Right balance of the country, to the detriment of the wider Burmese 
democratization process. 
Expansion in the IOR 
Considering external strategic benefits, it is China the one holding the strongest interests in 
collaboration with Myanmar. China’s Burma policy in terms of strategic implications in the 
geopolitics of the region must be framed within the wider expansionist plan undertaken by China 
in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). 
According to the so-called “String of Pearls” (SOP) theory, the PRC is interacting with countries 
located along the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) from East Asia to the Middle East in 
order to create strategic relationships and build ports and shipping facilities; this net of contacts 
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and bases located all across the IOR, as a whole, appears as a chain across the region, the so 
called “String of Pearls”56. 
 
Image 3. “Power competition in the IOR” (source: International Maritime Bureau) 
 
 
 
Although the SOP has not been declared by Beijing as its official strategy and despite the fact 
that the “pearls” forming the “string” at the moment constitute purely commercial facilities, 
however their potential military development and the “encirclement” they create around the 
Indian peninsula have brought many to consider the SOP as the new strategy of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in the IOR, aimed to boost the Chinese influence in the region, 
especially in anti-Indian function57. 
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Image 4. “China’s String of Pearls” (source: securityobserver.org) 
 
 
 
The SOP, as to the theory developed by the US lieutenant C. J. Pehrson58, is constituted by a 
number of different “pearls” located along the SLOCs and extending from mainland China (the 
eastern pearl of Hainan Islands) to the Red Sea (the western pearl of Port Sudan); each pearl is 
the result of the relations, interaction and negotiation of the PRC with the respective country. 
Presently Myanmar hosts nothing less than two pearls, the ports of Sittwe and Kyaykypyu, and 
rumours reported Chinese activity on another potential pearl to be, the Coco Islands59. 
The deep water port in Sittwe is a Burmese port constructed by Indian funding and located in 
Sittwe, capital of the Rakhine State (former Arakan), in western Myanmar, on the Bay of Bengal. 
The construction of the port was part of the wider Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, 
agreed in 2008 by the two countries and aimed to develop transport infrastructures between 
Southwestern Myanmar and Northeast India60. Later on, China has been given the right to 
construct a naval base in Sittwe, consequently gaining direct access to the Bay of Bengal: Sittwe 
is extremely important from the strategic point of view given its proximity to Kolkata, the 
                                                          
58
 C. J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral, 
Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006. 
59
 N. Swanström, op. cit., p. 18; J. Panda, The Pipeline Dynamics in the Sino-Myanmar Honeymoon. Regional 
Contention and Strategic Fallout, in “Policy Brief” (Institute for Security and Development Policy), 2010, No. 35, 
p. 3. 
60
 C. R. Mohan, Sittwe Port, India’s N-E gateway via Myanmar, has China docking in too, in “The Indian Express”, 
7th May 2006, URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/sittwe-port-india-s-ne-gateway-via-myanmar-has-china-
docking-in-too/4015/. 
78 
 
biggest city and port of Eastern India. In addition to this, China is currently funding the 
construction of the road linking Yangon and Sittwe, which would provide a PRC with a direct 
access by land to the Bay of Bengal from Southern China. 
The construction of a port in Kyaykypyu, Rakhine State, was announced in 2007 and China soon 
became the first investor in the project. In addition to this, since 2010 the PRC has been building 
a pipeline connecting Kyaykypyu with the Chinese city of Kunming, in the Southern Yunnan 
province, which will allow the country to directly get oil from Middle East passing through the 
Myanmar port and avoiding the Malacca Strait61.  
 
Image 5. “Chinese growing oil consumption” (source: US Energy Information Administration) 
 
 
Myanmar’s Coco Islands are located in the Northeastern Indian Ocean close to the India’s 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The PRC allegedly established an intelligence station on Great 
Coco Island in 1992 to monitor Indian naval activity in the aforesaid Indian Islands and the 
Indian launch site at Sriharikota and the Defence Research and Development Organization 
(DRDO) at Chandipur-on-sea. Recently the Chinese Army has been accused to be building 
another base on Little Coco Island; existence of the Chinese base remains questioned and 
uncertain62. 
Also the other giant is highly interested in the region: during the last two decades, India has 
practiced a silent and progressive expansion of its relations in the IOR, through versatile usage of 
diplomacy, military intervention, economic sops and hydrographical policy; when considered as 
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a systematic strategy, Indian moves have been dubbed as “Indian Iron Curtain” (IIC)63. In an 
analogous way, this trend, when considered the first manifestation of a new strategy by Delhi, is 
immediately interpreted in its potential anti-Chinese function. The so called IIC, according to 
Chinese claims, is being built by India in anti-PRC function across the IOR, creating a potential 
barrier to China’s access to the Strait of Malacca. India’s Iron Curtain can possibly be framed 
within the wider “Look East” foreign policy whose first step took place in Singapore in 199164. 
India has been playing the Look East policy with renewed commitment in the last decades, given 
its analogous interest of securing the shipping lines relevant to its trade route and the strategic 
necessity of containing Chinese expansion. Also India is strongly interested in the Strait of 
Malacca since 40% of its trade passes through it. As a consequence it is India’s interest to 
increase its naval presence in the zone by improving relations with neighbouring states.  
India’s attentiveness in cultivating cordial relations with Myanmar must be interpreted also 
within this strategic frame, given the centrality that the geographical position of the country 
enjoys in the IOR. Delhi for sure was neither glad to assist to the opening to China of the Indian-
financed port of Sittwe, nor to the progress of other Sino-Burmese economic-strategic ties. 
Burma is one of the fragile buffer-states dividing the two Asian giants so that if friendly is a 
precious defence against the expansionism of the other, but if lost can dangerously serve to the 
adversary as a stepping stone towards encirclement. 
The two countries are inspired in their practice by two theories of the IOR which are analogous 
and 
opposite, both of them claiming the area as their legitimate range of expansion. Indian 
commitmentin the IOR has been clearly declared as an objective in India’s maritime military 
strategy and the Navy’s 2004 maritime doctrine which identify the IOR as a place where «major 
powers of this century will seek a toehold» and where maintenance of stability is an Indian 
responsibility. On the other hand, the affirmation of Indian presence is perceived as threat by 
China, whose “revisionist” intent collides not only with Indian plans but also with the status quo 
established and maintained in the area by the US65. Behind China’s SOP there are cogent 
national interest related to the need of guaranteeing the survival of the regime and the 
development speed of the economy. Both these tasks impose the satisfaction of the energy 
security requirements, and consequently controlling the IOR waters, as an absolute priority66.  
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Image 6. “SLOCs and China’s “Malacca dilemma” (source: http://www.gloria-center.org) 
 
 
Given this background, Myanmar appears as a priority as well; Beijing demonstrated the 
relevance the country owns in a Chinese perspective by its attempt of exploiting Burmese natural 
resources, by various pipeline projects as well as by the construction of ports, whose first aim is 
to avoid China’s perennial “Malacca dilemma”67, but whose military potential cannot be 
completely set aside68. To sum up, in nowadays strategic interests of China, Myanmar is not only 
considered as an important ally in terms of energy security, but also a potential asset in the 
competition with India for the hegemony in Asia69. 
III.2.2. Drug traffic and HIV 
Opium cultivation in Burma has always been related to China; nowadays however the increase 
of drug criminality and HIV linked to the Burmese-produced heroin is representing a more and 
more challenging problem for the PRC government. 
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It is well known that opium was the instrument used by Western powers to penetrate the Chinese 
Empire and that, as a consequence of the massive amount of opium imported (especially by the 
British), until Mao Zedong came to power China was the main producer and user of the poppy. 
One  of the immediate goals of the new Communist government was to eradicate the use and the 
cultivation of opium, as it was negatively affecting the productivity of the Chinese and the 
national development as a whole. The anti-opium campaign by the CCP was effective, but its 
results are now threatened by the huge heroin traffic which starts in the Golden Triangle, in 
Burma in particular. 
Ironically, the production of opium in Burma has always been linked, in one or other way, to the 
Chinese. Before heroin became an extremely lucrative business like in contemporary times, 
opium used to be cultivated in the Northern region of Kokang, inhabited by various ethnic 
minorities, great number of them being of Chinese ancestry. The poppy cultivation was mainly 
destined to the private use of the same cultivators. The large scale production of heroin in Burma 
began following the trespassing of the GMD troops in 1950. In order to maintain their bases 
inside the country and to resist to the Chinese Communist forces, the GMD, backed by CIA, 
developed opium cultivation and heroin production as means of funding their military operations 
and control over the area. Opium then was the main resource of the anti-Communist forces, but 
very soon it became a fundamental revenue for the Burmese Communists as well. As mentioned, 
during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution, the CCP strengthen its links with the BCP, 
which obtained from Beijing consistent material support. But as the “Red diplomacy” faded 
away and Deng Xiaoping took back control over the foreign policy of China, the urgency of 
building new government-to-government relations necessarily reduced the support to the 
Communist parties of the area, including the BCP. The opium traffic became one of the few 
ways the BCP had to sustain its fight against Rangoon. In 1989 the BCP broke up into its 
different ethnic components, the Burman one returning to China. Through the mediation of a 
Kokang Chinese warlord, Lo Hsing Han, now the biggest trafficker in Burma, a cease-fire 
agreement was reached with General Khin Nyunt, the number one of the SLORC in power. The 
groups agreed not to ally with any insurgent force opposed to Rangoon, and the government 
gave them freedom to produce and traffic opiates. In sum, the groups ruling nowadays Burmese 
opium market are led by former CPB cadres, who in turn acquired their original power thanks to 
arms and training provided by China. 
The Chinese link continues: most of the opium production still is located in the Kokang and the 
majority of drug warlords are Chinese born, ethnic Chinese or Sino-Burmese. The main traders 
are Yunnanese, as Yunnan lies just on the other side of the border, while financing comes from 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan70. China is also the major transit country for Burmese heroin: exported 
in Yunnan arrives to Kunming, the Chinese drug capital and from there, via Hong Kong, it 
reaches Taiwan, the US and other markets. Even the majority of the precursor substances to 
synthesize heroin originate from China. In 1990 China introduced stricter legislation and started 
collaborating with agencies such as the UN Drug Enforcement Administration and the UN 
Office for Drug Control; anti-narcotics campaigns however are not so effective without the 
collaboration of the Burmese government. The Chinese express frustration for the lack of efforts 
by the generals, whose carelessness is due to the cease-fire agreements negotiated by Khin 
Nyunt; the SLORC reached an accommodation with the insurgency exchanging drugs for peace: 
the connivance of the regime with the narco-traffickers is its logic consequence. 
Chinese interest in containing trans-border drug traffic from Burma however is becoming more 
and more important for Beijing for a number of reasons. 
The first one is drug-linked crime: an increasing percentage of criminality in China is related to 
the drug trafficking, especially in the province of Yunnan and Guangdong71. The second one is 
the drug addiction: heroin addiction and HIV contagion is spreading more and more in the 
country72, with peaks in depressed regions like Xinjiang, were an increasing number of 
individuals belonging to the ethnic minority make use of hard drugs73. The spread of the disease 
is closely related to the traffic which takes place across the porous Sino-Burmese border. Along 
the trafficking and labour migration routes which link one side of the frontier with the other, 
together with large amounts of heroin, also HIV is exchanged, being needles sharing and 
unprotected sex its main channel of spreading74. Reports show that the subtype of virus spread 
along the Sino-Burmese border is the same which infects addict subject along the trafficking 
routes to Central Asia, passing through Xianjiang, and Guangxi75. The “export” of drug 
addiction and HIV from Burma to China is seen with increasing preoccupation by Chinese 
authorities since, besides its humanitarian consequences, could play a role in impeding or 
delaying Chinese economic development, as the African example demonstrates. 
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Also in this field China started collaborating with the UN agency UNAIDS and other 
international organizations, but the efforts of the PRC do not match with the negligence of the 
Burmese government76, which refused even to admit the existence in Myanmar of an increasing 
number of infected subjects as a real problem77. 
III.2.3. Economic interests: trade, investment and natural resources 
Trade 
Chinese economic influence in Myanmar is strong particularly in the Northern region and in the 
border region, where the economy is a kind of sub-economy of the Yunnanese one. It is 
important however to distinguish in this regard the two different actors who are involved, the 
Beijing government and the province of Yunnan. Beijing would like to support a stable 
economic development while Yunnanese companies’ practices often do not match such a path. 
The difference lies in the diverse conception that the two actors have of Myanmar’s role with 
respect to China; while the central government considers Myanmar especially in its strategic 
potential, Yunnan is interested in short-term gains to be obtained through business. This is a very 
poor region and Burma is a golden land for its companies. China’s economic advances in this 
sense cause great problem in terms of reputation, with Myanmar groups willing to offset Chinese 
business interests; great anti-Chinese sentiment grew among different subjects: minorities, 
governmental actors and opponents.  
The establishment of closer economic ties between China and Myanmar in recent times was 
basically due to external factors: in terms of economic collaboration, rather than by geographical 
proximity or utilitarian reasons, Myanmar was “forced” to join hands with China by the isolation 
created around the generals by international boycotts. The Chinese role in the country however, 
though important, shall not be overestimated, remaining Thailand and other ASEAN countries 
important trading partners.  
The official data proceeding from external sources reveal that there is no Chinese “economic 
domination” in Myanmar’s economy; anyways, these statistics are undervalued since they refer 
only to the formal market, while large part of investment are directed in illegal activities –
relative to strategic fields like natural resources and weapon industry– which remain obviously 
outside of the reports78. 
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Investment and natural resources 
Chinese interest in investing in Myanmar must be conceived as a consequence of the discovery 
in the country of precious natural resources, and their suitability to satisfy Chinese energy and 
security necessity. The increase in the investment can be also linked to China’s “Go Global” 
policy. Access to Myanmar’s resources was made easier by the international sanction addressed 
to Myanmar, which dramatically reduced the competition among potential investors. 
As mentioned, Chinese booming economy depends on the successful supply of great amounts of 
energy and raw materials. The satisfaction of these “energy security” requirements is 
fundamental also under the “national security” point of view: Chinese economic successful 
development is fundamental to the perpetuation of the CCP regime; not to let the PRC 
breakdown then the Party sees the provision of energy as a national priority. The issue acquires 
strategic relevance as well considering the risks faced by the PRC during the transportation of 
these resources, oil in particular. China is currently importing oil in three ways: through the 
Sino-Kazakhstan pipeline, through the Sino-Russian pipeline and, for 80% of the total, by 
shipping through the Indian Ocean79. Therefore China is highly dependent on the Strait of 
Malacca, which represents the shortest way from the IOR to mainland China but still remains out 
of PRC’s control (the so-called “Malacca dilemma”)80. 
The investments in Myanmar’s natural resources well represented the “Go Global” policy 
introduced since 1999 by the PRC, as part of the 10th “Five Year Plan”, aimed to encourage 
foreign investment by Chinese firms81. Previously, due to restriction towards embarking in 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) Chinese companies used to concentrate on domestic market.  
However, the urgency of securing long-term suppliers of resources brought to the necessity of 
promoting outward FDI. Myanmar represented an appealing opportunity due to its precious 
resources and to its relative availability: having only a few countries investing, China easily 
became its main investor, becoming as a consequence also major international player in 
Myanmar82. 
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Earth Rights International identifies about 69 Chinese multinationals involved in at least 90 
hydropower, oil, gas and mining projects in Myanmar83. 
 
Image 7. “China’s Trans-Myanmar oil-gas pipelines” (source: shwe.org) 
 
 
In terms of oil and gas pipelines the two major projects are the Shwe Natural Gas Project and the 
Burma-China Pipeline84. These pipelines, whose construction was decided in 2009 and started in 
2010 would link the port of Kyaukypyu with the Yunnanese city of Kunming. The implant will 
transport 22 million tons of oil and 12 billion cubic metres of gas per year85.  
China was motivated by different factors in participating, together with South Korea, India and 
Burmese enterprises, to the projects: first of all, reducing China’s dependence on the Strait of 
Malacca, they increase China’s security. Secondarily, they improve oil provision for the 
Province of Yunnan where, due to the high transportation costs, oil products are more expensive 
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and frequently scarce86. In addition to this, the PRC employs its own citizens as workers, 
creating jobs and richness which will be probably re-spent back in China (worsening at the same 
time the perception of Chinese FDI by local residents)87. 
In sum, the pipeline creates net benefits for Beijing; Naypydaw is advantaged by the fact that, 
being in debt with China, the product of the project could help to balance its payments. 
The biggest mining project is represented by Taguang Taung Nickel Ore Project Mining System 
started in 2011. The nickel extracted will not be used in Myanmar, but exported to China88. 
Myitsone Dam is the most important hydropower dam projected by the two countries. Also in 
this case, the biggest amount of the energy produced will be exported to China, though great 
number of Myanmarese suffer for electricity shortage89. The government of Thein Sein suddenly 
suspended the project in September 2011 adducing environmental concerns, causing great 
surprise in Beijing90. 
In sum, China is aiming to gain concessions in this potential market, just like Thailand and India 
did. Myanmar shown to have elected no particular country as favourite partner, but gave 
advantage to China in comparison with India under some points of view. 
From a Chinese perspective, Myanmar’s resources are the solution to PRC’s energy and national 
security problems, as they allow China to get resources from a close source eliminating 
transportation expenses and political uncertainty in the Middle East as well as the “Malacca 
dilemma”, still out of the control of the CCP. At the same time the creation of closer economic 
ties with Burma enables China to strengthen its influence and to secure the country as an ally. 
The Chinese FDI in Burma create a dependency effect: even though China plays the dominant 
role, China remains in need of Myanmar’s concessions. It is a reciprocal dependence: China 
needs what Myanmar has but possesses the capital necessary to exploit these resources; 
Myanmar possesses the resources but needs Chinese funding, especially considering the situation 
of international isolation which is living91.  
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Image 8. “Myitsione dam” (source: www.chiangraitimes.com) 
 
 
 
The benefit of both the players then depends on their mutual collaboration. However the 
unilateral suspension of the Myitsone Dam project by Naypidaw confirms the unpredictability of 
Myanmar’s behaviour while China could be, because of that, less willing to assist the country in 
the future92. 
The Border and the immigration problems 
The porous border dividing Burma and China has always been a constant problem in the bilateral 
relations between the two countries. The area which extends on both the sides of the frontier has 
always been a crossroads of different people and it is inhabited still today by a mosaic of ethnic 
minority, great number of which are Chinese. Though the demarcation of the border has been 
fixed with the Border Treaty in 1960, it has maintained its fluidity and many Chinese proceeding 
from the poor Southern countryside decide to cross it in force of familiar or ethnic ties,  and to 
settle. The Chinese immigration, which became a massive phenomenon during the British 
domination, has continued until recent days, giving birth to a number of consequences. 
The Chinese, following their trend to create ethnic areas within the city of settlement, have 
created real ghettoes in numerous cities. The greatest example is Mandalay, Burma’s Chinese 
hub, where, according to Mya Maung, the city is now «owned by Yunnanese and ethnic Chinese 
merchants», while the «relatively poor ethnic Burmese of Mandalay have been congregated» in 
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«new satellite towns built by the SLORC on the outskirt of Mandalay»93. Urban phenomena like 
this contribute to create a strong anti-Chinese sentiment among the Burmese, who in the past 
gave demonstration of their intolerance towards “bulky” immigrants during the anti-Indian and 
the anti-Chinese riots respectively in 1930 and 1967. Some consider that a new wave of anti-
Chinese violence is not unlikely to happen: the increasing and often aggressive presence of 
Chinese investors in the economy of the country points out that China holds a considerable 
economic stake in Burma and many fear that this could make it become a Chinese colony. China 
is considered to have changed the demographic balance of Myanmar and to have contributed to 
worsen the status of Burmese light industry through the importation of cheap Chinese goods94, 
welcomed by the generals as a solution for the lack of consumer goods suffered by the country in 
various occasions95. 
Given the considerable magnitude of Chinese immigrant flux towards Burma, Litner came to 
interpret Chinese migration as nothing less than a demographic strategy used by China to sustain 
its emergence as Asian world power96. As a matter of fact, the PRC is well accustomed to the use 
of the overwhelming demographic power of the Chinese majority to establish the central 
government’s control over periphery or ethnic areas; this would make the speculation about its 
application outside the national borders not so improbable. Conjectures apart, China’s proximity, 
revealed also through its demographic presence, keeps representing an important variable in 
Burmese domestic affairs. 
 
III.3. Assessing China’s Burma policy 
 
Chinese policy towards Burma since the foundation of the PRC seemed to be articulated into 
four main moments97. 
In the phase immediately following the establishment of the Communist rule in China, Chinese 
foreign policy was influenced by strong and as a consequence U Nu’s Burma, guilty of being 
unwilling to shift left, was attacked as reactionary nation affiliated to the USA. In this phase 
China opposed Burmese government and supported its breakdown by revolutionary forces. 
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The second phase started in the early 1950s and extended until the late 1960s. In this period the 
PRC lowered its initial tones and adopted a more conciliatory policy along with Bandung spirit 
of coexistence and neutralism, motivated by the intention of increasing Chinese influence in the 
Third World. From the point of view of the Sino-Burmese relations, this meant the end of the 
virulent attacks of the early 1950s and renewed efforts in highlighting the natural friendship 
existing between the two countries due to long-lasting cultural ties. The representation of Burma 
within the Chinese propaganda drastically changed: from nation servant to Western capitalism, it 
became a neutral state struggling in its anti-imperialist resistance. The restored peace with 
Rangoon served to Chinese foreign policy interests, namely to reward the country for not having 
slipped in the western block and keep it friendly, unwilling to embark in moves which could be 
contrary to Chinese positions. 
The peaceful coexistence was suddenly broken by the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. As 
the Red Guard seized power in Beijing, also Chinese foreign policy became “red” and the CCP 
started giving direct support to the White Flag Communists whose commitment was to 
overthrow the government in Rangoon. The red diplomacy put in practice by China reached its 
peak in the mid of the year 1967 when the PRC explicitly accused the Burmese government and 
called for the mobilization of the overseas Chinese in support of the ongoing Cultural 
Revolution. Such a hostile policy extended for the following two years and contributed to 
alienate the support of the Burmese.  
As the Cultural Revolution enthusiasm faded, the PRC started working for a return to normality, 
both in the domestic arena and in the international one. This implied restoring the status quo ante 
with Myanmar, symbolized by the visit by Prime Minister Ne Win to Beijing in August 1971.  
The end of ideological extremism was synthesized by China’s “dual diplomacy”, an attempt to 
save the new-built government-to-government relation without scarifying the affiliation of 
brother-parties. China however soon realized that continuing with the support of national 
communist forces was not worth as a strategy, and that relations with the governments were to be 
prioritized. Realistically, the CCP abandoned the BCP and started building closer and closer ties 
with Rangoon, especially after the 1988 coup.  
On the Burmese side instead, two major phases of foreign policy towards China can be pointed 
out, interestingly unrelated to the correspondent variations of Beijing’s policy, at least in 
appearance.  From independence to 1962 Burma was relatively open in terms of culture, politics 
and economy and cultivated diverse diplomatic relations. Within the country the different 
hegemonic powers competed in spreading their propaganda material. But after General Ne Win 
sized power with a coup in 1962 foreign investment stopped, economy was subjected to 
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nationalization and also diplomatic activity stagnated. As Burma remained more and more 
isolated, China progressively emerged as the country’s most important aid supplier. 
As mentioned, there is no evident relation between the changes of Chinese Burma’s policy and 
Burma’s shift from an open to a closed society. Chinese policy towards Burma was stable and 
friendly at the beginning of the 1960s and cannot be considered the cause of Burma’s 
transformation. At the same time Burma’s change was not the determinant element which 
contributed to Chinese hostility during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution. As a proof 
it can be noted that China’s Red diplomacy was addressed not only to Burma but was analogous 
also towards other Asian countries. The “rift” between Burma and China occurred in 1967 
should be rather interpreted as product of Beijing’s frustration over its failure in extending its 
political and economical hegemony over the country98. From a Burmese point of view in turn, it 
was the manifestation of Rangoon’s success in maintaining its neutrality and independence from 
any bloc, included the “Maoist” one.  
With the beginning of Ne Win’s era the reciprocal relations proved to be positive: Chinese have 
demonstrated in a variety of ways their willingness to be friendly and build further relations. 
This opening to Burma was not determined by a sincere concern about its interest of course, but 
by pure “realist” calculation. As China perceived Burma’s fear not to provoke its reaction, it 
decided to use conciliatory means rather than hostile ones to secure its collaboration. As Bert 
remarkably writes: «It is because the Chinese recognize that the Burmese are anxious to placate 
them that they prefer to ensure, by the use of the carrot rather than the stick, that Burma remains 
a good neighbour»99.  
That happened: Chinese appeasement reached its targets, with the exception of some “affronts” 
which Burma retained necessary to keep affirming its non alignment and prevent its neutralism 
to become a “leaning” one, a neutralism that, anyways, was mainly due to China’s bulky 
proximity. 
Generally speaking, Burmese political leaders have engaged in preserving positive relations with 
Beijing, also through that neutralism Beijing itself found so irritating. A constant feature of 
Burma’s foreign policy indeed was the attention not to join any project which could be perceived 
as threatening by China. This passed often through the adoption of a neutralist position in 
international affairs, refusing even regionalism as a concession to the US. 
As a consequence, the two main interest which influenced Burma’s relation with China and the 
rest of the regional actors have been the effort not to offend and provoke China and, at the same 
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time, the determination to preserve itself from an overwhelming Chinese influence. Burma’s 
historical neutralism served both the scopes. 
This did not allow China to obtain its full target, i.e. making Myanmar a client state, but allowed 
both the countries to maintain generally positive relations; the overall effect of this was a 
contribution by China to the survival of the Burmese authoritarian regime; this joining hands 
between the Chinese and the Burmese authoritarianism was not due to ideological affinity but to 
realistic geopolitical interest by both. China in particular, after having (partly in vain) sought 
Burma’s alliance in its competition with other hegemonic powers in the region, is now doing the 
same to secure its energy needs and to expand, again, its influence in the region, not vis-à-vis 
USSR and the US, but against a rising India and, secondarily, a declining US. 
Myanmar’s position towards China seems to be somewhat coherent with its past, mixing 
availability towards Beijing with a certain amount of unpredictability. Myanmar’s management 
of the Myitsone Dam project, valuable several billion dollars for the Chinese, represents the 
latest proof of the fact that, though the poor and isolated Myanmar is willing to collaborate with 
China in order to get the material support needed, the generals do not want to allow Beijing to 
influence decision-making in Myanmar beyond a certain extent100. 
In this light, new questions arise: are there the conditions for China to eventually review its 
Burma’s policy? In force of the interests currently held by Beijing in Myanmar, is still a 
persistent support to the generals’ regime the first best or could a change of regime represent an 
asset for Chinese stake? 
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Chapter IV 
“India and Burma” 
 
 
IV.1. India-Burma relations 
 
IV.1.1. Close ties and support for democracy (1948-1962) 
 
Burma is linked to India in force of an ancient and strong bound which includes different 
aspects,  from the cultural to the political.  
First of all, India was the cradle of the religions which became dominant in Burma: Hinduism, 
which strongly influenced Burmese liturgy and ethics, originated from India as well as 
Theravada Buddhism, which arrived to Myanmar spreading from the subcontinent through Sri 
Lanka. Pali, the language of the Theravada Buddhist canon, is an Indo-Aryan language 
indigenous of India.  
Under the political point of view the Indian legacy dates back to the time of  the Pagan Empires, 
who developed the first Burmese law codes, the Dhammathat, which are the major sources of 
Burmese legal theory and were derived from Indian ones1. The international relations between 
the two countries date back to the time of the Arakanese kings, who, for a period of time, ruled 
over the port city of Chittagong, in present day Bangladesh, and over the region which nowadays 
is the Indian Northeastern state of Manipur. The monarchs of Arakan had close relations with the 
Bengali sultans, so that, following dynastic upheavals, royal troops proceeding from India settled 
in Northwest Burma, creating the precedents of the nowadays Rohingya people, the biggest 
Muslim Bengali-descent minority of the country2. 
As widely exposed in the previous chapters, the ties between India and Burma became stronger 
during the British rule, which represented not only a common experience in the national history 
of the two countries, but also made them a unique political entity, since colonial Burma was 
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administrated as part of British India. The exchange between the two countries intensified 
notably and the Indian presence in the country became evident, with a great number of Indians 
entering Burma to be employed in the colonial administration of the province and in various 
productive sectors. This contributed to the development by the Burmese of a certain racist and 
xenophobic sentiment towards these South Asian immigrants, known as kaalas3. 
However, at the level of official politics, the two countries associated in their common fight for 
independence from the colonial rule. The Indian National Congress always shown sympathy 
towards Burmese nationalists and, after Burma separated from India becoming a province apart 
within the British Empire, the respective leaders supported each other in their struggle. This was 
made possible also by the friendliness existing between the Indian and Burmese leaders; while 
Aung San was Vice President of the Executive Council in Burma Nehru was Vice President of 
the Executive Council in India and the two statesmen developed, besides their official 
association, reciprocal esteem4. As the news about the assassination of Aung San reached Delhi, 
Nehru issued a statement in which he lamented the death of the General and promised full Indian 
support for the people of Burma. When the country had to prepare its first constitution as an 
independent nation, Narsing Benegal Rau, distinguished Indian constitutionalist, was placed at 
the disposal of the Burmese Constituent Assembly to support it during the drafting works5. 
The story of India and Burma proceeded in parallel also in the liberation from the colonial yoke: 
India became independent on the 15th August 1947 and Burma in the 4th January 1948. On this 
day, Prime Minister Nehru, saluted Burmese independence as an important achievement not only 
for the country, but also for India and whole Asia. 
The close ties between the two governments continued also thanks to the fact that Nehru and the 
thankin called to guide Burma after Aung San’s departure, U Nu, developed a personal 
friendship besides the cordial relations they entertained as heads of the states6.  
This was a phase, in the history of Indo-Burmese relations, of harmony and reciprocal support, 
especially from India in favour of Burma.  
The relations remained positive even when Burmese domestic politics affected the citizens of 
Indian origin living in the country. The fate of these people was in this period the principal issue 
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in the relation between the two governments. In order to reinforce Burmese business and restore 
a class of Burmese entrepreneurs, the U Nu government adopted a number of measures which 
favoured the ethnic Burmese at the expense of the others. Obviously the most affected were the 
Indians, since they constituted the greatest part of the middle class of Burma, largely controlling 
the correspondent economic activities7. In particular, among the various law approved by the 
government, Indians’ status was touched by the 1946 Land Alienation Act, which allowed the 
alienation of land only in favour of Burmese citizens, and the 1949 Burma Land Nationalization 
Bill. The measures caused great protest among both Indian and Burmese Indians but Nehru 
accepted their adoption, though claiming a fair compensation for the victims, and did not let the 
event ruin the relations with the Burmese government8. 
During these years Burma continued to benefit from its relation with India, its greatest rice 
importer, and to receive important financial and military aid in the first difficult post-
independence years. As in 1949 Rangoon needed money to promote counter-insurgency 
campaigns, India promoted the conference of the governments of the Commonwealth countries 
in New Delhi at this purpose; the result of the meeting was a loan of 6 millions pounds, out of 
them 1 million contributed by Delhi9. Moreover in the same year India sold arms and six 
helicopters, necessary to Rangoon to fight the rebels10. Finally, India announced in 1950 another 
special loan of Rs 5 million to Burma. These acts demonstrated that Delhi soon forgot about the 
fate of Burmese Indians and that the event was not influential in the maintenance of good 
relations with Burma. Nehru and U Nu held regular consultations and inaugurated a dialogue 
about bilateral and international issues, while Indian and Burmese neutralism of both began to 
emerge11. In 1949 India allowed Burma to be the first nation not belonging to the communist 
bloc to recognize the People’s Republic of China, which happened on the 18th December 1949, 
with Delhi immediately following on the 31th of the same month12.  
A Treaty of Friendship was signed in New Delhi on 7th July 1951, coming into force in January 
of the next year. The agreement was motivated by the desire of «strengthening and developing 
the many ties that have bound the two countries for centuries», «need for maintaining the peace 
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and friendship that have always existed between the two States»13; in particular, in Art.I the 
signers recognized their reciprocal independence; Art. II stated that the relations between the two 
shall be marked by «everlasting peace and unalterable friendship»; in Art. IV «The two States 
agree that their representatives shall meet from time to time and as often as occasion requires to 
exchange views on matters of common interest and to consider ways and means for mutual 
cooperation in such matters»14, stabilizing the pattern of the consultations already in practice15. 
A Trade Agreement between India and Burma was also signed on the 29th September, 1951. 
According to the deal Burma «agreed to export 350,000 tons of rice to India annually in 
exchange for jute goods, textiles, oil and steel products from India»16. 
In September 1949, due to the permanence of GMD troops on Burmese soil, the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) approached the Northeastern Sino-Burmese border, causing in Rangoon 
the fear that, taking advantage of the GMD issue, the Chinese Communists could enter the 
country. As the Burmese government decided to seek a solution to the case through the UN, 
India strongly supported such a choice, both within the international organization and outside 
it17. 
The season of the Afro-Asian conferences then began. As the Cold War was emerging, Nehru 
and U Nu strengthen further the Indo-Burmese connection through their common adoption of 
neutralism as a posture in the conduction of foreign affairs (though in the Burmese case it did not 
implied the adherence to the non-alignment bloc18) and through their role of champions of the 
Asian solidarity19. 
IV.1.2. The emergence of the border issue and the decline of the Indo-
Burmese harmony (1962-1988) 
Until the beginning of the 1960s heads of state in Delhi and Rangoon demonstrated to be good 
friends and loyal allies, but this idyllic situation was progressively tilted by the emergence of a 
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wide border problem involving the Indo-Burmese-Sino triangle which lies in the North of 
Myanmar. 
The problem resulted as the effect on Indo-Burmese relations of the wider change occurring 
since 1962 in Burma’s foreign policy towards China. As Rangoon seemed to get closer to 
Beijing, this consequently affected its relations with Delhi. 
On January 1960 the caretaker government of General Ne Win signed with the PRC a Border 
Treaty and a Treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression20, agreements which pointed out 
the new propensity of the General towards his Chinese counterparts. 
The move did not escape the attention of the Indian policy makers, who interpreted it as a 
Chinese attempt of wooing Rangoon. This was the very moment in which India started giving 
new strategic importance to Burma, as a potential asset in the containment of China or as a 
dangerous launching board for Chinese expansion towards India itself. Previously India did no 
perceive Myanmar as plausible ally of China due to General’s Ne Win neutralist posture in 
international affairs, and consequently underestimated the strategic potential of the country in the 
Indo-Chinese dynamics. 
Soon after, in October 1962 the border conflict between the two giants broke out, and the Sino-
Indian War began21.  
Burma, territorially and politically “sandwiched” between the two opponents, in the attempt of 
avoiding an excessive involvement in the conflict and the hostility of either of the neighbours, 
chase the less evil, i.e. remained neutral. 
The non-involvement of Burma however was interpreted by India as expression of Burmese 
recent pro-Chinese propensity, and the Delhi-Rangoon axis was negatively affected. 
Since 1962 until 1988 the relations between the two countries, having lost the previous harmony, 
cooled down and had a fluctuant trend, with moments of down followed by improvements. The 
Chinese factor was always central in the Indo-Burmese dynamics, which frequently appeared as 
a repercussion of the new Chinese engagement in Myanmar. 
In February 1964 Ne Win visited Delhi where received Nehru’s request of supporting India’s 
proposal for a conference of non-aligned nations to be held in Cairo with the exclusion of the 
PRC. Few days later the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited the 
General in Rangoon, asking Burmese backing for an Afro-Asian conference to discuss Sino-
Indian border issue; the General however again refused to take the part of either of the two 
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contenders and urged them to adopt the recommendations of the nations gathered in Colombo in 
December 196222. 
The maintenance of cordial relations was facilitated by the existence of a good relationship 
between the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had taken the place of the father, and 
General Ne Win, though this did not permit to go back the previous status quo, and overall 
relations remained formal. 
The lowest point of Indo-Burmese relations was registered during the same year, when General 
Ne Win promoted a series of nationalization which, as under the previous government, 
negatively affected the Burmese Indian community; in this case however the nationalization 
were so strong and the treatment Indians received from the government so harsh that the 
situation almost reached a breaking point. The government did not pay any compensation to 
those who were expropriated and did not arrange any facility to allow their repatriation. Those 
who decided to go back to India by their own means were not allowed to bring with them any of 
their belongings. 
At the end of the same year the status of the bilateral relations seemed to have improved, 
especially due to the worsening on the Sino-Burmese front. China’s support to the BCP and the 
insurgents caused mistrust and irritation in the government and the progressive estrangement of 
Rangoon and Beijing led to the famous anti-Chinese riots which broke out in Burma in 1967 and 
marked one of the lowest point in the relations between Myanmar and the PRC. The relative 
rapprochement seemed to be confirmed by a joint communiqué issued in Delhi as a consequence 
of the visit performed by Ne Win in February 1965; the document affirmed the good status of the 
bilateral relations and the common interest in pursuing a policy of non-alignment. 
In March 1967 a boundary agreement was signed, which provided to the settlement of the 
boundary in its whole length. 
Two years later the General paid another visit to Indira Gandhi and the topic of the meeting was 
believed to be a discussion about the potential collaboration between India and Myanmar in 
countering the threatening expansionist policy of China. The PRC expressed its disapproval 
towards Burma and kept accusing Rangoon (this was the aftermath of the rift between Rangoon 
and Beijing and the pacification between the generals and the PRC was yet to come). 
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In economical terms, however, the situation worsen during the 1960s as China replaced India as 
the first importer of Burmese rice and there was no notable increase in the trade between the two 
countries despite a trade agreement signed in December 1962 in Rangoon. 
In August 1974 a payment agreement stated that India would have supplied Burma with a 
number of products worth Rs 75 million and in 1979 India allocated Rs 21.7 million for 21 pilot 
projects in various fields. 
Though Burma’s foreign policy was an isolationist one, starting from the end of the 1970s its 
neutralism seemed to be “leaning” towards China, while at the same time cultivating other 
relations –like with the United State and West Germany– in order to mitigate Chinese influence. 
Despite its policy, during the Seventies Indian Ministers kept paying official visits to Burma; in 
December 1987 it was the turn of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, but no improvement was 
registered. 
Meanwhile, from 1974 to 1980 India gave shelter to exiled U Nu: though offering political 
asylum to Ne Win’s opponent could be counterproductive in the attempt of building closer ties 
with the General, Delhi finally accepted the request in compliance of the friendship which 
existed between him with India’s first Prime Minister. 
IV.1.3. Approaching the generals (1988-present) 
In 1988 the Indo-Burmese relations reached their lowest point due to the strong support India 
gave to the 8-8-88 protest which broke out in Burma23. India was the country sharing a border 
with Burma to take the side of the protestors and condemn the government. The Indian Embassy 
in Rangoon offered important material support: in order to help the activists, it kept in contact 
with the All Burma Federation of Students’ Union, Aung San Suu Kyi and U Nu; in addition to 
this, it offered shelter to those who jumped its fence looking for protection and arranged an 
emergency hospital in the building24. Moreover, the Embassy provided financial assistance to 
those who fled to the Indo-Burmese border and helped them to enter India. The government 
opened refugee camps in the border states of Mizoram and Manipur25. 
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At the international level, Delhi joined the coalition of Western countries who isolated the 
regime and sponsored its condemn within the United Nation, which occurred with the Resolution 
47/144 of December 199226. 
However, after this dramatic split-up with Rangoon, at the beginning of the 1990s itself Delhi 
tried to restore positive relations with the regime. This sudden turnabout was due in first stance 
to the emergence of problems along the Indo-Burmese border; in addition to such an issue, 
whose resolution was strictly dependent on Rangoon’s collaboration, evolutions in Indian 
economic and strategic foreign policy determined the change of direction. In particular, India 
realized that a friendly Burma was essential to fulfil its new goals, namely: a more globalized 
economy, to be realized first of all through an opening towards Southeast Asia; further 
engagement in the region to counter Chinese influence. Policy makers in New Delhi then 
decided that their initial and natural commitment to the support of the pro-democracy movement 
had to be sacrificed to the benefit of more urgent national interests. Indian interests matched the 
Burmese ones, as the ostracized junta was looking for recognition, especially by Asian countries.  
The rapprochement with the generals was immediately evident, but the distancing from the pro-
democracy movement was progressive: the new engagement with the military junta initially 
coexisted with the support to their opponents, which became less and less open and consistent, 
but without disappearing completely. 
As mentioned, the most urgent Burma-related issue that the Indian government had to deal with 
was the managing of the refugees and of the insurgents located along the Indo-Burmese 
boundary. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the junta intensified its military activity along the border, a 
territory where the effectiveness of the governmental authority has always been challenged by 
the actual control exercised by ethnic-based rebel armies. The clash between regular forces and 
rebels generated waves of refugees heading towards the neighbouring countries. Many of them 
sought shelter across the Indian border; in particular in 1992 the Burmese Naga fled to Nagaland 
due to the ethnic ties existing with the Indian minority settled in this state, located in the 
Northeast of the Indian Republic and shook by secessionist resistance. Delhi protested with 
Rangoon and asked to stop violence against the villagers settled on the border, finally obtaining 
collaboration for the repatriation of the refugees. In addition to the solution of this particular 
event, India realized that the cooperation of Rangoon was necessary to solve the long-term 
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border issue of the Indian Northeast, as many groups fighting for independence from Delhi used 
to flee beyond the frontier and establish camps in Burmese territory. The most well-known of the 
joint Indo-Burmese military operations against border insurgency was the Operation Golden 
Bird, launched against the Indian rebels of the Northeast in July 1995, famous for having been 
abandoned by the Tatmadaw as Delhi government announced the conferment of the Nehru 
Award to Aung San Suu Kyi. 
India launched an important signal 1991, as India accepted the request by the junta to stop AIR 
Burmese Language Broadcasting, a popular daily radio program in Burmese which contested 
from India the government in Rangoon. 
At the same time, India continued to provide shelter for Burmese political opponents fled from 
Myanmar and when Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in October 1991, 
it welcomed the event and expressed support to her democratic cause.  
The ambivalence of Indian policy was evident in February 1992, when President Venkataraman 
received the credentials of the new Burmese ambassador in Delhi, while at the same time 
expressing concern about the delayed transition to a civilian government and calling for the 
restoration of freedom and the liberation of Aung San Suu Kyi. 
The Burmese government showed interest in building new ties and the effects of India’s move 
came out very soon as in August 1992 the two countries normalized their bilateral relations 
through the visit to Delhi of a delegation headed by U Aye, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The visit 
was returned in March 1993 by the Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit; however at that 
moment, while restoring a dialogue, India did not refrain from asking to the government the 
release of all political prisoners and expressing its enduring stance in favour of democracy in 
Burma. 
In 1993 itself India conferred to the leader of the NLD the prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Award 
for International Understanding. 
In 1994 India and Burma signed the important India-Burma/Myanmar Trade Treaty, which 
inaugurated the cooperation in the commercial sector, whose relevance in the case of the two 
countries involved is not limited to the economic aspect, but also to the political, as the trade 
taking place across the Indo-Burmese border involves a number of illegal activity such as 
smuggling and drug trafficking. The building of closer and regular ties in the field of trade thus 
was seen by Delhi as a step towards reconciliation and wider cooperation. After 1994 numerous 
meeting between Burmese and Indian delegations took place in India and Myanmar until 1999, 
with an average yearly frequency, to further discuss aspects of such a partnership. 
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In the meantime, from the military point of view, Indo-Burmese cooperation had developed but 
continued to show enduring problems due to mutual suspicion. In July 2000, for example, the 
Indian Army Chief Ved Prakash Malik visited Burma27, while at the same time General Khin 
Nyunt, head of Burmese Intelligence, was in paying a visit to Pakistan which is known to supply 
arms to Burmese generals and behind whom many Indian analysts identify the direction of 
China28. 
In 2000 Burmese troops fired on an Indian patrol along the Nagaland border, shooting to death 
three Indian soldiers, allegedly mistaken for Naga rebels29. 
In terms of support for Burmese democratization, while demonstrating availability or at least 
non-opposition towards Rangoon, India continued to offer shelter to hundreds of Burmese 
political refugees, though its policy of support stopped being unconditional and explicit as it used 
to be before. Some events occurred in the last decade prove this shift and give an idea of the 
ambiguity of nowadays Indian support for Burmese democracy. In September 1998, 64 Burmese 
activists were arrested while demonstrating against the official visit of a Rangoon general taking 
place in New Delhi; in December of the same year the Indian Home Ministry cancelled a 
conference organized by Burmese pro-democracy groups, moreover imposed to the refugees to 
register with the Foreign Regional Registration Office (FRRO) and ordered to the UNHCR 
Office in Delhi not to issue further refugee certificates to Burmese people; in February 1999, 50 
Burmese activists were arrested while holding a demonstration against Rangoon; in July 1999 
another democratic conference was cancelled by the Delhi government and visa applications 
were refused to those who aimed to join it; in July 1999 a Burmese activist broadcasting for 
Radio Free Asia from Moreh, border town in Manipur, was arrested30.  
When Aung San Suu Kyi was released for the second time from home detention in May 2002, 
the Indian government saluted the event in low tones, declaring at the same time trust in the 
democratic transition in which the junta had embarked. 
When an international coalition led by the US condemned the junta following the so-called 
“Black Friday” incident of May 2003 and the consequent reiterated detention of Suu Kyi31, India 
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assumed a neutral position, marking a stunning change when compared to the posture adopted 
against the military rule in occasion of the 8-8-88 movement. In opting out from the international 
boycott addressed against the generals India sided with Chin and the ASEAN countries; Delhi 
waited for these to drop their non-intervention policy and ask for the release of Aung San Suu 
Kyi.  
India was also one of the countries which, as minority, voted against the decision of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) to intervene in the country against the government of 
Rangoon due to the persistence of the phenomenon of forced labour. 
Since events like these started taking place, the leader of the NDL Aung San Suu Kyi has 
expressed great disappointment. Though maintaining good relations with Delhi –she was given 
the 1993 Jawaharlal Nehru Prize in a ceremony held in 1995, and more recently, in 2012, she 
travelled to the Indian capital city to give the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Lecture32– she took 
advantage of numerous occasions to express her disapproval for India’s closeness to the military 
junta and to call for a return to a pro-democracy Burma policy for India33. 
From the Indian side it is maintained that India continues to support a democratic development in 
Myanmar, though it does not do it openly as before, due to its official collaboration with the 
military regime. 
 
IV.2. Indian interest in Myanmar 
 
IV.2.1. Managing instability in the Northeast India 
 
The Indian region of the Northeast consists of the states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunchal Pradesh and Sikkim and is connected to the rest of India by a 
narrow corridor in Darjeeling District of West Bengal.  
As a border region it has been historically characterized for political and cultural diversity. 
Under the British rule its heterogeneity was reinforced due to the diverse political organization 
existing in its different zones34: while the area in its whole was considered “tribal” and 
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administrated through a strict direct rule, at the same time existed in the territory numerous 
princely states35. Different regions underwent diverse evolution: while the hill areas remained 
more isolated, the valley suffered intensive migration. As a consequence, conflicts soon emerged 
due to disputes about resources partition. 
 
Image 9. “Northeast India” (source: mapsofindia.com) 
 
 
 
After the partition of India occurred in 1947, ethnic groups settled in the area where the border 
suddenly emerged were split on one side and the other of the frontier, phenomenon which had 
already occurred at the moment of the separation of British Burma from India in 1937. In the 
aftermath of the partition the political geography of the region appeared to have changed as 
follows: princely states of Tripura and Manipur joined India as federated states; Khasi was 
merged in Assam and Cooch Behar in West Bengal; Nepal preserved its autonomy; Bhutan and 
Sikkim became protectorates36. While following the artificial construction of the boundaries 
many ethnicities continued to live on both side of the borders ignoring their official delineation, 
the legacy of historical political independence soon came to the fore with the emergence of 
waves of separatist insurgency. In the aftermath of the partition, the Nagas declared separation 
from India in 1956 while insurgency broke up in Manipur and Assam respectively in 1964 and 
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1966. Delhi central government dealt with the problem adopting violent and strict measure 
which made any possibility of pacific solution of the question fade away. Such a hard strategy 
not only created an unbridgeable gap between government and insurgency, but also concentrated 
the power over local affairs in the hand of the security forces at the expenses of the civilian 
institutions. Police and military forces remain still nowadays the only Indian bodies able to play 
a role in the confrontation with the rebels. Given their main role, these security forces are often 
conniving with local rebels: groups which are not strong enough to operate directly against the 
government through military campaigns find more effective to corrupt local authorities, 
obtaining support in the control of the local people, basically in terms of channelling of votes 
during elections, in change of bribes of different nature. The Indian local authorities, in their 
side, often prefer to “solve” the problem of local insurgency in such a way rather than through a 
direct clash with the rebels, and are inclined to show a blind eye to infraction of democracy and 
rule of law by these local “warlords” in change of relative stability and personal benefits37.  
The final consequence of such a situation in terms of pattern of violence occurring in the 
Northeast is that, differently from other Indian regions affected by anti-governmental separatist 
activity, in the Northeast violence is less frequently directed Indian security personnel while has 
its main targets in the civilians, who result to be tyrannized by the insurgency on one side and by 
the governmental central authorities on the other38. Such is the situation in the Indian Northeast. 
The problem of the management of the insurgency in the region acquires further relevance in 
terms of bilateral relations between India and the countries lying on the other side of the 
Northeastern border. The Indo-Burmese border is one of these cases: as kinship are common 
across the border, the existence of ties between Northeastern and Burmese rebels is common. 
Northeastern insurgents when chased by governmental forces often cross the border where they 
keep camps, or keep operating from the Northern Burmese Hills.  
It is well known that Burma, due to the unwillingness or inability of Rangoon to deal with the 
problem and to the high level of corruption analogously affecting the local Burmese authorities, 
has long been tolerant with such an irregular activity taking place in its territory and Delhi has 
explicitly expressed its disapproval for the support that has been given to it, in direct or indirect 
way, by the generals. In particular, Burma has reportedly offered shelter to some of the strongest 
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anti-governmental ethnic groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)39 
and the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Asom)40. 
Due to the urgent necessity of dealing with the Northeastern instability emerged in Delhi in the 
1990s, and aware of the fact that without Burmese cooperation no tangible improvement was 
going to be achieved, the government rediscovered the importance of opening a dialogue with 
the military regime. An Indo-Burmese partnership in the field would have brought positive 
results also in terms of abatement of the smuggling of drugs and especially arms which takes 
place across the border and which is closely linked to the rebels’ activity41. 
Though the proposal of embarking in such a counterinsurgency partnership came from Delhi, 
also the Burmese government would have obtained its own benefits. The Burmese government 
indeed since independence has been affected by an enduring civil war; after the Communist 
threat faded away the main opponents continuing to oppose its authority have been the ethnic 
rebels. Thus, it is Burma’s interest to counter the insurgents active in the border area; in this 
perspective, the partnership with India would help the government especially with respect to the 
Kachin Independent Army (KIA) and the Chin National Front (CNF), who own camps inside the 
Indian border and have reportedly built contacts with their Indian counterparts. 
The existence of Burmese rebel activity on Indian soil, actually, was due to the collaboration of 
Delhi itself with the aforesaid groups: aware of the secret support given by Rangoon to 
Northeastern groups operating in the Burmese hills, in order to counteract, India built ties with 
these rebels during the 1980s42. India, for instance, trained the same Kachin rebels in order to use 
them as a buffer. Burma in turn, aware of the existence of such a collaboration as well as of the 
support India was giving to the pro-democracy front after 1988, decided to help more 
consistently rebels operating against Delhi such as the PLA and the ULFA. 
The situation however changed completely as the Kachins and the generals signed a ceasefire in 
1993, one among the numerous agreements negotiated with the rebels43. 
The visit to Burma by J. N. Dixit in 1993 laid the foundations of the partnership. 
In 1995 the armed forces of the two countries took part to a join operation named “Operation 
golden bird” against Indian insurgents. However the Tatmadaw, after the Indian government 
announced that the leader of the NLD Aung San Suu Kyi had been awarded the Jawaharlal 
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Nehru Prize for Peace and Understanding, ordered the withdrawal of Burmese troops, 
determining the failure of the collaboration. 
Joint operations were conducted against insurgents in 2000-2001; as a result of them, according 
to the Tatmadaw, five NSCN camps were destroyed. 
The overall effectiveness of the counterinsurgency cooperation, however, proved to be inferior to 
Indian expectations. 
IV.2.2. Opening up Indian economy to Southeast Asia 
Vis a vis the rise of Southeast Asian economies, India started identifying Burma as a potential 
gateway to the ASEAN area. As a matter of fact Myanmar lies at the conjunction of South Asia 
with Indo China and moreover is the only ASEAN country (it was admitted in 1997) to share a 
border with the Indian subcontinent44. 
India’s economic opening to Myanmar was actually coherent with the wider “Look East policy” 
adopted by Delhi since 1991 and aimed to increase Indian economic influence in the region45. 
The two most important partnerships resulted from such a policy are the “Bangladesh-India-
Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation” (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga 
Cooperation (MGC)46. 
The first multilateral project was inaugurated in June 1997 when Myanmar was still not part of 
it; as the country joined ASEAN its participation in the forum appeared essential and the 
BISTEC developed in BIMSTEC in December 1997. The main aim of the partnership is to offer 
a platform for collaboration to the countries of South Asia and Indochina with a particular focus 
on infrastructural project. The most important BIMSTEC goal indeed is the Trans-Asia 
Highway47, connecting India’s Northeastern landlocked region with Thailand via Myanmar. The 
high interest shown by Delhi in the project and the implications of its success in the 
improvement of the Indo-Burmese economic ties are obvious. 
MGC was inaugurated in 2000 by six countries: Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos 
–all states of the Mekong basin– plus India. 
The two multilateral projects see the participation of the countries located at the strategic point 
between India and the area it wished to extend its influence; Myanmar plays a key role in such a 
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project; moreover China, the greatest competitor India has to face in terms of expansion in the 
Southeast, is not included as a partner. 
The BIMSTEC and the MGC indeed, in India’s view had also the function, besides pursuing 
more obvious economic goals, of creating a forum with the exclusion of Beijing which could 
work as an alternative to the Kunming Initiative, involving the BCIM countries (Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar). This is a regional forum promoted in 1999 by the government of the 
Southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan, relying on the full support of Beijing. Though India 
has a certain interest in the implementation of some projects proposed within the BCIM, such as 
the restoration of the ancient “Burma roads” linking India to China via Myanmar, however Delhi 
seems to prefer dealing with China through bilateral channels rather than multilateral and 
regional ones, such as the Kunming Initiative. 
The participation to these multilateral projects was obviously welcomed by India and Myanmar, 
both of them willing to seek advantages from the partnership. 
Burma, largely regarded as a pariah states for years, was obviously motivated by the perspective 
of improving its status within the family of the Asian nations, both politically and 
economically48. 
India in turn saw in the association the opportunity of balance institutionally the Chinese advent 
and take advantage of opportunities offered by the growing ASEAN markets. 
With particular reference to Burma, India had different goals: to improve its bilateral trade 
relationship; to secure and enhance the trading routes connecting the landlocked and poor 
Northeast with Burma’s main trading hubs; to step inside the new Burmese energy market, 
which after years of isolation and under-exploitation promised great earnings, being moreover 
proscribed to energetic companies of Western and like-minded countries who had chosen to 
sanction the military junta49. 
With reference to bilateral commerce, in 1994 the two countries signed the Indo-Burmese border 
trade agreement which in the next year created the first official cross-border exchange point in 
correspondence of the cities of Moreh in Manipur and Tamu in the Sagaing Division in Burma50. 
In addition to this, in 2001 the construction of the India-Myanmar friendship road was 
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inaugurated: according to the project a road of 160 km length would have connected the town of 
Tamu, on the Indian border with Kalemyo and Kalewa, two Burmese trading centres51. 
Furthermore, India engaged in other infrastructural projects including railways and port facilities, 
especially in the Rakhine State, in the West of Burma. The choice of embarking in these plans 
was not casual, given the recent discovery in the region of a rich natural gas field52; wishing to 
exploit the combustible, India invested in the modernization of the deep-water port in Sittwe, 
capital city of Rakhine State, and laid the foundations for the construction of a pipeline aimed to 
transport the gas extracted directly to India via Bangladesh. Also in this case, however, Delhi 
had to face the concurrence of Beijing, equally hungry of energy supply and willing to gain 
access to the new Burmese market. 
 
Image 10. “India’s proposed Myanmar pipeline via Bangladesh” (source: “The Irrawaddy”) 
 
 
 
IV.2.3. Counter China’s threat 
Though the India was aware of the support given by the PRC to Indian Maoist insurgent groups 
during the 1960s and the 1970s and despite the fact the 1962 Sino-Indian War had left deep 
resentment and reciprocal distrust between the two contenders, however India did not perceive 
China as a strategic threat in Myanmar until the beginning of the 1990s. 
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This was mainly due to the ambiguous posture of Rangoon towards Beijing and to the overall 
frustration of the PRC in fulfilling a full engagement of Burma. 
Things changed at the end of the 1980s when the Chinese and the Burmese authoritarianism 
started moving one towards the other in search of reciprocal support vis a vis the international 
isolation surrounding them. On the Burmese front, China emerged more and more as the first, if 
not the only, ally Burma could rely on following the ostracism suffered by the regime as a 
consequence of the events occurred in 1988.  
China in turn had demonstrated its interest towards an opening to Burma already in 1985, with 
the promotion of the “Opening the Southwest” policy. Such a posture, coherent with the new 
course of Chinese international relations inaugurated at the end of the previous decade with the 
“open door strategy” by Deng Xiaoping53, aimed to create new ties between Rangoon and  
 
Image 11. “Power competition in the IOR: India’s “encirclement complex””  
(source: www.wikipeida.org) 
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Beijing in order to obtain two main results: to develop economically the Southwestern region, 
namely the less-advanced provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan54; secure a Chinese access to the 
Bay of Bengal, whose strategic importance could result crucial to the PRC in the event of a 
blockade of the Strait of Malacca, with all the consequences in terms of energy and national 
security which would derive from it. 
The tangible consequence of these new reciprocal propensity were the Sino-Burmese arms deals 
concluded in 1989 and 1994, which provided Burma with an affordable modernization of the 
Tatmadaw on one hand, while “opening a door” to the PRC in the country. 
Since then, India has started looking with increasing concern to the military collaboration 
developed by the two regimes; according to the String of Pearls (SOP) theory, which is rather 
successful among high military ranks in Delhi, such a collaboration could boost the process of 
encirclement China is implementing against the Indian subcontinent55. 
In this perspective, Myanmar appeared to be a crucial “battle-ground” in the geopolitical and 
geostrategic competition taking place between the two Asian giants in the IOR56. 
 
IV.3. Assessing India’s Burma policy 
 
IV.3.1. The evolution of India’s Burma policy: reasons, interests, strategies 
 
The evolution of India’s posture towards Burma showed an evident U-turn at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The year symbol of the shift from explicit opposition to rapprochement with the 
Burmese military junta is the 1993, when Jyotindra Nath Dixit visited Burma in quality of Indian 
foreign secretary57. 
Within the pre-1993 phase it is possible to distinguish a first period, until 1988, characterized by 
a neutralist stance, and a second moment, starting with the 8-8-88 revolt, of “idealist”58 support 
to the anti-governmental pro-democracy Burmese movement.  
Generally speaking, it must be said that during the pre-1993 phase India did not recognize the 
importance of Burma; as in 1962 General Ne Win confirmed the neutralist position of the 
                                                 
54
 R. Egreteau, L. Jagan, Back to the old habits…, cit., p. 18. 
55
 VV.AA., India-Myanmar Relations. Responses…, cit., pp. 29-31, 40. 
56
 Ivi, p. 17. 
57
 R. Egreteau, India’s Ambitions in Burma: More Frustration…, cit., pp. 936-937. 
58
 R. Mukherjee, D. M. Malone, Indian foreign policy and contemporary security challenges, in “International 
Affairs”,  
2011, Vol. 87, No. 1, p. 87-88. 
112 
 
country and cut the links with the neighbours, India entertained with the junta cordial and limited 
relations, without doing anything for improving them and lacking of any interest at this regard; 
the fact that Burma, following the coup of 1962, intensified its military and authoritarian 
characterization, represented on more reason not to have to deal with Rangoon. 
The eastern Indian border, dividing the world’s biggest democracy from the regime of the 
Tatmadaw, has for long time been neglected by Indian strategists, as the attention of the policy 
makers in Delhi was concentrated on the Western front, i.e. Pakistan. 
The indifference towards the East plus the high concern towards the Western affairs made Delhi 
satisfied of the relations-non-relations it was maintaining with Rangoon. 
However, the cruel repression of the 1988 demonstrations compelled India to rethink its Burma 
policy. In refocusing its posture towards Rangoon, India assumed hereafter an idealist stance: 
Indian commitment to the promotion of the Burmese democratization process appeared to be 
active and explicit, conducted as a humanist idealist policy in accordance to the Gandhian and 
Nehruvian principles at the basis of its own democratic republican identity. 
The idealist support to democracy, second moment of the pre-1993 phase, declined at the 
beginning of the 1990s, vis a vis the ongoing reshaping of the regional geopolitics following the 
end of the Cold War. The Indian leadership realized that the changed international arena 
presented new challenges to India, and consequently reshaped its interests as well as the 
strategies to be adopted in order to fulfil them.  
The new Indian set of interests can be summarized in three points: management of the ethnic 
insurgency of the Indian Northeast; opening Indian economy to ASEAN countries; countering 
the China threat. 
In terms of strategy this implied the search of a new contact with Burma regardless of its 
political “colour”, given that Burmese collaboration had been realized to be essential for the 
achievement of the aforesaid goals. Thus, the new concept lying beneath such a strategy was a 
rediscovery of Burma’s potential as a variable of geopolitical balance of the region. Delhi as a 
consequence started regarding the question of Burmese democratization process, previously a 
target to be pursued in accordance to universalist values, as an issue more and more restricted to 
Burmese internal affairs: Burmese democratization lost its “internationalist” connotation and 
stopped being the balance of Indo-Burmese relations. India consequently abandoned its previous 
“style” of conducting its foreign policy: the “Eastern” affairs, for long time neglected in favour 
of the “Western” ones, gained new relevance; and so did the overall economic component within 
the foreign policy. 
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Along with the changed international situation, which can be regarded as an “external” factor in 
the determination of India’s turnabout, internal factors also played a role. These internal factors, 
namely a change in the Indian leadership’s priorities and values in the conduction of foreign 
affairs.  
In Nehru’s epoch India’s foreign policy was balanced between regionalism and globalism, but 
after the change of leadership, globalism became relatively less important to the benefit of 
nationalism and regional interest. Indira Gandhi, was not able to assume the global role which 
had been belonged to his father; the last one to assume a distinctive international role was her 
son, Rajiv. The urgent domestic concern characteristic of the following governments necessarily 
influenced their interest towards international affairs, which resulted reduced. In addition to this, 
governments after 1989 were weak coalition governments, caring first of all about the stability of 
domestic politics rather than external affairs59. Another interesting point concerns the importance 
that, at the institutional level, foreign policy has within Indian institutions such as the Indian 
Parliament. It has been noted that although MPs possess great prerogatives in terms of foreign 
policy, however their main absorption remains focused on local interests related to their 
constituency of origin60. This made the Indian external intelligence organization (Research 
Analysis Wing (RAW)) come to the fore as a principal in the shaping of Indian foreign policy. 
 
IV.3.2. Realist nature of India’s regional support for democracy 
 
The realism underlying contemporary India’s Burma policy is no surprise if framed within the 
wider development of Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, with particular 
reference to the support to the democratic evolution of neighbouring countries. The wider 
promotion of democratic institution in the area practiced by Delhi, in other words, made of India 
an international advocate of democracy in South Asia, but hides under idealistic declarations 
concrete “realistic” interests61. The strategies used by Delhi to promote the regional stability, 
besides its pro-democracy rhetoric, show that it diversified its policy towards South Asian non-
democratic regimes depending on the occasion: with diverse neighbours India adopted a more 
categorical or flexible position in accordance to Indian national interests existing in that case and 
to what was considered the best way to pursue them. 
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According to Cartwright62 India’s engagement in the promotion of democracy after years of 
traditional neutralism came to the fore after the end of the Cold war, as a regional and 
international strategy aimed to secure India’s concern in the changing international scenario. A 
deeply “realist” support to democracy did not apply only to the Burmese case, but to a number of 
countries; out of them, the Burmese example is the one which more clearly proves such a realist 
posture in the regional and international promotion of national interests. 
In Cartwright’s analysis the international motivations determining Indian’s rhetoric in support of 
democracy are three: the creation of a stable relation with the U.S., still global hegemonic power, 
in the short term; the solidification of India’s role as middle power in the medium term; the 
promotion of India’s role as future world power, in the long term63. 
In terms of regional strategy instead, India has been moved by the necessity of finding a way to 
deal with the political transformation occurring in South Asia in neighbouring countries like 
Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Representing such an evolution both a 
challenge and an opportunity for India, Delhi aimed to secure stability during such a process; its 
manner of dealing with democratic promotion however was diversified based on the relevance of 
the interest that India held in the country in object and on the reciprocal sympathy existing 
between their set of interests.  
The author distinguishes three broad patterns; the first one is characterized by an identification 
between India’s democratic rhetoric and its real interests. When this pattern occurs India will 
actively promote democratization, fulfilling at the same time its official posture and its concrete 
intentions. An example is given by the interaction occurred between India and Afghanistan and 
Nepal64: India has intervened in the attempt to shape the political evolution of these countries in 
democratic sense, motivated by realistic interest, respectively in Pakistan and China. 
The second pattern occurs in the case in which India does not have urgent interest in the 
countries undergoing democratic transformation; as a consequence the support in favour of 
democracy will occur but in lower tones: are this the cases of Bhutan and the Maldives, who 
received support from India, but without a strict bound in pro-democratic sense65. 
The third pattern occurs in the case of a strong divergence between India’s pro-democracy 
rhetoric and its interest in the country considered. Burma represents the exemplification of such a 
pattern, which reveals the authentic realist “nature” of India’s support for democracy, given the 
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evident contrast between India’s courting of the junta and its democratic identity. Delhi has 
demonstrated to be consistent with its declarations in practical terms only when such a coherence 
turned useful to its national interest66; thus, the case of Burma, though apparently deviant when 
compared to the other examples of democratic promotion at regional level, is to be regarded not 
as an exception but as the “litmus test” of the realism underlying India’s pro-democracy stance in 
South Asia67. 
 
IV.3.3. The effectiveness of Indian realism 
 
India has abandoned the previous idealist policy in favour of a realist one. Fernandes, one of the 
strongest supporters of Burmese activists fled to India in the golden age of India’s crusade for 
Burmese democracy, has declared that India cannot do other thing than engaging the Burmese 
government, though it keeps giving help to its opponent in silent way. 
This recent realist Burma policy however appears to be hesitant and unclear, with Delhi almost 
“ashamed” to build close ties with the military junta. It could happen perhaps that India, trying to 
maintain a sort of engagement on the two sides, will finally result to be unable to win the full 
trust both of the junta and of the Burmese population, losing both of them in the end. Also in 
terms of international position, India’s hesitant posture is neither completely identifiable with the 
Western bloc nor with the ASEAN countries’ one. 
This introduces the problem of the effectiveness of India’s realist Burma policy.  
According to Egreteau’s analysis of Sino-Burmese cooperation, India has not reached the 
objectives for which it embarked in the new policy and, as an overall result, has obtained “more 
frustration than success”68. Assessing India’s Burma policy the author maintains that its 
performance is “mixed”: negative with respect to the border issue and the bilateral trade but 
positive for the strategic interest; anyways, if seen as a whole, the general output is 
disappointing. 
With respect to the first problem, i.e. the management of the insurgency in the Indian Northeast, 
a tangible cooperation between the two governments took place: following a number of meetings 
between the highest military authorities from both the sides, the Tatmadaw and the Indian Army 
started implementing a number of parallel attacks against rebel groups, especially Naga and 
NSCN-K. In 2002 India finally started selling arms: such a supply was supposed to be limited to 
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counterinsurgency necessity but then expanded to include a wide range of weapons69. In 2004 
General Than Shwe, while visiting Delhi, confirmed Burmese effort to collaborate with India in 
its fight to insurgency and later promoted a number of operations in Burma border territory 
relying on Indian equipment and intelligence70. 
Delhi, who had refused for long time to supply arms to the Tatmadaw, hoped such a move could 
serve to make the generals more sensitive to the Indian concern in the Northeast and also 
enhance their material ability to intervene on the matter71; however, the military collaboration 
with Burma, as predictable, caused great contestations from third countries, creating a first 
negative outcome accountable to the Indian realist policy. 
Even in practical term the military partnership has not produced the expected results. The only 
positive outcome was the disruption of some centres of narco-trafficking activity and arms 
smuggling in diverse areas of the region concerned. Vis a vis such a downsized achievement, 
Assamese, Naga and Manipuri groups are still active in the Burmese Hills and Rangoon seems to 
be unable or unwilling to offer a more effective cooperation.  
Beside the unreliability of the central government, it must be also considered that in this remote 
and poor region local authorities often choose to connive with criminals, gaining from bribes and 
smuggling a surplus income to improve their insufficient living standard. At the same time, India 
refrains from putting excessive pressure on Rangoon, fearing that, if irritated, the junta could 
make the border instability escalate. It could be even argued, at this regard, that Burma in 
consciously mismanaging the border partnership after having wisely used the issue in its 
negotiation with Delhi72. 
India got results which did not match its expectations also in the economic partnership. In terms 
of commerce, bilateral trade was stagnating or only slightly growing, never confirming the 
forecasts73. This was due to a number of obstacles existing in the field, which determined the 
ineffectiveness of the policies adopted and that, if not removed, will never allow a successful 
improvement of the trade relations between the two countries.  
The first obstacle to a satisfactory development of bilateral trade is the lack of proper road 
infrastructure to connect India with Burmese main trade corridor74. From the Burmese side there 
is neither financial capability nor political intention of opening to an Indian region shook by 
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instability, so that the Chinese connections have been preferred, like in the case of the Tamu-
Kalewa-Mandalay road, whose construction was never accomplished by Rangoon75. 
Another main de-motivator for those willing to start business in Burma is the instability of its 
banking system and of its economic system in general.  
In terms of marketing, moreover, Indian products are often overtaken by cheap goods proceeding 
from the PRC and Thailand, fact which has canalized the majority of Indian investment towards 
state-sponsored projects76. 
 
Table 1 - “India-Myanmar bilateral trade (US$ million)” 
 Source: Indian Ministry of External Affairs (www.mea.gov.in) 
  
Year India’s Export India’s Import Total Trade Balance 
2006-2007 139.95 781.93 921.19 (-) 641.98 
2007-2008 185.43 809.94 995.37 (-) 624.51 
2008-2009 221.64 928.97 1150.61 (-) 707.33 
2009-2010 207.97 1289.8 1497.77 (-) 1081.83 
2010-2011 194.75 876.13 1070.88 (-) 681.38 
2011-2012 217.65 763.32 814.6 (-) 545.67   
 
In terms of energy projects, India has succumbed to China. The greatest disappointment was 
represented by the failure of the negotiations for the exploitation of a gas field located in Arakan, 
being India interested not only in the massive acquisition of the extractions but also in the 
construction of a pipeline to pump the gas to India via Bangladesh. However, complications in 
the negotiations with the last one and the appeal of better conditions proposed to Naypidaw by 
Beijing made Burma drop off the offer of Delhi77.  
Strangely, it could be argued that India’s most successful aspect of its realistic Burma policy has 
been the collaboration in the strategic field; this third type of partnership aimed to “use” the new 
access to Myanmar in order to counter China, perceived as threateningly expanding its influence 
on the country and in the wider IOR. Such a conclusion is based on the fact that India obtained 
from the military cooperation with Burma a number of results, namely: the right to use Burmese 
ports as docking and refuelling points, implement joint naval operations and share intelligence 
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about Chinese military presence in the zone. On the other hand, it could be argued that at the 
basis of the reassurance which India sought to obtain through such a partnership, there was, 
rather than a successful containment of Chinese influence, the fact that the “Chinese threat” India 
thought to perceive was not as plausible as some military circles in Delhi, victim of a 
“encirclement complex”, maintained. 
In any case, being or not effective, it is likely that India will choose to continue in its realist 
Burma policy, at least in the short term, at least as long as the PRC, despite all the dilemmas 
which in turn affect Chinese relations with Rangoon, will somehow remain the junta’s closest 
ally. 
 
IV.3.4. Future perspectives of India’s Burma policy: realism or support to 
Burmese democratization? 
 
Based on the previous analysis, an overall evaluation of the perspectives of India’s pro- and anti-
democratic Burma policy will follow. Rather than a forecast, it will be an attempt to draw an 
evaluation of the plausibleness of the endurance of both the “idealist” pro-democracy policy and 
the “realist” pro-junta one: what are the obstacles for India in the prosecution of the already 
declined  support to the Burmese democratization process? What are the impediments for a 
reinforcement of the “realist” approach to the military government? 
A way to make the Indian support to Burmese democratization more effective could be first of 
all seeking a rapprochement between the Indian policy makers and the leadership of the 
democratic movement78.  
In this regard, some note that many Indian leaders perceive the Burmese democratic movement 
as highly influenced by the West, rather than to Asian countries, in terms of philosophy, interest 
and power. In addition to this, Indian NGOs and politicians involved in the activity of support to 
Burmese democratic cause have declared that the NLD rarely keeps a dialogue with them, and 
that their main Burmese interlocutors are not the leaders of the regular movement, but student 
groups exiled in India79. This lack of coordination is influential in the effectiveness of the 
support that still emanates from India: though many people are still supportive to the democratic 
movement (even though along the border the reception of the refugees is less and less welcomed 
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by Indian inhabitants) this sympathy was not transformed in a consistent backing to democratic 
campaign in Burma or India80. 
Though, as mentioned, the perseverance in this realistic posture is the option that India will most 
probably adopt at least in the short terms, pro-democracy supporters shall try to influence India’s 
policy demonstrating in which way the establishment of democracy in Rangoon can be useful to 
Indian interests, relying on the “hesitant” nature of Delhi’s approach to the generals and taking 
advantage of the partial failure of Indo-Burmese cooperation in terms of border management and 
trade partnerships81.  
Also with reference to the realist policy of  collaboration with the generals of the Tatmadaw, 
which is probably the direction which India will continue to follow, there are some 
vulnerabilities which prevent such a policy from being more aggressive and effective. 
The first one is the fact that India faces competition with the economic and political influence 
that China has affirmed and keeps on promoting in Myanmar. Though weakened by various 
complications, Chinese Burma policy is the main adversary for India in the effort of gaining trust 
and favour from the generals82. 
A second obstacle is represented by the low availability that the Burmese demonstrate towards 
foreigners willing to play a role in the politics and the economics of their country. This is 
particularly true in the case of Indians, victims of an “Indophobia” which dates back to the times 
of the British rule. Within Burma’s mainstream political culture, characterized by xenophobia 
and nationalism, people generally maintain an adverse consideration of Indians83. 
The geography of the area linking the two states represents another hardship, as its perpetuates 
the problem of the managing of the insurgency along the border and, due to its infrastructural 
deficiencies, contributes also to restrict the full development of bilateral trade relations. 
These are the main challenges that India still has to face in order to obtain more tangible results 
in Myanmar. To conclude, it could be advisable that, if willing to pursue a more aggressive and 
effectual promotion of Indian interest, Delhi shall solve the divisions existing within India itself 
with regard to the acceptability of a closer relation with the Burmese authoritarianism84. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The case of the Sino-Indian interaction with Burmese politics challenged the appearances and 
showed that, in reality, “it is not as it seems”: neither Sino-Burmese relations were as idyllic as 
the communal authoritarian nature of the states suggested, nor India was the incorruptible 
advocate of Burmese democracy as one could suppose at first glance. 
Thus, the first conclusion that can be deduced by the previous analyses is that both Chinese and 
Indian relation with the Burmese authoritarianism has been not constant but changing during the 
time. In the case of China the trend has been fluctuating, with a continuous oscillation between 
reciprocal compliance and mutual criticism. 
The second evidence is given by the fact that the reciprocal convergence between Beijing and 
Rangoon was due, for both the parties, to merely realist reasons: aspirations induced by Chinese 
hegemonic goals, on one hand, and state of necessity caused by Burmese isolation, on the other. 
Mismatches were due, on the Burmese side, by the resistance to the Chinese embrace practiced 
by the junta –in this instance faithful heir of the neutralist and isolationist position of the former 
civilian government. On the Chinese side in turn, both Burmese reluctance to surrender and 
upheavals in domestic and international politics of the PRC were causes of recurrent 
disturbances. 
On the Indo-Burmese front, instead, the changing trend of the bilateral relations between the 
world’s biggest democracy and the Tatmadaw appeared to be, rather than fluctuant, parabolic: a 
constant pro-democratic trend, increasing in correspondence of 1988, followed by a sudden 
turnabout, and a consequent growth in the opposite direction. 
Also in this case, the divergence/convergence between Delhi and Rangoon was motivated by 
realist interests; in particular, Rangoon was not reluctant to receive Indian “advances” as they 
could have been useful via-à-vis its enduring economic and political isolation. With regard to 
India, the centrality of realist interests in the shaping of an Indian Burma policy is evident if we 
consider that, as long as urgent interests were not identified, India ignored Burmese relevance 
and did not shape any proper strategy with respect to Rangoon. The first long pro-democratic 
phase was the product of such a “negligence”. As India woke up and realist interests came to the 
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fore, Delhi realistically sacrificed its democratic idealism to fulfil them; or, better said, to try to 
fulfil them.  
At this regard the third remark is that, despite their underlying realism, both the Burma policies 
failed in their expectations due to Rangoon’s uncertain and unclear moves. Burma never trusted 
and always feared China, and struggled not to make its neutralism excessively “leaning” towards 
Beijing. At the same time, it mistrusted India, suspicious because of colonial legacies and 
hesitant due to the worries that it could disappoint or provoke the PRC. Burma, despite the 
“absurdity” which often characterized its conduction of domestic and external politics, by 
practicing an ambiguous and indolent foreign policy finally outwitted both the giants. 
This does not mean that the pro-democracy or pro-generals support acted by Delhi and/or 
Rangoon was completely ineffective.  
Should one wonder whether China’s help to the Tatmadaw affected Burmese democratization, 
the answer would be that it undoubtedly had a chief role in allowing the regime to survive to its 
hardest hours; Chinese support to the anti-democratic government, in other words, was 
fundamental for its perpetuation and enforcement, especially from a military point of view. As a 
consequence, it should be also considered that Chinese action, empowering the reactionary rule, 
equally represented an obstacle for the democratic one struggling for emancipation. In sum, it 
must be concluded that from a Burmese point of view, Beijing worked against the Burmese 
democratization process by backing the junta with political and material support, though this 
support did not produce, from a Chinese perspective, the full identification Tatmadaw-CCP that 
the PRC was seeking to obtain. Burma did not become a client-state of China during the Cold 
War and continuously counterbalanced Chinese influence in terms of both foreign policy and 
foreign economic/military aid till recent days, never letting Beijing become determinant in the 
policy-making process taking place in Rangoon and later in Naypidaw. 
To India, on the other hand, it must be recognized that the “idealist” policy it initially adopted 
provided the Burmese front for democracy with precious help in terms of funding, management 
of emergencies following clashes with the Tatmadaw and, more importantly, political support: 
repeated accusations and calls for democracy from Delhi contributed to the international 
awareness with regard to the Burmese problem, giving public resonance to the “Fighting 
Peacock” and making the generals’ regime a pariah state. 
Delhi support to Burmese democratization has not been decisive as long as the movement 
remained a minority force, but undoubtedly represented an important source of aid and political 
ally for it, as proved by Aung San Suu Kyi’s complaints following India’s realist U-turn. 
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Similarly, India’s new policy of wooing the generals was highly useful to the regime; of course it 
was not decisive in the survival of the junta –as India’s approach was somewhat silent and 
hesitant– but the government made wise use of it: to diversify the sources of economic aid and 
arms supply against an overwhelming Chinese influence and, together with the ASEAN 
accessibility, to open a door to regional and international rehabilitation from that status of pariah 
that India itself contributed to build earlier. 
These are the lessons learned in terms of positive/negative influence of China and India on 
Burmese democratization process: the Peacock is still fighting, while the Elephant and the 
Dragon have been somewhat outsmarted by the junta. The junta –despite being an obtuse and 
retrograde ruler and an unpredictable international actor– seemed to have been able to play the 
best cards: in term of domestic politics it successfully resisted the legitimate power transfer in 
favour of the NLD, while in terms of external politics it made the two giants court it, obtaining 
and promising a lot but finally giving little. 
These consequences on the development of democracy/enforcement of military rule, however, 
have a feedback on the same actors who caused them. This is due to the fact that the perpetuation 
of the Burmese junta in power has got both a domestic and an external relevance; in terms of 
internal affairs it means that, obviously, the Burmese people continue to face an incompetent and 
repressive regime, cause of economic stagnation and human rights violations. In addition to this, 
in terms of external affairs, the continuation of the military rule implies that Myanmar remains a 
backward nation and that states who are interested in it have no other choice than dealing with a 
partner –the junta– who is inefficient and irresponsible. Although Chinese and Indian realism is 
indifferent to the first type of consequences (the domestic relevance of democracy, the promotion 
of democracy tout-court), however they do are concerned about the second one, which directly 
touches the national interests that they have in Myanmar. As a consequence, also the domestic 
issue becomes relevant, as it is the direct cause of the second: dealing with a non democratic 
Burma means making business with an unstable underdeveloped economy controlled by an 
unreliable government. Also realist self-interested stake-holders like China and India had to 
recognize that in Burma the political and economical development are closely linked to each 
other and that, though not relevant per se, democracy can indirectly become a goal for a more 
effective fulfilment of national interests. 
This could probably influence the resetting of the Chinese and Indian interests in Myanmar and, 
consequently, the Burma policy of the two countries. 
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It is not possible to say that in the short term the favourable approach Beijing and Delhi had 
towards Naypidaw will drastically change in anti-junta and pro-democracy sense. This is a less 
plausible hypothesis due to the ongoing strategic competition which is taking place in the greater 
Asia-Pacific between the two. Myanmar is a central battleground for India and China, with 
Beijing trying to gain momentum in the IOR and Delhi counterbalancing such an expansion. 
Both the contenders feel they cannot lower the guard, risking the other will checkmate and win 
the Burmese game. 
However, the urgency of Indian and Chinese interests in Myanmar vis-à-vis the overall failure of 
their partnerships with the Burmese junta suggest that probably both the Elephant and the 
Dragon will start looking at the Peacock’s fight with different eyes very soon. 
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